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FROM THE PISTOL TO THE PEN:
The military memoir as a source on the social history of
pre-Reform Russia

Although State service was the chief factor in the lives of male
members of the élite in early Imperial Russia, as it had been also in the
Muscovite era, we still know remarkably little about it. Recent studies
have enlarged our understanding of the dvoriane's role as landowners,
officials and incipient intellectuals, but their service in the armed forces
has been comparatively neglected, and as regards that of commoners, as
soldiers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), we are even more in the
dark. In Europe generally military sociology, as a branch of historical
study, is still relatively undeveloped and attempts to apply its insights
to Russia are only just beginning. Soviet work on military history has
hitherto been rather conventional in scope and approach, but there are
some signs of change in this respect.

One source which can throw light on the Russian officer's service
experience and outlook is the military memoir. The present article is
based in part upon more than sixty such autobiographical works. Most
of them are journal articles rather than book-length monographs and were
published in the late Imperial period, although some appeared earlier and
one saw the light of day as recently as 1966. In his very valuable bibliog-
raphy of Russian memoir literature P. A. Zaionchkovskii lists no fewer
than 240 items relating to the land forces in the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. This may make our selection seem rather limited.
However, the vast majority of military autobiographers wrote only about
their campaign experiences and the more professional aspects of their
careers and had little or nothing to say of broader interest; moreover,
some of our sources were omitted from Zaionchkovskii's list, probably
because they were not thought sufficiently important. Since State
service was not sharply differentiated between the military and civil
branches until the early nineteenth century, any selection is bound to be
somewhat arbitrary. We have excluded accounts by foreigners who
were not in regular service and by well-known personalities such as
C. H. von Manstein, A. T. Bolotov, G. R. Derzhavin, L. N. Engel'gardt,
F. F. Vigel', I. I. Lazhechnikov or N. I. Pirogov, whose careers were not

primarily in the military, but whose memoirs sometimes have a bearing upon our subject.

It should be made plain at the outset that this type of material suffers from serious deficiencies. It ought to be treated only as an auxiliary source to flesh out the dry bones of official histories and legislative compendia. Its quantity does not make up for its qualitative shortcomings. In the Reform era in particular the writing of reminiscences seems to have become a regular pastime for retired officers with ample leisure and some pretension to literary talent. Their object was to instruct or entertain readers from their own social milieu. Few authors consulted documents or attempted to produce works of scholarship, and so their accounts tend to be anecdotal and superficial. Moreover, they dealt gingerly, if at all, with matters likely to discredit the army or the political establishment. These writers were, almost by definition, men who had been professionally successful; most of them had attained senior rank. They and their publishers had to be ever mindful of censorship requirements, which were unreasonably strict: as late as the 1890's passages were excised from the work of one officer who described critically conditions in the army a whole century earlier. Indeed, military autobiographers may be said to have internalized these controls in their desire to avoid crossing the boundary of the permissible. The limits were relaxed during the early years of Alexander II's reign, when there was a flurry of oblichitel'naia literatura, and again after the 1905 revolution; but in the latter period writers were of course chiefly concerned with the post-Reform era.

For all these reasons military memoirs tend to reflect official thinking and to adhere to a stereotyped pattern both in subject matter and in the way it is treated. To be sure, criticism of the régime could be ventilated indirectly by attributing defects to a single discredited individual, such as A. A. Arakcheev, and some authors published their work abroad, which gave them a greater measure of freedom. But all in all Beskrovnyi's severe judgment on the value of this type of source material for conventional military history holds good also for Russian social history:

“Memoir literature is characterized by a high degree of subjectivism. As a rule historical facts and events are treated [...] in a subjective and clearly tendentious fashion. Their accuracy is greater where the author describes matters that were important to himself. Diaries are not as a rule intended for publication, and therefore judgments and characterizations in them are more expressive and sincere, revealing directly the author's sympathies and antipathies. But memoirs designed to appear in print have generally been toned down. Writers refrain from giving their personal views and aspire to an 'official objectivism'. They often appeared many years after the events described, and so contain errors in regard to dates and figures; or else the writer changed his mind in the interim and judged events from his new standpoint. Nevertheless memoirs are of extremely great value, since they give the military historian additional material.”
We may first give a general idea of the chronological scope of this material and of the principal authors involved. In our view the first Russian military memorialist was V. A. Nashchokin (1707-1761) whose reminiscences, written in 1758-1759, cover the period from 1719, when the author enrolled as a soldier in the Belgorod infantry regiment, to the date of writing, by which time he held the rank of lieutenant-general.9 Much of his service was in the élite Izmailovskii guards regiment. Two early Ukrainian diarists were M. Khanenko (1693-1760) and Iu. A. Markovych (1696-1770), whose writings cover the periods 1727-1753 and 1717-1734 respectively.10 A Baltic German author whose work deserves to be better known is G. E. von Strandman (1742-1803); from his manuscript—based on a diary and therefore more reliable—extracts have been published covering the period from 1769, when as a subaltern he served in the first of Catherine’s Turkish wars, to 1780, when he was campaigning on the Kuban’ in the rank of colonel.11

Three other men of non-Russian extraction whose reminiscences deal with the eighteenth-century army may be singled out. One was an anonymous Pole of French descent who entered Russian service in 1736 as a lieutenant, saw service on the Ukrainian line and had been appointed second major by 1752, when the extant portion of his manuscript breaks off; from internal evidence it was written some time before 1792.12 S. S. Pishchevich (Piščević, 1731-?), a Hungarian Serb, describes graphically, if ungrammatically, the difficulties facing immigrant colonists in the Upper Donets valley in the 1750’s: at first, he says, they lived ‘like shipwrecked sailors on a desert island’; subsequently conditions improved slightly, but remained rough at least until the reforms of 1764, at which point his account breaks off.13 A sequel is provided by his son, A. S. Pishchevich (1764-1805), who, as his literary style testifies, assimilated more successfully into the Russian environment. He describes his experiences in the Crimean campaign of 1783 and later in the Caucasus, as well as in the second Russo-Turkish war. While serving in the Caucasus Pishchevich junior was charged with corruption, court-martialed and deprived of his command over a squadron; this circumstance—which did not prevent him from later serving on such a tribunal himself!—enabled him to provide the first unofficial account of Russian military justice in action.14 Despite its self-serving tone and stress on the more adventurous episodes in his career, his memoir has an unself-conscious directness lacking in many later works. It can stand comparison with that of his better-known contemporary S. A. Tuchkov (1766-1839), who reached higher rank—that of lieutenant-general—and was one of the first Russian officers to develop broad cultural interests. Curiously, he too fell foul of the law (in 1812), but the episode is not discussed in his memoirs, which reach only to 1808.15 Tuchkov served against the Swedes and Poles and later in the Caucasus. Having prospered under Paul I, he was highly critical of his successor. This viewpoint was most unusual at the time and no doubt accounts for the hundred-year delay in publication of his manuscript.
At the turn of the century the spread of education among the Russian gentry led to the emergence of what has aptly been called a ‘military intelligentsia’. The immediate stimulus to this development was the traumatic effect which Paul’s brief but turbulent reign had on the officer corps. A fair number of those who suffered personally from his arbitrary rule, or were at least acquainted with its victims, have left impressions of this period; but the value of these records is limited by their obvious tendentiousness.\(^{16}\) After 1801 the trickle of memoir literature swells considerably. Writers naturally concentrated their attention upon the great conflicts with the armies of Napoleon. For the 1812 campaign the personal accounts by such prominent figures as A. P. Ermolov or K. F. von Toll are of less interest for our purposes than those written by humbler participants. The memoirs of D. V. Davydov (1784-1839), the partisan leader (and poet),\(^{17}\) and S. N. Glinka (1776-1847),\(^{18}\) who served in the militia, are fairly well known; much can also be gleaned from the reminiscences of A. B. Chicherin (1793-1813) and A. B. Antonovskii, both of whom were only subalterns. The former text (written in French) came to light quite recently and has been well edited by L. G. Beskrovnyi;\(^{19}\) the latter appeared in a collection of autobiographical accounts published at the beginning of this century.\(^{20}\)

Several officers who took part in the campaigns into central and western Europe have left impressions of their experiences. The first to be published, a rambling account in twelve parts, was by F. N. Glinka, younger brother of the man just mentioned; his account of the Habsburg domains in 1805 is fresher and more informative than that of Germany or France several years later.\(^{21}\) So far as the army’s inner state during the latter campaigns is concerned, perhaps the most revealing autobiography is that by N. N. Murav’ev(-Karskii), who went on to fame in the Crimean war.\(^{22}\) He shared, up to a point, the critical frame of mind which became common at this time among the more intelligent officers and found expression in the formation of secret societies after 1816. Almost automatically one refers to these men as ‘Decembrists’, although this label conveys revolutionary associations that are not always warranted, since there was a great range of opinions among them on all questions of the day. The memoirs by serving officers that throw light on the growth of political opposition include those by I. D. Iakushkin, A. S. Gan-glebov, I. I. Gorbachevskii, N. I. Lorer (Lohrer) and—despite its extreme brevity—A. M. Murav’ev.\(^{23}\) These are best considered as a separate category within the ‘military memoir’ genre. Published long after the events they describe, their standard of accuracy may often be faulted, but in this case there is ample information from other sources against which details can be checked.

This is not the case with those memorialists who, writing in the Reform era, gave more or less critical accounts of their experiences during Nicholas I’s reign. For these writers it became almost obligatory, if they were to retain their self-respect, to dissociate themselves from the excesses that had characterized military life under the ‘iron tsar’. One man who went considerably further than any of his comrades used an as yet undeciphered pseudonym, ‘Neizvestnyi’ (Unknown); his account did not appear until 1894.\(^{24}\) Others who adopted a critical stance were
G. D. Shcherbachev and I. I. Venediktov, both of whom developed liberal views that led them to transfer to the civil service, in 1856 and 1847 respectively, where they could eventually promote progressive causes. Their accounts are objective and credible, if less than complete; the same may be said of that of M. Ia. Ol'shevskii, which covers only his experiences in an elite military school. Another record of such an upbringing which is much less plausible is that of M. A. Markov, while a favourable view of Nicholas's militaristic system is given by D. G. Kolo-koltsov; all these three men eventually reached general's rank.

Apart from the military schools and regimental service in peace and war there were two other subjects which attracted many of these writers: the prolonged struggle in the Caucasus and the military colonies. The former involved only a tiny segment of the Russian army but brought these men into contact with an unfamiliar Oriental milieu and one in which the usual rigid service relationships were somewhat relaxed. Prince A. I. Gagarin, a divisional commander, gives a vivid picture of the administrative abuses that characterized this colonial war in an account which for obvious reasons could not appear until after the 1905 revolution. Writers were freer to express themselves critically about the military colonies since this unfortunate experiment was abandoned in 1857.

Surveying the genre, it must be said that even the most outspoken military memorialists were far from adopting a radical position; the Decembrist generation does not really constitute an exception. They were 'establishment figures' whose outlook was traditional, nationalistic and above all service-oriented. Their loyalty to the monarchy (or perhaps one should say to the monarch, since they thought in personal rather than institutional terms) was rooted not only in their privileged social position but also in their cultural isolation. The pre-Reform Russian army officer belonged to a militarized caste cut off from the rest of the population by a way of life in which violence and brutality were the norm, where discipline was maintained by barbarous means, and where the wider society was visualized in terms of the mechanical subordination that obtained within the military hierarchy itself.

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Even after the celebrated edict of 18 February 1762 which exempted the dvoriane from obligatory State service a large proportion of them—just how large it is difficult to ascertain—continued to enlist in the armed forces. Tuchkov noted that in the 1780's 'few gentry served in junior civil service positions, whereas almost all of them were in the army'. An observer of Nicolaevan Russia noted that 'the gentry joined the service very willingly since it was more attractive in many respects: a military uniform, especially if one were in the guards, and a military rank gave one a social status unattainable in any other way.' Shcherbachev confirms this testimony: 'in the 1840's all young nobles sought to serve in the army, because this gave them a certain standing in society, and also because it was almost exclusively in the forces that one could make a service career, for all the higher offices of state [...] were
given to military men who were more in the Sovereign's eye than civil officials. Yet it was precisely at this time that the civil bureaucracy was emancipating itself from the military influences that had shrouded it since the age of Peter the Great!

The decision to join the army was taken for a variety of reasons: family tradition, personal preference, state of health and sheer economic necessity. But above all it depended on opportunity: one needed a vacancy—and a patron. S. N. Glinka probably reflected a widespread opinion when he wrote scathingly of the 'spoiled mothers' sons' who in the 1790's, although holding officer's rank, did not serve because there was no room for them in their regiments and chose to remain at home: 'without having smelled powder, they hastened off to hunt hare [...] and were afraid to stick their heads out from their rustic retreats to fight for the Fatherland.' He was referring to the supernumeraries (sverkhkomplektnye) who, it should be added in fairness, were not to blame for their equivocal situation; Glinka admits that they did not draw pay and that the army at that time had more than enough officers for its needs. Moreover, despite his patriotic effusions Glinka himself chose to retire from the service in 1800, aged only 24, when he discovered that he had 'an inborn distaste for blood', and thereafter directed his talents to the field of journalism.

H. von Hansen, who came from a relatively poor Baltic German family, joined the army in 1821 as a volunteer aged only 14, but found promotion to officer's rank slow for one of his condition; he would willingly have transferred to the civil service, but realized that 'without a fortune or patronage (Protektion) such a decision could have had the most sorry consequences for me'; he had no choice but to soldier on in a chasseur regiment in dismal provincial Poltava until war against the Turks set him on the upward course that ultimately earned him general's epaulettes.

Most officers must have been obliged to begin service in the ranks, as Hansen did—and as had been Peter I's original intention. That this was so is stated by Von Toll, whose father commenced his career in this way; his more famous son, however, took a different route. He was enrolled in the Cadet Corps at the age of 5, and on graduating was singled out by Paul I for competence in draughtsmanship; the tsar appointed him a lieutenant in the so-called 'Quartermaster's section', which then did duty for a general staff. Many other writers took a privileged path to officer status. Such individuals would typically either attend one of the military schools or else be educated at home; if they served in the ranks at all, they did so only nominally or for a short term; appointment as adjutant would bring them to the notice of some august personage and assure them almost automatically of a 'brilliant' career.

The all-important role of patronage is discussed quite frankly in some of these accounts, especially the earlier ones. When the Crimean war broke out, the future historian S. M. Zagoskin, then aged 20, decided not to enlist because he had no 'influential uncle' (diadushka) whose orderly he might become. Much earlier A. S. Pishchevich began his education in a school for engineering cadets; in 1783, when the boy had reached the age of 18, Potemkin, who knew his father, found him a place in a dragoon
regiment of which he was chief (shef); Potemkin wanted to make him one of his numerous adjutants but—a characteristic detail—Pishchevich could not afford to take up the post and to his dismay another lad was appointed in his place. More fortunate were the twenty-year-old A. K. Denisov, who became Potemkin's adjutant in the same year, and S. I. Mosolov, a captain's son who around 1765 was introduced to Field-marshal P. S. Saltykov, under whom his father had served; he was sent as a soldier to the Arkhangel regiment and after a mere four weeks promoted to junior ensign; his widowed mother thereupon promptly took him back to express his gratitude to Saltykov in person. His subsequent progress seems to have been fairly slow, however: he served as adjutant in 1770 and became a lieutenant in 1773; the ranks of captain followed in 1774, second major in 1780, first major in 1786, lieutenant-colonel in 1793, colonel in 1794, and major-general in 1797. (He seems to have written his memoirs with his formul'arnyi spisok set proudly before him.)

A practice which, though familiar, still awaits thorough study is that of juvenile enlistment, notably in privileged guards regiments. Although Catherine II ruled that it should be permitted only with her express authorization in each case, it was still sufficiently widespread to pose a problem as late as 1817. It originated in Elizabeth's reign. In 1749 her favourite K. G. Razumovskii celebrated an occasion in Nashchokin's family by promoting his three sons, aged 14, 7 and 6, to the rank of fur'er and corporal; four years later the youngest children had become sergeants, and when 16 or 17 years old entered service in their father's regiment as ensigns. Tuchkov's observations on this practice, cited in several general works, appear to be exaggerated: if he was indeed, as he says, dressed up in an NCO's uniform at the tender age of 4 and so 'turned into a little Prussian', this was probably some whim of his father's. P. M. Volkonskii states that he was enrolled as a sergeant in the Preobrazhenskii regiment on the day of his baptism (in 1776), at the request of an uncle in the service, and given a document entitled him to 'home leave' until he had finished his studies; at the age of 16 he wanted to see actual service, got himself posted to another regiment, and within a matter of months was an ensign; two years later he was an adjutant in his original regiment.

Such laxity was, however, characteristic of Catherine's last years; it would be much less usual under her militaristic successors. In 1807 M. M. Muromtsev, on leaving the family 'nest', had to take a stiff examination at the Cadet Corps and instead of studying there was sent straight off to the front as an NCO; he was obliged 'to carry the standard and to march on foot' because his commander thought him a spoiled noble boy, and two years passed before he became an officer. Promotion was more rapid in the army than in the civil service, for obvious reasons: it was the correlate of the greater physical risk one ran. How long on average did one remain in each rank: was Mosolov's progress (referred to above) typical? What criteria were employed when filling vacancies? These questions could be answered definitively only after undertaking a thorough examination of service records, but the general picture is fairly clear from the published sources. To use the contempo-
rary jargon, under Catherine *vyshluga* mattered more than *zasluga*: that is to say, seniority rather than merit was the normal criterion. The routine procedure was that each army division (a purely administrative unit at this time) prepared a single list of all subaltern officers who had served for the specified term in their present rank, and the divisional commander allocated vacancies to those who were at the head of the queue; for 'staff' officers (major and above) and other senior men a similar list was compiled, on an army-wide basis, in the War College and appointments were made by the Sovereign. For each individual concerned a testimonial (*attestat*) was required, in a stereotyped form, confirming his worthiness for promotion; this was supposed to be signed by all officers of the same rank in his unit and then by his superiors.51 Those who were passed over, but knew of some vacancy for which they considered themselves qualified, might submit petitions, mentioning cases known to them where less senior men had been promoted—a practice which shows that the Muscovite tradition of *mestnichestvo* was not quite dead!52

The literature suggests that the system did not work well. S. M. Rzhevskii, author of a brief but frank memorandum, complained that the attestation procedure was a mere formality, since officers would sign whatever their colonel wanted for fear of receiving a bad testimonial themselves.53 The selection procedure was also distorted by social prejudice. A well-informed foreign observer noted in 1810 that talented officers of modest means were aggrieved that their promotion was blocked by aristocratic young generals, so that it took fifteen years to reach captain's rank.54 Certainly the well-connected could reach high rank with remarkable speed. Paskevich was a major-general at 28. Of two sons of Field-marshal M. F. Kamenskii (1738-1809) the elder became a major-general when aged 26 and the younger when only 22—both appointments being made under Paul I.55 M. A. Katinin is said to have risen from lieutenant to major-general within a few years by securing appointment as adjutant to a grand duke and then marrying the sister of the emperor’s ADC.56 Cadet Corps graduates posted to units as subalterns 'took away promotion chances from ensigns', and when guardsmen joined line regiments they might rise by as many as three grades.57

Nevertheless the root of the 'promotion problem' seems to have been not social discrimination but natural irregularities in the availability of jobs. The casualty rate fluctuated, of course; so did the size of the 'reserve army' of supernumeraries, and thus the labour market was volatile. Unfortunately no military writer seems to have recorded his experiences as a supernumerary, although Strandman does note the death in action of one of them (1770), from which it is clear that some supernumeraries would accompany their units into the combat zone, no doubt in hope of winning quick preferment, instead of staying at home or seeking alternative employment.58

Those who had served in a given rank for a certain term were automatically promoted by one grade on discharge.59 This created problems if they subsequently returned to active duty, for their comrades would resent the unfair advantage they had gained; if they had earned further promotion in the interim, the sense of grievance would be enhanced. Mosolov complains that one of his superiors, a Pole named Szenbek who
was allegedly very corrupt, retired in 1799 as a major-general to avoid
active service and returned as a lieutenant-general when the war was
over; but his information is not corroborated.60 In 1812, when many
retired officers came back to the colours, they were generously treated:
F. N. Glinka got his old rank of lieutenant (after some inconvenience
as his testimonial had been lost through enemy action); L. A. Naryshkin,
who had spent the intervening years at court, was promoted from lieue-
tenant to captain; and even Löwenstern, who had seen service with the
French and whose loyalty was suspect, received his former rank of major
—which did not prevent him complaining of discrimination for years
thereafter.61 Under Nicholas I the rule was that on re-entering the
forces one lost any seniority gained elsewhere,62 so that this particular
grievance seems to have been eliminated.

Temporary leave was provided for in Peter I’s military statute (1716),
and in the period of retrenchment after his death as many as two-thirds
of serving officers were sent home.63 At first furlough was granted by
the central authorities, but by mid-century controls had been relaxed:
in the 1750’s the elder Pishchevich obtained four months’ leave from his
divisional commander, and in 1783 his son was given three months’
leave by his colonel.64 Our anonymous Pole was twice denied leave
(1740, 1752), but this may have been because he wanted to go abroad.65
Were leave applications in peacetime systematically denied, or was it
just a matter of officers not applying because they could not afford to go?
A number appear to have never received leave. Lieutenant Vasil’ev, the
first Russian military diarist, who served in Poland, was able to visit
relatives in Moscow only when he was sent there on an official errand.66
The well-informed Von Hupel says that commanders would evade the
formalities by entrusting subordinates with such welcome commissions.67
During the Potemkin era it was relatively easy to absent oneself without
permission,68 and in 1806 E. F. Komarovskii, then deputy military
governor of St. Petersburg, was allowed to go abroad by an informal
arrangement with his superior without the fact being published in army
orders;69 but probably only the most favoured could get away with this.
There were frequent official complaints about officers overstaying leave
terms by pretending to be ill,70 but none of our informants, not surpris-
ingly, admits to having done so.

Although from 1762 onward officers were in principle free to quit the
armed forces whenever they wished in peacetime, in practice the State
managed to protect its interests by keeping discharges under central
control. Archival evidence from the 1790’s suggests that it was not too
difficult for senior officers to obtain discharge to attend to their private
affairs, a reason commonly given in petitions;71 but retirement was seen
as a privilege rather than a right, and applicants had to surmount nu-
merous administrative hurdles.72 Again, it is not clear how often requests
for discharge were refused. In 1795 Denisov, then a thirty-one-year-old
lieutenant-colonel in a Don cossack regiment, came to the capital intend-
ing to apply for discharge, but on being introduced to the empress changed
his mind; four years later he found himself a major-general.73 Demo-
bilizations seem to have occurred in waves, especially at the conclusion
of campaigns; this was certainly the case after the Seven Years’ war (when
they were accelerated by the 1762 edict) and after the Crimean war, when the army's size was substantially reduced; however, no corresponding major movement (except for the militia) seems to have taken place after 1814, which leaves one wondering how far this may have contributed to the disaffection of the future Decembrists. A wave of voluntary resignations occurred during Paul I's reign, on a scale so considerable that it may be regarded as a manifestation of protest against his brutal and arbitrary reinforcement of disciplinary controls.

Only the relatively prosperous and well educated could envisage retirement before expiry of their service term, which in principle was the same as for other ranks. The rest, so long as they remained physically fit, had no choice but to stay on since they were ill equipped for alternative employment. For many poorer gentry the prospect of retirement must have been unwelcome both on material and moral grounds. Löwenstern, who put in for discharge to take up farming at the age of 28 (1804), was sorry to part from the company of his brother officers, and for older men the psychological wrench will have been greater. Many preferred a garrison posting, despite the much reduced pay scale, to return to some bleak rural homestead.

The memoirs are not particularly helpful on this matter. Murav'ev (-Karskii) gives a frank description of the frustration and tedium of life as a pomeshchik, for which he had 'no desire at all'; as one domestic catastrophe followed another he eagerly grasped each passing rumour that he might be taken back into military service. To be sure, his case was unusual in that he had been relegated on suspicion of disloyalty. Most writers seem to have felt it dishonourable to discuss discharge or transfer to civilian service. One man who did so was Venediktov, a graduate of the Moscow Cadet Corps in the 1830's, where he acquired what he refers to cautiously as 'new sentiments' that made the prospect of life in a guards regiment unattractive and led him to 'look for a place'. He provides no details of the bureaucratic procedure involved, but relates how some friends introduced him to a functionary of the Committee of Ministers, who offered him a position as deputy section head (pomoshchnik stolonachal'nika) in the road construction department, which he gratefully accepted. This branch was run on semi-military lines; on the office wall hung birch rods (rozgi) for chastising the clerks, so that his new milieu was painfully familiar.

For many retired officers civil employment was essential to supplement their meagre pension. In the late eighteenth century such persons were assigned to live in specified towns, which had to provide for their support. Personal pensions were awarded only to the most meritorious, and only if they had no private means. Individual application had to be made to the Sovereign, who found the resources at her disposal far from adequate to satisfy all approved claims. In 1803 Alexander I introduced a system of payments graduated according to length of service. There were three main classes: those who had served for 40 years were to receive the equivalent of full pay; those with over 30 years' service that of half pay; and those with 20 years' service were to be fully maintained at State expense. Mosolov provides confirmation that this decree was indeed implemented, for he had served for 32 years and was pensioned
off on half pay.\textsuperscript{78} He adds the significant detail that he was permitted to go on owning his house, but that the rent from it had to be handed over to the authorities, who held it on trust for him; however, the fact that he also possessed an estate (which he had won by gambling) suggests that no thorough attempt was made to relate pensions to alternative sources of income. Other memorialists note the existence of semi-official or private pension schemes.\textsuperscript{79} These were apparently discontinued after the reform of 1827, which introduced far more comprehensive arrangements.\textsuperscript{80} None of our sources refer to them, so that they probably worked satisfactorily; in any case retired officers fared better under Nicholas I than later in the century.

In general military writers were loath to discuss such mundane matters as pay and allowances. One of the few to mention his financial situation was S. I. Maevskii, who was of Polish extraction. He boasts that, whereas his widowed mother in the 1780's had possessed a mere thirty peasant souls (which would have brought her an income of about 200 roubles per annum), by the end of Alexander I's reign he drew a major-general's salary of 8,000 roubles\textsuperscript{81}—albeit in paper assignats. At the beginning of the century another general, Denisov, bought an estate in Voronezh province for 75,000 roubles; he borrowed two-thirds of the purchase price and soon landed in financial difficulties, from which he was rescued by two wealthy comrades. One can scarcely credit his complaints that his salary was inadequate to pay the expenses of his position, so that he 'went short even of necessities'.\textsuperscript{82}

Some less senior officers present a far more plausible picture of economic hardship. Pishchevich junior's inability to take up a lucrative appointment has already been alluded to; six years later he was still dependent on periodical gifts from his tight-fisted father.\textsuperscript{83} In 1778 Colonel von Strandman had to finance a journey from Riga to Astrakhan', at a cost of 229.50 roubles, which made a large dent in his fortune of 442 roubles (hastily supplemented by a 400-rouble loan).\textsuperscript{84} Fifty years later, on the outbreak of war with Turkey, all the (subaltern?) officers in the Pavlovskii guards regiment had to request an advance of pay, since they had no private means. Markov, our informant, received as an ensign a salary of 440 assignat roubles. At that time one\textit{funt} (approx. 400 grams) of tea cost 10 roubles. A young officer could not afford to buy a horse—or to get married; and the colonel showed contempt for his impecunious subordinates, exclaiming 'when will they stop sending me beggars?'\textsuperscript{85} In the 1860's, when the first systematic investigations were undertaken into army officers' material condition, only 16\% were found to own landed estates.\textsuperscript{86}

There existed less legitimate potential sources of income, as we shall see in a moment; but the main beneficiaries of corrupt practices seem to have been regimental commanders (and commissariat officials) rather than the humdrum subaltern.

It is clear that the latter, unless he were from a privileged background, had a hard time making ends meet, even though he enjoyed many amenities denied to the rank and file: better food, clothing and accommodation, an orderly to look after his wants, and a horse (perhaps also a carriage) which might allow him to escape the rigour of long marches.
Nevertheless the gap between junior officers and their men was a good deal narrower than it was in civilian life, and it would be false to assume that the gentry-serf relationship was simply carried over into the military milieu.

This is apparent from frequent references in memoirs to lack of food, especially when on campaign. One source claims that officers were actually worse off than soldiers as they did not get regular allocations but had to make their own arrangements; since there were so many other claims on their resources (for uniforms, horses and so on), ‘they could afford only the most frugal diet’.87 This is perhaps overstating the case; but few officers seem to have had sufficient cash reserves to acquire enough supplies to last them through a campaign, and some lacked the means to transport them. In practice several would club together for messing purposes, in a manner not too different from the soldiers’ artel’. An anonymous writer who took part in the campaign against the Crimean Tatars in 1736 states that ‘each officer was glad if he got his hat filled with grain when it arrived for distribution among his men’ and that he paid no less than six roubles (equivalent to a soldier’s pay for six months) to a sutler (markitant) for a loaf of bread and a rotten cucumber.88 One need not feel too sorry for Mosolov, who complains that in 1772 ‘we suffered much deprivation; there was so little food [...] that even the officers had only boiled beef to eat for two days.’89 Both A. S. Pishchevich and A. I. Viazemskii, however, testify that officers would sometimes have to mess together with their men; when news of such practices reached the empress she expressed concern.90 Pishchevich adds that his soldiers received him well; his initial embarrassment soon wore off and he learned that ‘there is much more nobility of thought among simple people than among those who boast of this [noble] title.’ One can see why Catherine was worried.

In peacetime, of course, supplies were better assured. S. N. Glinka, stationed in Moscow in 1796, states that ‘at that time officers in camp lacked nothing’: his battalion commander, P. S. Bibikov, held open table daily for all of them with money from the so-called ‘economic’ sums or contingency fund, about which more will be said below.91 In the Baltic provinces at this time General Numsen, who headed a cuirassier regiment, gave a weekly dinner for his officers, who sat down to table at 2 p. m. and did not rise until midnight: ‘c’était une véritable orgie. Il fallait boire jusqu’à extinction de force ou de raison’, remarks a participant in these feasts.92 Other nineteenth-century sources corroborate the existence of such practices. They not only gave the impecunious valuable material assistance but served to reinforce regimental loyalties and maintain control. However, once the troops marched off to war the banqueting would suddenly cease. In 1810 Muromtsev in the Balkans was living off horsemeat soup, which he pronounced ‘not bad’, and for Shcherbachev on the Alma in 1854 ‘dinner consisted of only one course, soldiers’ shchi’—which would have been a luxury for those besieged in Sevastopol’ a few months later.

Curiously, the latter two writers are the only ones to allude to the accommodation which officers disposed of during this period. No doubt military men considered it unethical to show too much concern for bodily
comfort. As a young guards officer in St. Petersburg in 1809 Muromtsev shared a three-room apartment in the barracks; one year later he was in a tent, keeping warm by using dried grass as fuel. Shcherbachev, quartered in peacetime among the Chukhontsy (a Finnish people in Ingria), remarked on the primitive squalor of their huts. Normally officers would not have been billeted upon peasants, as were their men, but would have found accommodation on a landowner's estate.

The Russian officer of the 1850's differed from his eighteenth-century forerunner primarily in being better educated. Not only was his attitude to the military craft more professional, but his intellectual horizons had expanded. This process went furthest at the summit of the military hierarchy, so that it is fairly well documented in the memoirs.

The empire was comparatively rich in élite military institutions modelled on those of western Europe. To the Nobles' Land (later First) Cadet Corps, founded in 1731 and much modified by Catherine II, there were successively added specialized 'corps' (i.e. schools) for artillerists and engineers (1762), the Corps of Pages (1802), the Noblemen's Regiment (1807), the Guards Sub-ensigns' school (1823) and several so-called 'junker schools' for training army ensigns; a number of other training colleges were set up in the provinces. Although only about one thousand cadets had graduated by 1800, 4,329 did so during Alexander I's reign and 17,653 during that of his successor. Neizvestnyi thought that 40% of the officer corps under Nicholas I received some kind of higher or secondary education. In 1831, when there were 4,767 pupils in élite military schools, their annual budget stood at 3.3 million roubles, or 698 roubles per head—an inordinately high figure when one recalls that a soldier was then paid from 3 to 6.60 roubles (silver) a year.

The memorialists tell us in great detail what it felt like to enter such schools (often a traumatic experience!), to study in them and to graduate from them; much can also be learned about their administration, personnel, curricula and general ethos. Only a few points will be singled out here. First, the authorities sought to mould an 'officer type' with stereotyped personality traits. These are listed by one writer thus: 'patriotic, modest, cultured, comradely, patient, attentive, efficient [...] and with a pure zeal to repay [the State] for one's education by honourable service, an honourable life and an honourable death.' Second, much emphasis was placed upon the more formal and trivial aspects of the military métier—correct turnout, punctilious drill movements, guard duties and the like—which, as Kolokol'tsov remarks, was designed to enforce respect for hierarchical gradations of rank (chinopochitanie) and certainly did not make for efficiency. Third, discipline was very strict. It was maintained by a system of petty regimentation which stifled individuality and was administered in a cruel and arbitrary fashion.

Although dvoriane had been exempted from corporal punishment by the charter of 1785, this rule was frequently ignored in practice. Some NCOs and teachers lost no opportunity to humiliate upper-class boys whom they considered 'soft', and the older lads emulated them by bullying
their juniors. In the First Cadet Corps in 1808, where the younger boys were taught by women, one instructress would occasionally substitute for a recreation period a one-hour-long study session, after which 'those who had not learned their lesson in time would be beaten with birches (rozgi)—and nanny Ivanovna hit to hurt. Pushes, shoves, bruises, pulling one's hair and ears, striking one's fingers with a ruler—all this was a daily occurrence.' Older boys would be taken to the college armoury for severer punishment. Venediktov, who entered the Noblemen's Regiment in 1830, remembers 'hearing the cries' of a fellow-cadet who was beaten for some trivial prank; another, for breaking a window-latch and replying 'insolently' when reprimanded, was sentenced by the sadistic General I. A. Sukhozanet to 'the bench and the birch', whereupon 300 blows at once rained down upon him.

These tyrannical measures did not achieve their intended object. The cadets responded by neglecting their studies and engaging in acts of passive or active resistance. The first known instance of rebellion occurred in the Corps of Pages around 1813, when a popular cadet named Arsen'ev, abetted by several comrades, resisted 'execution' (the standard term for a military flogging). The matter was thought sufficiently serious to be referred to Alexander I, who decided that the 'ringleader' of the revolt should receive 30 blows. A few years later, in the First Corps, cadets made a point of demonstrating their solidarity, at considerable personal risk, with comrades confined without food in the college jail (kartser). On one occasion (1823) some who were discovered, in their anxiety to escape retribution, broke down a gate, struck two officers and accidentally killed a watchman. The offenders were publicly flogged 'as harshly as soldiers' and then sent off to serve in the ranks.

Alain Besançon has recently noted that during Nicholas I's reign there was '[un] déclin de la vocation militaire' among Russian officers, for which the cadet schools were to blame: 'les écoles de cadets sont ainsi pour la noblesse russe une évocation de son cauchemar: la perte de sa sécurité personnelle, la violation des droits et de la dignité, qu'elle a eu tant de peine à acquérir et dont Paul I et Arakcheev ont montré la précarité.' This is putting it a little too strongly, in our view: certainly many officers did resent the unnecessary hardships imposed upon them by the tsar's militaristic approach to pedagogy, but others were more pliable. In the early 1830's Kolokol'tsov, then a cadet in the Guards Sub-ensigns' school, was discovered riding in a cab (a privilege denied to cadets, as it was to soldiers); he was sentenced to six days' kartser, followed by one month's confinement to barracks and repetition of a year's course of study; it was only thanks to protection by instructors who appreciated his talents that he escaped expulsion. Yet these severe penalties, out of all proportion to the gravity of his offence, did not lead Kolokol'tsov to question such disciplinarian methods; on the contrary, he observes meekly that they turned out useful, competent officers. Even the critics seem to have objected more to the way the principles were applied than to the principles themselves. Their opposition was, as we might say today, 'non-systemic'.

Conformist political attitudes were only to be expected, given the elitist nature of the student body, the character of the instruction, and the
general political climate. The emergence of a critical spirit among Russian officers has to be seen as one element in a many-sided and gradual process of intellectual maturation. Too often it is considered simply as an automatic response to experiences gained in central and western Europe in the years after 1813. Foreign influences were indeed important, but their source was not always the countries that one might suppose: Poland, and later Austria, may have been as significant before 1812 as Germany or France were to be thereafter; and their role should not be exaggerated.

In the late eighteenth century Russian officers spent their leisure hours in the traditional manner, much as might be expected: carousing, gambling and pursuing the fair sex. A. S. Pishchevich claims to have avoided the first of these vices, says nothing of the second, but makes much of his gallant exploits. Yet an improvement was already under way: when stationed on the Kuban' in 1787 he attended amateur theatricals in which certain roles were taken by his unit commander's children; three or four years later, in Bessarabia, he went to 'routs' (raduty) at which officers could play cards and dance either with each other's wives or with Moldavian boyar ladies; these seem to have been very proper entertainments, a modest charge being made for admission. In 1809 Muromtsev went to the Hermitage theatre 'almost every Sunday' — something he particularly appreciated since before his promotion to officer rank this privilege had been denied him. The co-tenant of his apartment was an aspiring dramatist, S. P. Zhikharev, who introduced him to the artistic milieu, and soon Muromtsev was helping him with his literary work; subsequently he joined an informal circle, organized by M. A. Fonvizin, to study military history. The young officers discussed the merits of ancient Athenian democracy in a manner too free for the taste of their commander and soon found themselves in trouble. The episode was a harbinger of what would become almost commonplace in the capital cities after the war of 1812-1814.

During those campaigns some officers at least spent their leisure hours in more cultured fashion than their predecessors. F. N. Glinka mentions that on a winter evening 'we go to the colonel's or the general's [Miloradovich] to read, draw, talk and joke. Our commander's kindness and a pleasing informality distinguish these evening conversations.' Chicherin, bout studiously over his diary, was mocked by a brother officer, Okunev, of whom he records that his mind was 'closed to the pleasures of existence', namely reading, drawing and good talk. In the postwar years a number of the more cultured and serious-minded young officers arranged to share living expenses and to enjoy in this way the pleasure of one another's company. One such artel' that has been thoroughly studied was set up by the three Murav'ev brothers and had fourteen members; another, involving some fifteen to twenty officers, existed from 1815 in the Semenovskii regiment, and a third among the Izmailovtsy. Its founders, the brothers M. N. and N. N. Semenov, possessed a well-stocked library of French classics. It was in their company that around 1821 the future Decembrist A. S. Ganjeblov, stationed in what he called a 'terribly remote' village (not far from the capital!), came across the works of Rousseau. 'I was struck',

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he records, 'by the novelty and daring of his views on the way Man had distorted his nature as he passed through the labyrinth of civilization.' A comrade who dropped by for a game of chess had even more advanced opinions: all art, he maintained, was 'unnatural', a luxury for a minority of privileged aesthetes, who indulged their fancies while most of mankind was struggling grimly for subsistence.\textsuperscript{115} The social conscience had been born, and with it a puritanism that would flower in a later age.

The ultimate sources of this new spirit may be traced back to the literary and philosophical influences to which these officers had been exposed during their education, but they would have remained mere abstractions had it not been for their personal experiences during the Napoleonic wars. The young men of Alexander I's reign were more introspective than their fathers; they sought to understand the reasons for their presence in camp or on the battlefield and to analyse their emotions at the sight of hardship and suffering. No longer willing to accept their lot as naturally befitting servitors of the God-given monarch, they began to probe into the whys and wherefores of their condition.

On 10 October 1812 Chicherin discussed with some friends the moral corruption that seemed to him inescapable in high society. 'Man is born to live among people like himself'; one had an obligation 'to make others happy', 'to try to be useful', 'to serve others'—in these unaffected terms the young diarist summed up his philosophy of life.\textsuperscript{116} One of his interlocutors was Iakushkin, the later Decembrist, but there is no reason to assume that either man influenced the other; such ideas were in the air at the time, and a casual mention of the social contract suggests their source. Chicherin was naively, pathetically keen to perform his military duties to the best of his ability; several times he refers to his readiness to lay down his life for his country (which he eventually did): 'I shall be happy to die defending my mother land, the faith and the just cause.'\textsuperscript{117} He identified strongly with those commanders or fellow-officers who lived up to his own heroic ideal, and in so doing developed his critical faculties; on the basis of gossip and rumour he distinguished between the successful generals and those who committed errors, including among the latter the commander-in-chief, Kutuzov.\textsuperscript{118}

Of particular interest is Chicherin's attitude toward the horrors of war. At first the sight of seriously wounded men left to die without medical care made him 'turn aside, perhaps with a sigh, and seize the least excuse to forget'; but a few weeks later he says that he cannot become accustomed to the heaps of frozen corpses along the route.\textsuperscript{119} Other writers too seemed initially content with an aesthetic concern for their own emotions; but as time passed they developed compassion for the innocent victims, respect for those—all too few—individuals who tried to relieve the suffering, and disgust at those on either side who committed deliberate acts of barbarism, such as 'finishing off' enemy wounded.\textsuperscript{120} Löwenstern was present when a watchmaker of Dorogobuzh led his fellow-partisans in a \textit{pogrom} against a totally demoralized party of invaders, in which the man claimed to have killed twenty with his own hands; the spectacle led Löwenstern 'to groan over the calamities inseparable from warfare'.\textsuperscript{121} After coming upon evidence of a mass killing by cossacks, Antonovskii 'first raised [his] eyes to Heaven, rever-
ing the inscrutable ways of Providence', but then began 'to contemplate the fate of these unfortunates': where, he asked himself, did responsibility for the atrocity lie? Had the victims perhaps been found dead by the cossacks, and not killed by them? Clearly this line of thought could not be pressed too far, at least in print, without raising larger issues of responsibility for the war. In 1812 all the blame could plausibly be laid upon the invader, but when Russian troops misbehaved abroad the question was harder to resolve.

At the war's end there was widespread hope within the officer corps, especially in guards regiments, that Alexander I would undertake major reforms in the armed forces and in society generally. The cruel disappointment of these hopes during the so-called Arakcheevshchina led the more adventurous spirits along the path of scheming and eventually conspiracy—with results that are common knowledge. 'Decembrism' was not a coherent philosophy but a state of mind; its chief element was a new-found and quite justifiable pride in the army's achievements, of which government and society ought to take adequate account. Only a few extremists, notably P. I. Pestel', wished the army to play a direct part in the country's political life by establishing a Bonapartist-type dictatorship, but all were imbued with respect for the military virtues. Nationalism loomed as large in their thinking as liberalism or humanitarianism, and their condemnation of serfdom was rooted in a desire to preserve the national unity that had been demonstrated so effectively in 1812. As firm believers in maintenance of the Russian empire, they were suspicious of such minority groups as Poles, Germans and Jews: the first because they were inconstant in their loyalty during the war, the second because they were thought to enjoy the ruler's special favour, and the third for reasons that had more to do with traditional religious and cultural prejudice.

The nationalist motif was most pronounced among members of the Murav'ev clan. A. M. Murav'ev's oft-cited remark that after 1812 Alexander I rewarded his Polish subjects with a constitution but his Russian ones with military colonies may reflect views that he developed later in life; but Murav'ev(-Karskii), whose memoirs were written (but not published!) in 1818, makes a similar point: Alexander, he writes, 'won the goodwill of the French but so caused his victorious army to complain against him.' The same view is expressed by Matvei Murav'ev-Apostol', younger brother of the leader of the Chernigov regiment's abortive revolt.

It is a misapprehension to believe that Russian officers who went abroad to fight were necessarily bowled over by the superior conditions they encountered there. A study of their memoirs suggests a more nuanced interpretation. F. N. Glinka describes enthusiastically the prosperity of the Austrian countryside that he saw for the first time in 1805 and the 'free rights' enjoyed by merchants and peasants; on entering Silesia eight years later he is equally outspoken in praise of the social arrangements there; but Paris strikes him unfavourably as 'a new Babylon', whose swollen populace, he thinks, should be returned to the villages so that they might devote themselves to useful toil. A similar view is expressed by Murav'ev(-Karskii): in Baden-Württemberg he is struck
by ‘the dense population, the fine villages with gardens all around, and fields worked incomparably better than in any other country’; but on crossing the French border he found the inhabitants dirty, impoverished and ignorant. ‘Where is that douce France of which our tutors had told us, I wondered.’ Perhaps it still lay ahead, in the capital? But Paris disappoints him too: life is expensive and the people unfriendly; as a professional soldier Murav’ev is more impressed by the Invalides than the Louvre; dutifully he paces out the full length of the Grande Galerie, commenting: ‘I was unable to judge the beauty of the pictures and statues, although I couldn’t help stopping to admire the best’—and after these brief remarks passes on with evident relief to details of his homeward journey.127

Even a young subaltern like Chicherin, who had never been abroad before, realizes that the relative prosperity of German peasants—even the poorest, he commented, had horses fit to draw a carriage—is due to the superiority of the political-administrative system under which they live. At Bunzlau (Silesia) he comes upon a throng of well-dressed, cheerful farmers standing in front of the town-hall, and discovers to his surprise that they have come to pay their taxes. And yet

‘the love I bear my fatherland burns like a pure flame, elevating my heart; it is a source of quiet joy to me [...] and I shall maintain it until I die [...] We continually see here the achievements of civilization, for they are evident in everything—in the manner of cultivating fields, building homes, and in customs—yet never, not even for a minute, would I wish to settle under an alien sky, in a land other than that where I was born and where my forefathers were laid to rest.’128

Thus foreign experience augmented the sense of malaise that Russian officers felt about the direction of affairs at home. It produced contradictory emotions of admiration mixed with shame and envy, a mood that would later be given a philosophical foundation by the emergent intelligentsia but which in the present generation helped to paralyse their will to act. The history of ‘Decembrism’ is long on good intentions but short on deeds: the coup d’état was badly bungled, and even within their own milieu the reformers’ stance was ambiguous. Some of the most important measures taken at this time to promote the soldiers’ well-being were the work of moderates like M. S. Vorontsov, while the radicals, who looked forward to a citizen army on the French model, had a certain sympathy for tough disciplinary regulations. This helps to explain their irresolution and awkwardness in trying to cultivate good relations with their men.129

Russian officers at this time—like the dvorianstvo whence they sprang—had as yet only an embryonic political consciousness. As military men, bound by their oath and brought up in a spirit of unquestioning obedience to authority, they remained monarchists by conviction: Pestel’ was an obvious exception, but then his republicanism was of a peculiar kind. Most would have been well satisfied even with Alexander I, had he but paid greater heed to army opinion. Their attitude to the ruler was intensely personal and emotional, perhaps even more so than it was among civilians. One catches a glimpse of this in
the frank confession which some arrested Decembrists made to Nicholas I, or in the adulation which this upholder of absolutist principles received from many of his officers. Markov, when presented to the tsar, feared he would collapse, for 'he appeared before my eyes as the very embodiment of the idea of totality [...] I felt the tears coursing silently down both cheeks.' Kolokol'tsov tells the story of a certain major-general, Mikulin, who 'worshipped' the Imperial family to the point of fanaticism; on receiving an official report from the tsarevich Alexander, he declared that the precious document should be buried with him in his tomb—as indeed it eventually was, after a funeral ceremony held in the presence of the entire regiment. Another officer, after waiting on parade for four and a half hours in the early morning before the Sovereign appeared, was overawed by Nicholas's physical presence: 'what a marvel of a man he is; with what majesty and yet benevolence he inspects the soldiers.' Veneration for the supreme power might well be accompanied by a critical attitude towards his entourage, and high-ranking dignitaries in general. Such rivalries within the élite helped to give the Russian autocracy its extraordinary staying power.

What these officers lacked in political savoir-faire they made up for in moral sensitivity and zeal. A number of writers denounce corruption, inefficiency and malfeasance among their superiors; understandably, they were less ready to confess their own misdeeds. The impression one gets is that these vices were most prevalent under Catherine, when controls were feeble; this may, however, be less than just, since the bureaucratic centralization carried through by her successors did not eliminate the evil. Perhaps regimental commanders no longer engaged in such spectacular offences, but the incidence of petty peculation increased; there is no sure means of knowing.

For the late eighteenth century A. S. Pishchevich is once again an invaluable source. He is very explicit on the manner of passing a bribe. In 1795 he went to St. Petersburg to expedite his promotion to first major; early one morning a secretary in the War College, Tarutin, came to his lodgings unexpectedly and said that he 'was willing to serve him if he [Pishchevich] would advise him how to proceed'; a few days later Tarutin told him that his papers were in order and that gifts totalling 800 roubles were expected. Pishchevich refused to pay. (He does not say whether his promotion went through; as he soon transferred to the civil service, he will have qualified for advancement then in any case.) Tuchkov offers a detailed breakdown of the principal illegal ways in which a colonel could accumulate funds:

"Savings were obtained from (i) the remains of fabrics used to make soldiers' clothing; (ii) keeping fewer horses than prescribed for the baggage-train and artillery; (iii) the men's food allowance (proviant) [...] while they were quartered in the villages; (iv) keeping the pay and allowances of soldiers sent on leave; (v) keeping the pay and allowances of deceased soldiers whose death was not reported for several years (this was the most profitable method); (vi) taking men from the regiment into their own service, training them in various skills, and pocketing their pay;
in general [such] soldiers had to give part of their earnings to the regiment.”

The last remark shows that both officers and men stood to gain from such an arrangement and that an element of collusion was involved. This point is overlooked in historical accounts, where the practice is treated simply as an extension of serfdom into State service. It might equally well be regarded as an outgrowth of the soldiers’ artel’; to the extent that the men benefited materially from private employment, it cannot be dismissed as mere exploitation, and even where they received no monetary reward they may have appreciated a temporary escape from the parade-ground to a familiar rural environment. In any case climatic conditions made military labour a necessity at harvest time. The chief loser from the practice was not the soldier but the State, which had to go on paying soldiers who were only nominally in its service. One military historian claims (without providing evidence) that some 50,000 men, roughly one-eighth of total effective, were employed in this way at the end of the eighteenth century. Legislators frequently inveighed against the practice but on occasion were obliged to tolerate it. Such ambivalence could only encourage a hypocritical attitude among those involved.

A colonel’s profits were not all personal income. Tuchkov points out that some commanders used their funds to assist poorer officers, and this is attested from other sources; another portion might go to embellishment of the regiment. On handing over his command, the colonel would enter into official and unofficial financial transactions with his successor. If there was a large deficit in the accounts, he might be obliged to make it up before the new appointee would accept his responsibilities. Alternatively, a wealthy commander might buy his entrée by taking over his predecessor’s debts. Bona fide shortages would sometimes be made up by higher authority. At such moments informal patronage relationships were of considerable importance. Sometimes a situation would arise where the officers could make their influence felt collectively, and lobbies would form for and against the departing colonel. In the most favourable circumstances his partisans might raise money on his behalf; in the worst a colonel in debt who died might have his property sold off at auction. It was precisely to guard against such contingencies that unit commanders sought to build up unofficial reserve funds. At first tolerated by the State, this practice was legalized by Nicholas I and the money invested on the regiment’s behalf. Even so one may doubt whether more than a small fraction of the funds held back was reported. Estimates of a colonel’s ‘take’ are available only for the 1780’s; Von Hupel puts it at 2,000 - 6,000 roubles per annum, and notes that cavalry officers did better than others.

From this it is clear that Russian regiments, and indeed the army as a whole, had an ‘inner life’ of which only faint traces have been left in military memoirs. Yet for all its limitations this source lifts a corner of the veil that still enshrouds the social history of the institution which, after the autocracy itself, was the mightiest in the land.

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THE MILITARY MEMOIR


5. They have disappointingly little to say about their men, and only three pieces were written by non-officers: I. M. Mineaev, "Vospominaniiia Ivana Men'shogo 1806-1849", *Russkaya starina* (hereafter RS) 10 (1874): 46-59, who is revealing on recruitment procedure; P. N. Nazarov, "Zapiski soldata Pamilova Nazarova, v inochestve Mitrofana, 1792-1839 gg.," RS, 22 (1878): 529-556; [I. Zagorodnikov], "Dnevnik russkogo soldata, vziatogo v plen pri Bomarzunde v 1854 g.," RS, 80 (1893): 265-212, who describes his captivity in England.


9. D. I. Iazykov, ed., "Zapiski Vasilii Aleksandrovicha Nashchokina, generala vremen elizavetinskikh," *Russkii arkhiv* (hereafter RA), 21 (1883): 2: 243-352 (cited as V. A. Nashchokin, "Zapiski"). Some would claim this honour for I. A. Zhelabuzhskii, whose *Dnevnye zapiski*, first published in 1840, cover the period 1862 to 1870; but his duties were as much civil as military.


14. Zhizn' A. S. Pishechevicha, im samim opisannia, 1764-1805 (with a preface by N. Popov) (Moscow, 1885) (cited as A. S. Pishechvich, Zhizn').

15. K. A. Voenskii, ed., *Zapiski Sergeia Alekseevicha Tuchkova, 1766-1808*
A. B. Antonovskiy, "Zapiski," in V. Kharkevich, ed., 1872 g. v dnevnikakh, zapiskakh i vospominanitahkh sovremennikov... (Vilna, 1900-1904) 3: 1-207.

21. F. N. Glinka, Pis'ma russkogo ofitsera o Pol'she, Ausiriiskikh vlaedaniakh, Prussii i Frantsii (Moscow, 1815-1816).

22. N. N. Murav'ev-(Karskiy), "Zapiski," RA, 1885-1889, 1891, 1894-1895; for full bibliographic reference see P. A. Zaiuchkovskiy, op. cit.: 145.


31. Colonel P. I. Pestel', who paid for his views with his life, was untypical. Admittedly radicals would have been less able or willing to write memoirs, even "for the drawer"; however, the exception that proves the rule is N. A. Mombelli, one of the "Petrashetsy", whose diary for May-November 1847 shows him to be mentally unbalanced: cf. his "Zapiski", in V. Desnitskii, ed., Delo petrashevtsev (Moscow-Leningrad, 1937) I: 287-315.

32. For a discussion of these difficulties see R. E. Jones, op. cit.: 43; and W. M. Pintner, "Russia as a great power, 1709-1856," (Kennan Institute Occasional paper, no 33. Washington, 1976): 34.

33. S. A. Tuchkov, Zapiski, 14.


35. G. D. Shcherbachev, art. cit.: 87, 123; for a recent analysis of this phenomenon see W. B. Lincoln, "The composition of the Imperial Russian State Council
under Nicholas I," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 10 (1976): 369-381, and
38. *Ibid. :* 184.
40. T. von Bernhardi, *Denkwürdigkeiten des kaiserlichen russischen Generals
der Infanterie Carl Friedrich Grafen von Toll* (Leipzig, 1856-1858), I: 3, 14.
41. S. M. Zagorskin, "Vospominания," *Istoricshkii vestnik*, 80 (1900): 60; he
later served in the militia.
(1874): 22.
44. "Zapiski ostavstvnogo general-maiora Sergeiya Ivanovicha Mosolova. Istoriia
45. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi Imperii* (hereafter cited as *PSZ*), sobr. I, XVI,
no 11771 (8 Mar. 1763); N. Dubrovin, *A. V. Suvorov sredi preobrazovatelei
ekaterininskoi armii* (Spb, 1886): 13; D. F. Maslovskii, *Zapiska po istorii voennogo
tsiklustva v Rossii, 2: Tsarstvovanie Ekateriny II* (Spb, 1894): 43; M. Sokolovskii
(*op. cit.*), *Iz materialov po istorii russkoi konntsys, II: Proekt o proizvodstve v
ofitsery za otlichnie a ne za vyslugu (1817 g.)," *VS*, 12 (1904): 179.
46. V. A. Nashchokin, "Zapiski": 304, 309, 323, 349.
47. S. A. Tuchakov, *Zapiski*: 3.
48. "Rasskazy kniazia P. M. Volkonskogo, zapisannye s ego slov A. V. Viskovatym
v ianvare 1845 g.," *RS*, 16 (1876): 177.
(Cited as M. M. Muromtsev, "Vospominaniiata").
51. "Zapiska grafa S. R. Vorontsova o russkoi voiske, predstavlennoi imp.
Aleksandru Pavlovichu v 1802 g.," *Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova, 10 (Bumagi grafa
S. R. Vorontsova, III)* (Moscow, 1876): 487; D. F. Maslovskii, *op. cit.,* 3: 10; *PSZ*,
XVI, no 11770 (3 Mar. 1763); A. W. von Hupel, *Beschreibung der Russisch-
Kaiserthumischen Arme nebst andern kürzern Aufsätzen...* (Riga, 1782; rpt. Hannover-
Döhren, 1972): 58, 95; L. I. Sazonov, "Attestat," in *Voennaiia entsikhlopediia*
(Moscow, 1911) 3: 247-249.
52. *TvSVA*, fond Voenno-uchenogo arkhiva 1349, delo 300 (Raporty gen.
Levanidova o sustoianii voisk, 1796 g.), II, 19-20 (petition by Capt. D. R. Kosssov-
ski, 23 (Capt. V. A. Kuzmin.
53. M. Rzhhevskii (*op. cit.*), "O russkoi armii vo vtoroi polovine Ekaterininskogo
54. C. von Plotho, *Über die Entstehung, die Fortschritte und die gegenwärtige
Verfassung der russischen Armee, doch insbesondere von der Infanterie* (Berlin, 1811):
75-
55. Stecherbatow, *Le feld-maréchal prince Paskievitch: sa vie politique et milita-
ire, d’après des documents inédits* (Spb, 1888-1890) I: 81; *Russkii biograficheskii
d Vorot* (St. Petersburg, 1902) 8: 423, 430.
56. D. G. Kolokol’tsov, "Vospominaniiata": 618, 620.
57. S. A. Tuchakov, *Zapiski*: 124. Officially there was a two-grade difference
at this time between the guards and the army.
*PSZ*, 23, no 17140 (12 Sept. 1793), paras. 7. Löwensten was once a supernumerary
(*Mémoires*, I: 73), but says nothing about the fact.
59. *PSZ*, 17, no 12552 (27 Jan. 1766) specified three years but this was later
shortened to one: 27, no 20358 (3 Aug. 1802).
60. S. I. Mosolov, "Zapiski": 148.
61. F. N. Ginka, *op. cit.,* part IV: 102; "Vospominaniiata L. A. Naryshkina," in
V. Kharkevich, ed., *op. cit.,* 2: 151; Löwensten, *Mémoires*, I: 177; cf. S. I. Maevskii,
62. C. A. Haillot, *Statistique militaire et recherches sur l’organisation et les insti-
63. *PSZ*, 7, no 5016.
64. N. A. Popov, *op. cit.:* 484; A. S. Pischchevich, *Zhizn’:* 32. In the latter
case this may have been because he was supernumerary; no clear distinction was
drawn between the two types of absence.
66. E. Shchepkina, foreword to Dnevnih poruchika Vasil'eva (Spb, 1896): v.
This memoir is unfortunately of next to no value.
68. N. Dubrovin, op. cit.: 133.
69. "Iz zapisok general-adiutanta grafa E. F. Komarovskogo," RA (1867),
col. 760. (Komarovski's memoirs were published in monograph form in St. Peters-
burg in 1914.)
70. E.g. PSZ, 24, no 17570 (20 Nov. 1796).
71. Ts GVIA, fond 11, op. VIII, ed. khr. 1 (War College reports on personnel
matters), l. 24 (case of Lieutenant-general V. Dolgorukov, 6 Febr. 1795); most of
these requests for discharge were on grounds of wounds or old age.
72. There was an obligatory minimum service term; requests had to be sub-
mitted through a multiplicity of instances, and only during a limited season.
Cf. PSZ, 23, no 17110 (Apr. 1793).
74. Löwenstern, Mémobres, I: 85.
75. N. N. Murav'ev-(Karskii), "Iz zapisok N. N. Murav'eva," RA, 1 (1895):
76. I. I. Venediktov, art. cit.: 274, 590, 40-52.
77. "It is impossible to make grants to these officers from the State Treasury":
Ts GVIA, fond 11, op. VIII, ed. khr. 1, l. 29 (Catherine II - War College, 20 Oct.
1795); l. 36 (Statement of accounts of the Order of St. George). For a survey of
the relevant legislation see N. Solov'ev, "O pensiakh za voennuiu sluzhbu
v Rossii v XVIII i XIX st.," VS, 210 (1893): 302-312; cf. also D. Berezhkov, "Isto-
richeskii ocherk prizreniia ranenkih," VS, 137 (1881), pt. 2: 36-58, 138 (1881),
tsarstvovaniia imp. Ekateriny II: materialy dlia russkoi voennoi istorii (Moscow,
1898): 83-90.
78. S. I. Mosolov, "Zapiski," 154, 173.
79. S. N. Glinka, Zapiski: 24 (Kutuzov's widow); N. N. Murav'ev -(Karskii),
80. "Ustav o pensiakh i edinovremennykh posobiakh," in PSZ, sobr. II, 2,
no 1592 (6 Dec. 1827): 1032-1044.
81. S. I. Mavrikii, art. cit.: 129, 447.
82. A. K. Denisov, art. cit., (1875): 244-249.
84. G. von Strandman, "Zapiski," 84.
87. E. von Stork, Denkschrift über die Kaiserlich Russische Kriegsmacht...
(Leipzig, 1828): 45.
88. "Tureckaiia voina pri imperatritse Anne. Sovremennaiia rukopis,'" fore-
word by S. Safonov, RA, 3 (1877): 262. According to the 1731 slitya a soldier was
paid 10-98 roubles per annum plus 72 kopecks "meat money".
89. S. I. Mosolov, "Zapiski": 130.
90. A. S. Pishchevich, Zhizn': 38; A. I. Viazemskii, "Zapiska voennaia, pisani-
aia... v oktiabre 1774 g.," in Archiv kniasia A. I. Viazemskogo, ed. S. D. Shere-
meteva (Spb, 1881): 20; N. Dubrovin, op. cit.: 9, citing archival source.
92. Löwenstern, Mémoire, I: 25.
93. M. M. Muromtsev, "Vospominaniiia": 76; G. D. Shcherbachev, art. cit.: 250.
94. M. M. Muromtsev, "Vospominaniiia": 70, 76.
95. G. D. Shcherbachev, art. cit.: 104.
96. L. G. Beskrovnyi, Russkaiia armiiia... v XVIII v., op. cit.: 450; idem,
Russkaiia armiiia... v XIX v., op. cit.: 123-129; A. N. Petrov, ed., Russkaiia voennaia
sil: istorii razvitiiia voennogo dela ot nachala Rusi do nashego vremeni, 2nd ed.
(Moscow, 1892) II: 154-155.
97. Neizvestnyi, "Za mnogo let": 120.
98. J. Tanski, Tableau statistique, politique et moral du système militaire de la
THE MILITARY MEMOIR


100. D. G. Kolokol'tsov, "Vospominanija": 276.


108. A. S. Pischevich, Zhizn': 38, 40, 149.

109. Ibid.: 87, 133. At this time officers were often allowed to take their wives and families on campaign, if they could afford to do so.

110. M. M. Muronmstev, "Vospominanija": 78.

111. Ibid.: 69, 71, 78.


117. Ibid.: 18.

118. Ibid.: 55, 87.


121. Löwenstern, Mémoires, 1: 328-329.


126. F. N. Glinka, op. cit., I: 6, 19, 54, 179; IV: 249; V: 15-16, 186-188; VIII: 32.

127. N. N. Murav'ev(-Karskii), "Zapiski": 71, 75, 110-117. For more positive views of French life: S. I. Maevskii, art. cit.: 288-289; 302; S. Ia. Shtraykh, op. cit.: 8. Iakushkin's oft-cited remark that "one year's stay in Germany and then several months in Paris could not but change the views of any thinking Russian youth; in such a tremendous environment each of us matured a bit" was written in 1854!


129. See my The Russian army's response to the French revolution" (forthcoming) and for a different interpretation, the very thorough study by E. A. Prokof'ev, Voennyie vzgliady dekabristov (Moscow, 1953).

130. M. A. Markov, art. cit.: 84.

131. D. G. Kolokol'tsov, "Vospominanija": 297, 305.


133. G. I. Vinski, author of "Moe vremia: zapiski," RA (1877) (also published separately Spb. 1914 and reprinted Newtonville, Mass., 1974 with an introduction by I. de Madariaga), was sent to Orenburg for a scandal in which two guards officers stole 500 roubles from a State institution in Reval: but he gives no details of the incident.

134. A. S. Pischevich, Zhizn': 211. Tarutin was exposed, discharged, and exiled by Paul I.


137. For bans on it: PSZ, 5, no. 2638 (28 Jan. 1713); 22, no. 15984 (18 Apr. 1784); 24, no. 17576 (22 Nov. 1796); 34, no. 26772 (15 Mar. 1817); for tolerance of it: Ustav voinskii (1716 g.), in Pamiatniki russkogo prava, K. A. Sofronenko ed. (Moscow, 1961) 8: 333 (arts 54-55); PSZ, 24, no. 17856 (28 Febr. 1797); 27, no. 20865 (25 Jul. 1803).
