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# An Italian Aristocracy in Arms: The Duke of Parma Goes to War 1635–1637

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**Abstract**
When the Duke of Parma, Odoardo Farnese, summoned his noble subjects to join his army with a view to joining the French alliance against Spain in 1635, he was gratified by a turnout of astonishingly high proportions. Not nearly enough of them had personal experience of modern war, and so the prince appointed military nobles from much of northern Italy to fill the cadres, alongside the French officers whose contingents on loan from Louis XIII made up a third of the infantry. Unlike Spanish nobles, Odoardo's subjects were even willing to serve in the ranks, while waiting for their advancement. The two brief campaigns turned out to be a disaster for Odoardo and his subjects. War quickly receded from Parma's horizon, but the experience reveals that Italy's aristocrats had not yet consigned their weapons to display cases.

**Keywords**
1630s, Duke of Parma, Italy, military aristocracy, Thirty Years' War

In a previous investigation of the place of Italian aristocrats in European armies I explored for the first time some important characteristics of these participants and proposed a rough chronology of their commitment to the conflicts of their age. On the basis of second-hand sources dating from the Fascist era, buttressed by primary sources in the form of complete lists of Italian knights of Malta and Santo Stefano, it was possible to propose tentative conclusions on the makeup of this warrior class. The great majority were urban nobles whose families were prominent in local government across central and northern Italy. The vast majority hailed from former medieval communes and the greater part of those resided in the dozen or so 'capital' cities with a court or autonomous collegial government. Among these, however, the great feudal families serving at the ducal or vice-regal courts contributed a disproportionate share. A statistical device that slotted

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service of each of the over 4000 individuals in the sample into a decade of service, enabled me to show that the period of peak participation was during the Thirty Years' War, and most intensively during the 1640s.[1] That study was a *pré-enquête*, a rapid overview of an important problem long neglected or misunderstood in Italian history. Apart from a single close study of the city and district of Siena, which reflected the model described above, a fuller picture has still to be realized.[2]

The ambitions of specific princes were of primordial importance in this period when power was personalized to such a high degree. Odoardo Farnese, fifth Duke of Parma and Piacenza (born 1612, reigned 1622–1646), lusted after military glory from his earliest years, and hoped the great wars of his age would not stop until he had a chance to take part. He had more than his fair share of self-esteem, and burned with the desire to live up to his eminent ancestors, and we know too that his court poet kept up a correspondence on the subject of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, his contemporary.[3] The Duke's chief minister, Fabio Scotti, convinced him that Spain's star was on the decline, and that he should abandon the dynasty's traditional pro-Spanish stance and throw his lot in with France. Cardinal Richelieu was trying to create a great anti-Habsburg league of Italian states in the early 1630s, and Duke Odoardo was the only truly willing participant. Indeed, he badgered the cardinal to open the great conflict with Spain in Italy at the earliest opportunity.[4] Contemporaries were indeed struck by the vehemence of his resentment towards Spain and his readiness to throw off his dynasty's traditional alliance. 'The orphan duke grew up with very ambitious notions, steeped in the opinion that the alliance of his ancestors with Spain was mere servitude, and that the sovereignty of Italian princes was subjection: he aspired with his whole heart to the most absolute liberty and the expansion of his states to greater glory'.[5] Our young and inexperienced Duke conveniently fits Steven Pinker's characterization of the 'tin-pot tyrant' eager to launch a war of conquest for his personal gratification. His 'narcissistic personality disorder', defined in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* as 'a pervasive pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration and a lack of empathy', includes a disregard for the rights of others, black and white thinking, grandiosity and a need for admiration.[6] We could add to the list his bouts of righteous rage against whoever frustrated his ambitions, attested by French and Savoyard soldiers and diplomats, who considered him a prickly windbag. Pope Urban VIII later called him an excitable nitwit (*cervellino troppo vivo*). The accounts of Italian historians writing while he was still alive, and a very detailed and lengthy panegyric by one of his courtiers, make abundantly clear that he suffered from delusions of fantasies of unlimited success that underpinned his overconfidence in war.[7]

Yet, for all his character flaws, Odoardo's war mobilized the duchy's aristocracy like no other cause. Inducing the region's social elites to serve them voluntarily had been one of the principal thrusts of Farnese policy since the dynasty's establishment in northern Italy in 1545. The dukes expected feudatories to surround the throne, like rays of the sun, to better reflect its splendour.[8] After the assassination of the first Duke, Pier Luigi Farnese, in 1547, his son and successor Ottavio

(ruled 1547–1587) waged a slow contest of attrition against hostile powers inside the state, dismantling the largest feudal statelets to his benefit and executing plotters whenever they gave him a valid pretext.[9] The so-called plot against Ranuccio I unearthed in 1611 was the work of a socially homogeneous group of inter-related feudatory families without much social grounding in the city elite. The *Gran Giustizia* of 1612 ended all possibility of a successful coup by disgruntled and un-cooperative aristocrats against the Farnese and served as a watershed episode in relations between the prince, the feudatories and the urban patriciate. The extinction of a dozen plotters and the confiscation of their estates reinforced the power of the Farnese dynasty considerably.[10] Cardinal Odoardo, the Duke's paternal uncle and regent from 1622 to 1626, kept the nobles in hand with the creation of prestigious court functions, like the companies of ceremonial guards created for this purpose. These charges provided the members of titled houses with stipends, continuous presence at court and visibility on ceremonial occasions. The Farnese dynasty would not allow these privileged aristocrats to reside outside the state without permission. The dukes expected this service nobility to assemble around them whenever they required it, and entrusted them to carry out diplomatic assignments whose expenditures on representation were not always reimbursed. The personalization of the prince's power at the court *required* a continuous and conspicuous presence of the most senior nobility if they were not to be upstaged by prestigious outsiders, typical of the court of Savoy, or else displaced by ambitious newcomers from city elites or gifted commoners of humble background.[11] The power of the prince was also reflected in the lavish lifestyle at the court, which the nobles were forced to imitate at their own expense if they were not on the payroll.[12]

Many of these same families had been making war for generations, following what Brian Sandberg has described as 'warrior pursuits', whose benefits in terms of prestige and political power outweighed the risks of death and mutilation.[13] 'The direct association of traditional noble status with military service was deeply entrenched in the cultural assumptions of European elites', writes David Parrott.[14] When local war was not available, a prestigious distant war would do. Italian aristocrats were therefore numerous among the colonels and captains serving Catholic armies in the Low Countries, Germany, Hungary and the Mediterranean. Parma was not directly a belligerent in these wars, and so those who sought positions befitting their status in Habsburg service would have competed with aristocrats from most of Catholic Europe. They would not have opposed in principle a war closer to home in which they would reap fresh rewards.

Robert Wright describes the ways in which war serves to force people into cooperation, and notes how this has a very long history. War appears in Wright's telling as a zero-sum game (where one side wins, and the other loses proportionally) that generates non-zero-sum games of mutual co-operation for greater benefit. Conflict with an outside group pushes people who regularly interact with each other more tightly together into organic solidarity, for they patch up their differences and focus their energies on the common cause. Being tightly knit

and having a clear leader were two clear advantages in wartime, not specific to any time and place. So, if war creates zones of zero-sum contention between the two belligerents, it has a paradoxically congealing effect at lower levels, uniting people whose fates are entwined in the service of the cause. As Wright puts it: 'That, actually, is a good rough-and-ready index of non-zero-sumness: the extent to which fates are shared. War, by making fates more shared, by manufacturing nonzero-sumness, accelerates the evolution of culture toward deeper and vaster social complexity.'[15] Indeed, the unifying effect of war within each camp, Wright considers to be a 'general law of history'. This theory is a good guide to illuminate the dynamics at play in Parma's mobilization during the Thirty Years War, for which we have an exceptional wealth of documentation.

Baroque princes might browbeat their nobility into subjection, but it was the exception and not the rule. The research of the last generation has demonstrated that rulers could not easily direct unwilling societies to obey them. This was true even in absolutist France under the firm hand of Louis XIV.[16] It was more to the Prince's advantage if he could come to some understanding with his most powerful subjects, where in exchange for obedience and loyal service, they could obtain preferment and special treatment in the way of material recompense and political influence.[17] The King of Spain made this policy of '*mercedes*' (rewards) the pillar of social and political stability in all of his Italian domains.[18] Duke Odoardo's sovereign, Pope Urban VIII Barberini, encouraged urban elites to take an active role in episodic pontifical expeditionary forces.[19] Almost all of the Italian princes followed similar principles, and the Farnese duchy was no exception. If nobles in Piacenza before and during the Farnese era constituted about 5 per cent of the total population, they were anything but homogenous. The oldest and richest dynasties constituted about a quarter of the 176 noble families in the 1540s, but a civic nobility comprised of judicial and mercantile urban elites made up the remainder.[20] The oldest nobility clearly enjoyed preferential treatment when it came to the most lucrative charges at the court. But the Farnese wished to promote the city elites too, something Duke Ranuccio I did systematically between 1596 and 1620, by creating 29 cavalieri (whose nobility extinguished when they died), 15 hereditary nobles of Parma and six hereditary nobles (or *patrizi*) in Piacenza.[21] Once they were officially recognized, these '*patrizi*' could hope to climb into the ranks of the feudatories, although they could not expect to hold more than one fief. What was once referred to disparagingly as a process of retrograde 'refeudalization' was in fact just the Italian version of the domestication of the nobility, unfolding simultaneously in France and other monarchies.[22] Social elites let themselves be domesticated with these new offices and functions because by the 1620s the economic conjuncture had soured considerably, reducing both revenues and the value of the assets behind them. In Piacenza, families with mercantile assets shifted these towards the ownership of land in the early decades of the seventeenth century. The brutal famine of 1629 and the catastrophic plague of 1630 which killed perhaps as much as a third of the population accelerated this transfer, for peasants needed to sell their holdings to survive. Hard times changed the make-up of the social elites

all over Italy and reduced their margin of manoeuvre with respect to the ruling dynasties.[23]

Young Duke Odoardo paused this process of diluting the traditional nobility with an influx of new families, although no source I have seen alludes to this as an articulate policy shoring up the prestige of the older houses. Odoardo in his entire reign issued only one patent of *famigliarità* and no knighthoods. Only two or three newcomers – the Duke's lowborn political advisors – joined the select feudatories during his reign. If Odoardo did not rush to ennoble new families (the term *nobiltà* was not used before 1660), he might have been expecting to see first some sign of their adhesion to his cause. But noble status was only one of the special favours the Duke could bestow on deserving supplicants. The ducal *patenti* or letters patent cover a great number of situations where the Duke authorized something in his prerogative they wished for. The Duke could award someone a pension, he could confirm their hold over a fief, or he could appoint a judicial official there who was the feudatory's client. He could grant nobles permission to carry weapons, to hunt on reserved areas, and he could legitimize their bastards. The Duke could authorize nobles to sell their harvests outside the state for a higher price, which the statutes normally prohibited. He could appoint these noblemen and their wives to the court in some capacity, or guarantee their daughter entry into a prestigious convent. For families not yet noble, the Duke could admit them to citizen status that taxed them on the (lower) city rate, and exempted them from feudal judges by committing their lawsuits and their criminal actions to city magistrates. Most people of property managed lawsuits and juggled mortgages and debts. The Duke could intervene at any moment to protect someone from their creditors by arranging some compromise. There are patents for all of these situations in the records.[24] This does not take into account the thousands of petitions that the Duke and his functionaries received from subjects of every status requesting a vast array of exemptions and derogations of the law in their favour.[25] The Duke had a complete monopoly on pardon over all the laymen in his territories, and could award it to his feudatories and their clients, just as he could withhold it at his pleasure.

Successful prosecution of a war required bringing the aristocracy, and especially the feudal aristocracy onside. For centuries the principal feudatories had led contingents of mercenary soldiers in the service of the dukes of Milan and of Parma.[26] The rationale for choosing noble officers is clearly expressed in the project of Cardinal Odoardo to raise contingents to operate in the field with Spanish forces in 1625. A report to the cardinal in April 1625 listed the potential officers who might be appointed, and why they would be appropriate and willing to serve. The report began with the names of captains living outside the duchy with military experience and the money and connections enabling them to raise and outfit a company of soldiers for Farnese service. Orazio Scotti followed with a list of likely candidates living in Piacenza and Parma who had military experience under their belts, and enough money in the family to put men in the field. A number of these were serving the House of Austria in Flanders and in Germany, like the brothers Francesco and Marcello Marazzani, but Scotti hoped that they

would drop everything and transfer to the Duke's service. Some good prospects were unwilling to accept the command of infantry detachments, and so he short-listed them for a commission in a cavalry squadron instead. Some of them could not come home because there were outstanding warrants for their arrest from ducal tribunals, or else they were on hostile terms with other feudatories. In both cases Scotti urged the cardinal regent to use his power to iron out these impediments. He also considered offering commissions to people without experience of war, if they enjoyed good social standing and adequate financing.[27]

Duke Odoardo ramped up the duchy's military potential anew in the early 1630s, this time to assist France as part of a great alliance, alongside Savoy and Mantua, with the expectation that Modena and Venice would join in too for a share of spoils. Aristocrats had excellent private reasons for wishing to please the Duke, and serving him in high-profile military capacities confirmed their social and political leadership. Ongoing war is a negative-sum game, costly to everybody. But *this* war was going to be easy, and Odoardo was going to be acclaimed as a liberator by grateful Italians. Did the nobles respond to his call for support? Examining the rosters of ducal subjects in the invasion army of 1635 and in the reconstituted army of the following year, the answer is a resounding yes.[28] We find 263 names of *native* noblemen in the army lists and other chronicles recounting the war, but this is still incomplete.[29] We lack the names of the Parman noblemen admitted to the honour guard of the Cornetta Bianca (probably a couple of dozen individuals), or details on the garrison of Piacenza or its citadel, nor do we know the commanders of the city gates of Parma. We do not have the names of most of the commanders of militia companies, or the castellans of most of the castles and walled towns considered to be strategic enough to garrison. There are in addition families whose noble status was ambiguous in 1635 or whose nobility has escaped our notice. So a more realistic number of noble vassals in the active military service of Duke Odoardo would be about 300 or perhaps even more, out of an entire noble population of three or four thousand individuals of both sexes, young and old, lay and ecclesiastic. Despite the long internal peace, Italy's aristocrats had for generations offered their services in foreign wars, and they still defined their status in military terms. In the period of the Thirty Years' War, the pool of willing participants was still very large, and fully validates the intuition expressed in my 1998 book.[30]

Bearing out the pattern reflected in the Fascist era historical dictionaries, the great feudatory dynasties with stout rural castles and a long military pedigree contributed more than most, especially in Piacenza. Eight high-profile dynasties contributed 62 individuals, and 42 of them came from the leading four, the Scotti, Anguissola, Pallavicino and Arcelli. These were the same families which for generations had provided officers and soldiers to foreign states like Savoy. Piacenza, with 166 of 260 identified noble origins, was clearly the city more focused on military matters, while Parma figured only 91 times. It is possible that I have erred by including among the nobles some commoners who shared some patronyms which were widespread in the region, like Bianchi or Ferrari. But alongside

families whose names figured in the rosters of senior municipal magistrates or persons admitted to the court, there were other families not included in my tally whose nobility everyone considered 'tacit'. Many of these additional names are the patronyms of the brides or mothers of the noblemen figuring in the company books. The participation of social elites in Odoardo's army included scores of families just under the threshold of official noble status, many of which would obtain that rank in the reign of Ranuccio II. On the face of its enlistment alone, the involvement of the dynasty's elite is quite astonishing. The Count-Duke Olivarès, the King of Spain's chief minister, would have been envious of Odoardo's fortune in this regard, for such keenness to serve was increasingly rare in Spain.[31]

Not all the noblemen were serving at ranks that reflected their status, for there were not enough officers' positions to satisfy everyone with a fine pedigree. The Duke restricted admission to his honour guard of the Cornetta Bianca to the leading families of each major city, and included the major court officials or their close relatives able to participate on campaign. Other nobles of various status he designated captains of companies, or else as ensigns or lieutenants, but Odoardo was careful to confide some of these charges to people with experience. There were two additional guard companies, one of horse and another of foot that were packed with noblemen who served alongside experienced soldiers of various extraction. By concentrating these people in units kept close by his person and under his personal command, the Prince accorded a fair degree of visibility to his leading subjects. But even this was not sufficient, and some aristocrats were willing to serve at any cost. At least 116 noblemen, probably without any military experience to draw upon, served as rank and file in other units over the two campaigns, and four more served as non-commissioned officers. About 60 per cent of those (66 of 116) served in the cavalry, or started out as infantrymen and then graduated soon after to become cavalry troopers. Two Piacenza families of considerable prominence, the Mancassola and the Nicelli, provided four men each, none of whom held a commission or even a berth in a guards company. Teodoro Nicelli signed on as a simple cavalry trooper at age 50. Teodoro Landi, scion of one of northern Italy's principal dynasties, signed up as a cavalry trooper too, but the smooth-faced youth of 17 was soon sent home.

All of these men were subject to considerable peer pressure to perform well. Noblemen would have gone out of their way to stand out from the common soldiery, already evident by their keenness to serve in the cavalry. In the era before uniforms and standardized weapons, they brought their own finery, armour and arms, and perhaps their own horse too, kept in the baggage train at their own expense. In the army, there was a great deal of pressure for the officers and nobles of every rank to maintain an ostentatious lifestyle in order to gain and keep the respect of their peers and underlings, and to remind their superiors of their eligibility for higher office, beginning with the Duke himself, who pined after appointment to command a French army.[32] So far, Wright's characterization of war as an activity which fosters vertical social integration holds good. One might think that

these spontaneous careers were part of social posturing, but noblemen in the service could hardly shun the rigours of campaigning. Of the more than two hundred gentlemen in our rosters only five deserted, 10 were killed or died on campaign, and two more were executed or were condemned to death for flinching in the face of danger. The same social pressures pushing nobles to join the colours worked powerfully to keep them in line.

Noble birth in itself did not suffice to acquire an officer's commission from the Duke, who seems to have retained complete control over the process.[33] I have found 109 commissions or *patenti* issued by Odoardo from 1629 tol 1636, involving 96 different individuals, from elite cavalry to militia infantry captains, to commissioners who oversaw troop lodgings in rural communities.[34] These do not comprise the totality of officers' commissions handed out, and it is interesting that there were no lieutenants, or ensigns among them (or commissions for *cornetta*, the cavalry equivalent to the most junior officer). This implies that the colonels, sergeant-majors, captains or adjutants retained some leeway to designate the junior officers serving with them. The absence of commissions awarded to French officers is also conspicuous, which leads me to suspect that French colonels and captains received their commissions from Louis XIII, and that the Duke of Parma merely paid for the maintenance of their companies.[35]

The *patenti* identified the positions that were vacant and then often stated the reasons why the Duke granted the offices to the persons named. One might immediately think that Odoardo would reward his principal courtiers for loyal service. Cremona Visdomini, a capable mathematician of Piacenza and Odoardo's personal tutor as a child, obtained a company of horse and command of a castle. Orazio Pallavicino, created captain, taught the young prince how to ride and wield a sword.[36] But only about 10 per cent of the commissions specifically mention faithful service at court or the beneficiary's status there, like page, *cameriere*, or ambassador. We might include among the courtiers a few guards from the company of *arcieri*, about half of whom provided claims of military experience, but they were definitely not aristocrats. The commissions assigned responsibilities to them that were not all glorious. The Duke entrusted five or six beneficiaries with the spiny task of sorting out the conditions of lodging and foraging for infantry and cavalry while they waited for the campaign to begin. On others he bestowed the guarding of city gates, in command of a handful of paid soldiers and a larger number of militiamen. This was a sensitive and richly remunerated function reserved for noblemen, for it entailed collecting fees and other taxes at the city gates from merchants and landowners, including ecclesiastics, who customarily claimed exemptions.[37] Still other beneficiaries, often noblemen, he placed at the head of village militia companies or entrusted with coordinating large militia contingents that patrolled the border areas to prevent enemy looting raids.

A good pedigree gave young nobles some advantage in obtaining plum posts in Odoardo's new army, but there was a premium for expertise too. Twenty-seven of the beneficiaries of these commissions cited military experience, extending as far back as the 1580s in the case of Galvano Anguissola, who followed the great Duke

Alessandro to Flanders. About a third of them noted service in Flanders and Germany since 1620. An equivalent number mentioned service in the wars against Piedmont since 1615, and a number of appointees fought in the campaign of 1625 in the Parman contingent under Don Francesco Farnese. All four of Odoardo's regimental commanders, who were foreigners, could boast considerable experience commanding men in action. The irony was that the great majority of the experienced officers forming the cadres of Odoardo's army, like those of other Italian armies, had done so in the defence of the Habsburg Catholic cause. Eighteen of these commissioned officers (at least) were not natural subjects of the Duke, but hailed instead from all over northern and central Italy and Corsica too, and one of them, Giovan Battista Cislago from Alessandria, came from territory subject to the king of Spain. Some could boast of injuries acquired on campaign, at the bitter siege of Vercelli in 1617 (Francesco Serafini) or at Verrua (Scipione Colla) in 1625. Ricciardo Avogadri was a Brescian cavalry officer serving in the German regiment of Ottavio Piccolomini at the fateful battle of Lutzen in 1632, whose repeated cavalry charges against superior numbers prevented a Swedish victory. The wounds officers received during these exploits constituted a kind of diploma attesting to their hands-on experience of war.

The standard practice for raising an army entailed designating the senior officers first. In Spain and Naples, the king first appointed a colonel or *maestro de campo*, and a given number of captains, each with recruiting powers.[38] Their relatives, friends and clients enlisted themselves and helped raise soldiers from their estates, although to date there is scant data on the precise location of the recruiting.[39] In Piacenza and Parma, the four infantry colonels each had overall responsibility for about eight or 10 companies. They oversaw the behaviour of the officers below them, and applied general discipline through specialized judicial officers acting in their name. The colonels also served as Odoardo's general staff and advised him on plans for the campaign and the best means of its execution. Regiments also employed a sergeant major, who oversaw drill and sometimes mustered and manoeuvred the entire regiment in the field. The tactical preparation of the rank and file, and their ability to fight in formation, was his particular responsibility.[40] Odoardo's invasion army of September 1635 included a colonel of cavalry, Marino Badoero from Venice, and two colonels of Italian infantry, Fausto Melari, a Sienese nobleman residing in Piacenza who had served at the great siege of Breda under Ambrogio Spinola in 1625, and Francesco Serafini from Lucca. Serafini was not noble at all. One author claimed he was a barber's son from Lucca who joined the Spanish army in Sardinia, before it was posted to Lombardy. His career progressed quickly after he was hired by Don Francesco Farnese in 1625. After various adventures he passed from sergeant-major to become colonel and commander of the Piacenza citadel in 1634, easily the most important position in the duchy.[41] He married a Malaspina heiress and simultaneously joined the feudatories. Alongside the Italians were two French colonels dispatched by cardinal Richelieu from their native Dauphiné, Jean de la Roquette and Claude Vernatel. Each of these also employed a sergeant major

for field operations. Johann Werner Moralt, the captain of the large Swiss company of 300 men functioned as a colonel, and he employed a sergeant major too.[42] There were few occasions, however, when colonels and sergeant majors commanded an entire regiment in the field, because most operations required only a handful of companies.

The duchy's native nobility served more frequently at the rank of captain or lower, whatever their social status. In October 1631, Odoardo came to Piacenza to raise soldiers on the news that the French might invade Italy. He awarded five recruiting patents to notables resident in Parma and Piacenza, establishing large infantry companies of 200 men on the Spanish model.[43] In the Spanish system practiced in Italy, whenever a recruiting contract was issued, the prince allotted a sum of money to the captain to offset the expense of gathering and outfitting the men, along with a signing bonus of one pay, minus something for the cost of the clothes and the arms. Ducal officials sought the services of noblemen who had the cash reserves to hire troops, and the connections outside the Farnese states. Ferrante Paveri of Piacenza obtained a fief and a title, in exchange for raising a company of 200 infantry at his personal expense. Odoardo issued seven new recruiting contracts in April 1633. A summary of the contract tucked inside the cover of one of the company rosters specified that the captain promised to raise 200 men for the sum of 800 ducatoni (7,200 lire in 1633).[44] The captain could unfurl the banner of the unit once he presented 50 men in Piacenza, and his pay would commence from that moment. Captains arranged for their own lodgings and the lodging of their men too, for which they would keep accounts. An important proviso stipulated that the captain could not recruit anyone who lived in Piacenza or Parma. Such was the attraction of the Duke's impending war that one Piacentine noble, Ferrante Portapuglia, offered to raise a company of troops entirely at his own expense, if he might be allowed to command it. Just before the war, Odoardo ordered all his subjects, feudatories and even outlaws to report back to the duchy in order to make themselves available for mobilization, on pain of confiscation of their property.[45] All but a few native aristocrats responded to his call, although these last were significant exceptions. The count of San Secondo, Troilo Rossi, risked all his estates, valued at 10 million lire, and jurisdiction over about 7,500 vassals, by remaining faithful to Spanish service.[46] Baron Francesco Marazzani, a colonel under Wallenstein was conspicuous by his absence in Odoardo's order of battle, and the Prince placed him under surveillance in Piacenza. Before the war was over the Duchess imprisoned him in the palace dungeon (the Rocchetta) in Parma for passing intelligence to the enemy, and he was not released until after Odoardo's death a decade later.[47] We have emphasized the importance of inducements encouraging the nobility to serve the Duke willingly, but Odoardo like his father laid great store by the sinister Rocchetta prison and the stern Swiss guards who watched over its highborn inmates. Nobles were occasionally the subject of clamorous arrests in order to set an example to the others. Ranuccio II's first act as Duke of Parma in 1646 was to release eight imprisoned nobles, but we know that this was not the total number confined there.[48]

Native nobles, however much they were encouraged, incentivized or threatened by the Prince, were not sufficient for Odoardo's projects. Seventeenth-century armies were composite constructions, defined by John Lynn as an 'aggregate contract army', made up of different contingents, each with a different understanding with the warlord who hired them.[49] In addition to awarding recruiting contracts to local captains, the prince could also pay an entrepreneur who would receive money in exchange for delivering a certain number of men to a designated place. This last in the Spanish service was called an *asientista*, a specialized contractor in soldiers who knew where he could locate men immediately. In Germany the Holy Roman Emperor and his Protestant adversaries employed these 'military enterprisers' on a large scale.[50] One could not expect much loyalty from foreign noblemen, but Odoardo like his contemporaries turned to them as he expanded his army in preparation for the long-hoped-for war. He never contracted for an entire regiment, but he did have recourse to these contractors for individual companies. The largest of these was the company of Swiss raised in the Catholic canton of Lucerne by Johan Werner Moralt. It was not to be incorporated into any other regimental structure and Odoardo promised to observe all the privileges and exemptions customary for Swiss troops in the service of other nations. Several cavalry companies recruited from the Venetian Terraferma just before the onset of the first campaign also appear to fall into this category.[51] Such mercenary forces found employment almost everywhere in the seventeenth century, for their discipline and efficiency were long proven.[52]

Very few French officers appear among the *patenti*, which leads me to expect that these men were issued their commissions and their recruiting money in France. While they commanded units and entire detachments of the ducal army on campaign or in garrison, comprising a third of the infantry at the outset of the campaign and more than half by the end, they were not really the Duke's men at all. More ominously, they might have been something of a fifth column in the state, looking to take control of the citadel of Piacenza or of the fortress of Sabbioneta if they could. That would reduce Odoardo to a puppet of French policy, as Richelieu had done to Duke Charles of Mantua by defending Casale Monferrato.[53] The French do not fit the urban aristocratic pattern discernible among the Italians, and not all of them were even Catholic. The preponderance of soldiers and officers from southeast France hints that they were firmly in the shadow of the French theatre commander, the marshal Créquy, who inherited from his late father-in-law the marshal Lesdiguières an immense capital of military resources.[54]

In the months and weeks leading up to the onset of the first campaign in September 1635, Odoardo restructured this army in two important ways. By the 1630s, the European trend was to reduce the size of the companies from 200 men to only 100 and to consider 'full' companies of even smaller size.[55] Odoardo, perhaps following French suggestions, added 17 new companies to his order of battle, staffed in part with new arrivals from France and Italy, and in part by shifting men from the original companies to the new units. These he designated either 'French' or 'Italian' companies, but only a few of the French ones looked ethnically

homogenous. The others mixed and matched recruits placed under officers of equally diverse backgrounds. The second important development was the creation of seven cavalry companies, four of which were commanded by officers hailing from Venetian territories. The Duke then augmented these by blending in cavalry militia troopers from Farnese territories and some French troopers too.[56] Cavalry was ruinously expensive to maintain, so the first company was set up in March 1635, with four more established the following May, and the final two in July and August, just before the beginning of operations.

So despite the enthusiastic rush of aristocrats to offer their swords to the Duke, the officer corps was no mirror of the local nobility. If we include both the patenti or commissions with the officers designated in the two armies of 1635 and 1636, we reach a total of about 300 appointments, although many of the individuals appear two or three times, either serving for both campaigns, or being transferred from one unit to another. In 1635, only 43 of 152 identified individuals (a mere two are unidentifiable) were subjects of the Duke – a low third.[57] An equal number were subjects of King Louis XIII, the principal ally, to whom one can append four Savoyards and two Monferrini, subjects of allied princes. Another third, 45 individuals, were subjects of neutral Italian states, principally the Papal States and the Republic of Venice, where much of the Italian soldiery was recruited. Six officers were Swiss, all but one serving in the large company raised in the German-speaking Catholic canton of Lucerne. And seven more were Italians hailing from territories under Spanish rule, principally from the neighbouring state of Milan. Some bitter lessons were learned in the first campaign. The Italian companies recruited far and wide across central and northern Italy quickly came apart notwithstanding their very low casualty rates. Many of the Italians deserted after looting the village of Pontecurone on the march towards Valenza, an easy success. The lack of rapid progress before Valenza did the rest, so that three weeks into the campaign, Odoardo retained less than half of his original 4000 foot soldiers. The fresh Italian formations did not bond the men into a coherent corps with fighting spirit, such that between half and three quarters of the men deserted (depending on the company), and many of those signed on with the enemy.[58]

There was a significant shift in the composition of the 149 officers serving in 1636 of whom we can identify 145. Half of them (74) had served as officers in the previous campaign. Of these 145, only 39 were subjects of Duke Odoardo, alongside 24 Italian neutrals, illustrating the unreliability of those troops and the Duke's frustration with these last. Now there were 68 subjects of the king of France and five Monferrini and Piedmontese, who together formed practically half the cadres. The Swiss provided five more and four officers from enemy territories persisted in Farnese service. If practically none of the Duke's noblemen fled the scene, the same is not quite true of the officer corps. During the two campaigns, 12 officers fled, and only one of them was a subject of the Duke, while none of them were French. These deserters were all junior officers, ensigns (8) or lieutenants (4). Officers were often in harm's way, since they posted themselves towards the front of their unit in combat in order to transmit orders more effectively. Apart from their greater

conspicuousness on the field (for they were often mounted), flinching in the face of danger or flight was tantamount to social suicide. The records only identify one officer killed at the siege of Valenza (September and October 1635), the general of cavalry Avogadri, but two more died at Casale in the aftermath in November. The campaign of 1636 was far more perilous, with about 10 per cent of the officers (12) dying of wounds or illness, a rate probably higher than the fatalities among the rank and file. With vacancies being opened up by woundings and death on campaign, there was some room for mobility. But social mobility via the officer corps (starting at ensign or *cornette*) was more the exception than the rule, and none of the beneficiaries were commoners from Farnese territories.

Both the campaigns of 1635 and 1636 were utter failures for the French coalition. The failure of the besiegers before Valenza was followed by their inability to seize the initiative in Lombardy the following year, notwithstanding their numerical superiority. The Franco-Savoyard army narrowly escaped disaster when the Spanish army under Leganés stormed their entrenchments at Tornavento on June 22 and almost swept Créquy's force into the Ticino river. Following that bloody battle, Habsburg troops unfurled their banner over the duchy of Parma and blockaded Piacenza before the year was out. Spain's resilience in the 1630s came as a surprise to contemporaries.[59] Odoardo himself became the object of scorn within the alliance from his inability to work with other commanders who were his seniors in every way. French commanders in Piacenza noted by early 1636 that his subjects bore little love for him.[60] Of course, the native aristocracy was not able to express their disillusionment except in the most veiled terms, but the non-zero sumness implicit in their participation was not a foregone conclusion!

In adversity Odoardo used every means in his power to raise more resources to continue the war. After dilapidating the great treasure in the Rocchetta, mortgaging his Lazio fiefs to Roman bankers, and borrowing heavily from Florentine aristocrats, he unleashed a great wave of emergency taxation that fell as heavily on the feudatories as on everyone else. Taxes on merchant capital, on chimneys and then on windows were deliberately aimed at social elites. Parma's city councillors (who were also aristocrats, but not feudatories) did their utmost to ensure that everyone bore the burden equitably. By the end of summer in 1636, everyone, nobility and clergy included, was personally liable to work on the city's defences.[61] Odoardo's obstinacy in remaining in the war despite the hopelessness of the cause soon endangered his status as a ruling prince. Spanish and Papal ambassadors discussed removing the Farnese dynasty from the duchy altogether and awarding Parma to the Papal Barberini family instead.[62] Only the widespread misgivings among Italian princes of increasing Spanish territory enabled Odoardo to sign a peace, with his estates bruised but intact. But the experience did not slake his thirst for military glory, and so he plunged into the Castro War against the papacy in 1642 after the papal nephews seized his Roman patrimony, to satisfy his local creditors. That short war (1642–1644) entailed a similar mobilization of the duchy's human and financial resources, for which the company rosters exist in the state archive. Odoardo's early death at the age of 34 in 1646 was a blessing

for his subjects, and after a short military misadventure against the Papacy in 1649, his son Ranuccio II would follow the path of peace. But this would lead to a demilitarization of the local aristocracy that would never be reversed.[63]

## Notes

1. Gregory Hanlon, *The Twilight of a Military Tradition: Italian Aristocrats and European Conflicts, 1560–1800* (London and New York 1998), ch. 6, 221–61.
2. Gregory Hanlon, 'The Demilitarization of an Italian Provincial Aristocracy', *Past & Present*, No. 155 (1997), 64–108; In the light of this first work, Davide Maffi has established a substantial list of Lombard aristocrats serving solely in the Italian theatre, but he has not spread their service along a chronological span. See Davide Maffi, *Il Baluardo della Corona* (Florence 2007), 195.
3. Ugo Benassi, 'I Natali e l'educazione del duca Odoardo Farnese', *Archivio Storico per le Provincie Parmensi*, n.s. 9 (1909), 99–227.
4. Giovanni Drei, *I Farnese: Grandezza e decadenza di una dinastia italiana* (Rome 1954), 204.
5. Pietro Giovanni Capriata, *Dell'Historia* (Genoa 1649), 125.
6. Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and its Causes* (London and New York 2011), 520–1.
7. In addition to Capriata, cited above, see Girolamo Brusoni, *Dell'Historia d'Italia, dall'anno 1625, sino al 1660* (Venice 1661), 108; Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato, *Historia delle guerre del Conte Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato* (Venice 1646), 306, stresses the importance of Odoardo's character, 'principe spiritoso e d'alti pensieri'; a Benedictine monk who lived in Parma during Odoardo's reign who later became one of Europe's foremost historians, Vittorio Siri, *Delle Memorie recondite* (Lyon 1679), Vol. 7, pp. 772 and 790, and Vol. 8, pp. 256–8; for a very detailed portrait, Biblioteca Palatina, Ms Parmense 737, Hippolito Calandrini, *L'Heroe d'Italia, overo Vita del Sereniss.o Odoardo Farnese il Grande*.
8. Letizia Arcangeli, 'Giurisdizioni feudali e organizzazione territorial nel Ducato di Parma (1545–1587)', in M. A. Romani, ed., *Le Corti farnesiane di Parma e Piacenza (1545–1622)*, Vol. 1 (Rome 1978), 91–148; Pietro Castignoli, 'Caratteri della feudalità nel ducato di Parma durante il secolo XVII', *Archivio Storico per le Provincie Parmensi* (1966), 317–24; Letizia Arcangeli, 'Feudatari e duca negli stati farnesiani (1545–1587)', in *Il Rinascimento nelle Corti padane: Società e cultura* (Bari 1977), 77–96.
9. Vito Ghizzoni, 'Sorprusi dei Farnese ai danni dei Pallavicino nella seconda metà del '500', *Archivio Storico per le Provincie Parmensi*, 19 (1967), 149–61; Riccardo De Rosa, 'La congiura di Claudio Landi contro i Farnese e i suoi riflessi sulla questione di Borgo Val di Taro', *Bollettino Storico Piacentino*, 97 (2002), 131–50.
10. Jean Boutier, 'Trois conjurations italiennes: Florence (1575), Parme (1611), Gênes (1628)', *Mélanges de l'Ecole Française de Rome: Italie et Mediterranée*, 108 (1996) 319–75, 370.
11. Claudio De Consoli, *Al soldo del duca: L'amministrazione delle armate sabaude (1560–1630)* (Turin 1999), 48.
12. Marco Boscarelli, 'Appunti sulle istituzioni e le campagne militari dei ducati di Parma e Piacenza in epoca farnesiana', in A. Bilotto, P. Del Negro and C. Mozzarelli, eds, *I Farnese: Corti, guerra e nobiltà in Antico regime* (Rome 1997), 561–78.
13. Brian Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore, MD 2010), 6.

14. David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge and New York 2012), 252.
15. Robert Wright, *Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny* (New York 2000), 54–64, 54.
16. William Beik, 'The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration: A Review Article', *Past & Present*, No. 188 (2005), 195–223.
17. Jeremy Black, *War: A Short History* (London and New York 2009), 74; for groundbreaking research into just such a pact, William Beik, *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc* (Cambridge and New York 1985); for the north Italian context, see Cesare Mozzarelli, *Principe, Corte e governo tra Cinque e Settecento, Antico regime e modernità* (Rome 2008) 153–65 (first published 1985).
18. Gianvittorio Signorotto, *Milano Spagnola: Guerra, istituzioni, uomini di governo*, 2nd ed. (Florence 2001), 167–9. See also Maffi, *Il Baluardo della Corona*, 197–208; see also, among the numerous publications on this theme by Mario Rizzo, '"Ottima gente da Guerra", Cremonesi al servizio della strategia imperiale', in *Storia di Cremona. Vol. IV, L'età degli Asburgo di Spagna (1535–1707)* (Bergamo 2006).
19. Giampiero Brunelli, *Soldati del Papa: Politica militare e nobiltà nello Stato della Chiesa (1560–1644)* (Rome 2003), 246–62.
20. Ugo Benassi, 'Governo assoluto e città suddita nel primo Seicento', *Bollettino Storico Piacentino*, 12 (1917), 193–203 & 13 (1918), 30–38; Carlo Emanuele Manfredi, 'La nobiltà piacentina alla Corte Farnesiana', in Bilotto, del Negro and Mozzarelli, eds, *I Farnese*, 33–46.
21. Roberto Sabbadini, *La Grazia e l'Onore: principe, nobiltà e ordine sociale nei ducati farnesiani* (Rome 2001), 64–74.
22. Gregory Hanlon, 'In Praise of Refeudalization: Princes and Feudatories in North-Central Italy from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century', in Nicholas Eckstein and Nicholas Terpstra, eds, *Sociability and its Discontents: Civil Society, Social Capital and their Alternatives in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Turnhout 2009), 213–25.
23. Paola Subacchi, *La Ruota della Fortuna: Arricchimento e promozione sociale in una città padana in età moderna* (Milan 1996), 17, 122; there exists a close study of the appointment of people to the court in Parma in the latter years of Duke Odoardo's reign, bearing out the juxtaposition of different nobilities, Gregory Morris, 'The Court of Farnese Parma, 1639–1646', Honours thesis, History Department, Dalhousie University, 2010.
24. ASPr, Indice Patenti, Vol. 3, Patenti of famigliarità and of cavaliere.
25. Cristina Nubola, 'Supplications Between Politics and Justice: The Northern and Central Italian States in the Early Modern Age', *International Review of Social History*, 46 (2001), 35–56; also Paola Ripetti, 'Scrivere ai potenti: Suppliche e memoriali a Parma (sec. XVI–XVIII)', *Sogittura e Civiltà*, 24 (2000), 295–358.
26. Maria Nadia Covini, L'Esercito del duca: Organizzazione militare e istituzioni al tempo degli Sforza (1450–1480) (Rome 1998), 93–102; see also Marco Gentile, 'Casato e fazione nella Lombardia del Quattrocento: il caso di Parma', in Anna Bellavitis and Isabelle Chabot, eds, *Famiglie e poteri in Italia tra Medioevo ed età moderna* (Rome 2009), 151–87.
27. ASPr, Governo Farnesiano, Milizie 1: *Lettera informativa per scegliere e creare ufficiali, da Orazio Scotti, 15 aprile 1625*.

28. For detailed information on the families concerned here, see *Le antiche famiglie di Piacenza e i loro stemmi* (Piacenza 1979); Maurizio de Meo, *Le antiche famiglie nobili e notabili di Parma e i loro stemmi*, 3 vols (Parma 2000).
29. Biblioteca Palatina di Parma, Ms Parmense 737, *L'Heroe d'Italia, overo Vita del Sereniss.o Odoardo Farnese il Grande*; Crescenzi Romani (GP), *Corona della nobilta d'Italia, ovvero compendio dell'Istorie delle famiglie illustri*, 2 vols. (Bologna 1639–1642); the troop rosters in the Archivio di Stato of Parma contain the most complete information, Collatereria Generale 229–35 & 262–6 (cavalry), 317–18 (guard cavalry); Collatereria Generale 319 (guard infantry), 337–82 (infantry), 384–90 (infantry), 603 & 606 (garrisons of Parma & Borgo Taro citadels).
30. For an overview of this problem, see Gregory Hanlon, *The Twilight of a Military Tradition: Italian Aristocrats and European Conflicts, 1560–1800* (London and New York 1998), chapter 6, 'Careers and Profiles', p. 253.
31. Fernando Gonzalez de Leon, *The Road to Rocroi: Class, Culture and Command in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1567–1659* (Boston and Leiden 2009).
32. John A. Lynn, *Giant of the 'Grand Siècle': The French Army 1610–1715* (Cambridge and New York 1997), 239; for the finery inherent in the armour and weapons in northern Italy, Paolo Pinti, 'Le Armi dei Farnese', in Bilotto, del Negro and Mozzarelli, eds, *I Farnese*, 493–508.
33. In the later French religious wars, this control over officers' appointments was frequently delegated to great lords and provincial governors located far from Paris. See Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits*, 191–203.
34. ASPr, Patenti. The archival classification of the patenti defies understanding. Of the many volumes containing manuscript copies of these documents, only four volumes contain significant numbers of military commissions; vols 7, 28, 31 and 41bis. In addition to the patenti themselves, some details can be gleaned from manuscript compilations on noble families; Clerici for example in the BPPr Ms Parmense 656, Padre Andrea da Parma, cappuccino: Opere diverse di storia parmense, Appunti sulla nobiltà parmense (sec. XVIII), p. 227.
35. There is no surviving documentation on the payment (as opposed to the feeding and lodging) of French troops in the duchy, although the French commander, the Comte de Saint-Paul, brought money with him for their upkeep. The French origin of the payments is implied in a letter from the French extraordinary ambassador to the duke of Savoy accompanying the army, to Cardinal Richelieu, Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique Sardaigne 24/2, 2 July 1636; 'Avec ses gents [Duke Odoardo and Fabio Scotti], Votre Eminence ne fera jamais bon affaire. Il est important que Mr de la Thuilerie [French resident in nearby Mantua] aie soin du peu de troupes qui restent à Parme et à Plaisance. Il est impossible d'y pourvoir d'ici. Ils ont des bleds pour le reste de l'année, ils ont reçu quatre montres (paies) avec 25.000 écus. Il est à propos que Mr de Parme n'aie point sujet de se plaindre de ce costé.'
36. BPPr, Ms Fondo Parmense 737, Calandrini, *L'Heroe d'Italia*, 62; the noblemen from Piacenza were particularly salient in Odoardo's reign. See the article by Manfredi, 'La nobiltà piacentina', in Bilotto, del Negro and Mozzarelli, eds, *I Farnese*, 35–46.
37. ASPr Collatereria Generale 529 & 530; Ruoli delle porte di Piacenza, 1634 & 1636; ASPr Governo Farnesiano, Milizie 1; Capitani delle Porte di Parma, n.d.

38. Maffi, *Il Baluardo della Corona*, 101; for the procedure in Spain itself, Julio Albi de la Cuesta, *De Pavia a Rocroi: los tercios de infanteria española en los siglos XVI y XVII* (Madrid 1999), 32.
39. Angelantonio Spagnoletti, 'Onore e spirito nazionale nei soldati italiani al servizio della monarchia spagnola', in C. Donati and B. Kroener, eds, *Militari e società civile nell'Europa dell'età moderna, sec. XVI–XVIII* (Bologna 2007), 211–53.
40. Paul Azan, *Un tacticien du XVIIe siècle* (Paris 1904), 19.
41. R. Meli Lupi di Soragna, 'Vita di Francesco Serafini, mastro di campo del Ser.o Duca di Parma, castellano di Piacenza', *Atti e memorie delle R.R. Deputazioni di Storia Patria per le Provincie modenesi e parmensi*, ser. III, v.5 (1888), 1–29.
42. ASPr Collatereria Generale 345 & 370, companies of Johan Werner Moralt in 1635 and 1636 respectively.
43. Biblioteca Comunale Passerini-Landi de Piacenza, Ms Pallastrelli 126, *Croniche o diario del Rev.o Sgr Benedetto Boselli, rettore della chiesa di Santo Martino di Piacenza* (1620–1670), 94.
44. ASPr Collatereria Generale 340.
45. BPPr, Ms Parmense 1261, Storia di Parma, dell'abbate Gozzi, 1113.
46. Sabbadini, *La Grazia e l'Onore*, 153; Rossi's estates were confiscated for treason, by ducal decree on 3 January 1636, ASPr Gridario 32, number 42.
47. Giovanni Pietro Crescenzi Romani, *Corona della nobiltà d'Italia, ovvero compendio dell'istorie delle famiglie illustri* (Bologna 1639), Vol. 1, 73.
48. Andrea Pugolotti, *Libro di memorie. Cronaca parmense del XVII secolo*, Sergio Di Noto, ed. (Parma 2005), 163–5, September 1646 to March 1647.
49. Lynn, *Giant of the 'Grand Siècle'*, 6.
50. The term was invented by the foremost historian of the question, Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force*, 2 vols (Wiesbaden 1964); for Spanish practice, see Luis Antonio Ribot Garcia, 'El reclutamiento militar en España a mediados del siglo XVII. La "composicion" de las milicias de Castilla', *Cuadernos de Investigacion Historica*, 9 (1986) 63–89.
51. ASPr Governo Farnesiano, Milizie 2, *Obblighi del Cap.o Vernerio Moralto Svizzero, 22 marzo 1635*.
52. Parrott, *The Business of War*, 6–17.
53. David Parrott, 'The Utility of Fortifications in Early Modern Europe: Italian Princes and their Citadels, 1540–1640', *War in History*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2000), 127–53.
54. Stéphane Gal, *Lesdiguières: Prince des Alpes et connétable de France* (Grenoble 2007), 191–3, 271–2.
55. David Parrott, 'Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War: The Military Revolution Revisited', *Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1985), 7–25.
56. ASPr Collatereria Generale, 229–35 and 262–66, cavalry rosters.
57. By comparison, Duke Charles IV of Lorraine could confer over half the officers' commissions (56 percent) to his own subjects in 1625, leading 4000 men who were 80 per cent Lorrainers; see Jean-Charles Fulaine, *Le Duc Charles IV de Lorraine et son armée 1624–1675* (Metz 1997), 21–3.
58. Girolamo Ghilini, *Annali di Alessandria*, A. Bossola ed. (Alessandria 1903), 101.
59. Archives des Affaires Etrangères Paris, Correspondance Politique Sardaigne, vol. 24/2, letter from the French extraordinary ambassador, Michel Particelli d'Emery to cardinal

Richelieu, 27 June 1636, following the hard-fought battle of Tornavento, 'J'ai souvent écrit que les Espagnols n'étaient pas si faibles que l'on croyait . . .'.

60. Service Historique des Armées, Château de Vincennes, A1 31, n.20, lettre du comte de Saint-Paul à Monseigneur (Prince Gaston d'Orléans, brother and heir to King Louis XIII), 5 December 1636. 'Les postes du duc se réduisent à peu de places par le défaut de payer des gens de guerre et le peu d'affection de ses peuples et le desplaisir de voir sa personne . . . On est pourvu de beaucoup de choses mais le péril est dans les affections des sujets et leur refroidissement envers leur prince . . .'.
61. ASPr Comune 331, Minute delle Ordinazioni; a multitude of entries from 23 July 1635 to 8 October 1636 reveals the increasing pressure on Parman elites to find new resources to continue the war.
62. Antonio Alvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, 'The State of Milan and the Spanish Monarchy', in T. J. Dandelet and J. A. Marino, eds, *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society and Religion 1500–1700* (Leiden 2007), 100–32.
63. A sense of the duchy's complete abandonment of military ambition may be glimpsed in the recent book by Mario Zannoni, *La 'Guerra' tra Napoleone Buonaparte e Don Ferdinando di Borbone: la battaglia di Fombio, 8 maggio 1796* (Parma 2010).

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