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The Rape of Baturyn: The Archaeological Evidence

Volodymyr Kovalenko

In the final months of 1707, at the very height of the Northern War, King Charles XII of Sweden marched eastward with 44,000 troops—a huge army in those days—intent on pushing the Muscovite state away from the Baltic Sea and Central Europe. He had already succeeded in subduing Denmark, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Saxony, whose leaders had tried to halt Swedish expansion on the European continent. Charles was convinced that the time had come for Sweden to deal decisively with another enemy, Peter I of Russia, whose troops had been taught a harsh lesson at the Battle of Narva on 20 November 1700.1 A country practically lacking all natural resources, Sweden had managed to create a mighty empire, having unpredictably expanded its borders on the Baltic Sea at the expense of its neighbors, Denmark, Saxony, Poland-Lithuania, and Russia. From his father, Charles XI, the young Swedish monarch had inherited a properly functioning state, a powerful naval fleet, and a large, well-trained, and well-equipped army that specialists justly considered to be one of the best in Europe.

Despite the numerical superiority of Russian troops, Peter was very uneasy at the prospect of facing the best army in Europe. Not entirely convinced of the battle-readiness of his newly formed regiments, the Russian tsar resolved to use an ancient, Scythian-era tactic against the enemy: withdraw deep into the country, along the way destroying all possible supplies and resources ahead of the advancing enemy, and simultaneously evading decisive battles. It goes without saying that during this type of operation the fate of the local population was of no concern to either of the warring sides. Towns and villages were methodically burned to the ground, and all supplies were shipped out or destroyed so that the enemy could not lay his hands on anything. Any resistance was decisively and mercilessly crushed. Soon, the Swedes were forced to begin economizing not only on food but also gunpowder. The triumphant march of the undefeated army, which was complicated by endless skirmishes with Peter’s mobile detachments and local partisans, was inexorably turned into a struggle for survival. There was only one solution: to catch up with and
defeat the elusive Tsar Peter. A frenzied race to close the gap began in the impenetrable Polissian swamps. Charles XII, elated by the fact that from time to time his troops managed to inflict annoying blows on his enemy, failed to notice that his army was gradually melting away, and, along with it, all chance of success. The 29 September 1708 defeat at Lesnaia of General Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt, who together with King Charles was leading a huge baggage train with artillery, gunpowder, and supplies, spelled the definitive end of the Swedes’ hopes for a speedy victory. Before the onset of winter Charles decided to head for the food-rich south, to “Cossackia”—that is, Ukraine, where he expected to remain until springtime, when he would resume his march on Moscow and inflict a decisive defeat on his enemy.

However, this course of events hardly suited the ruling Ukrainian elite headed by Hetman Ivan Mazepa. After all, no matter which of the warring sides would be victorious, the only prospects awaiting Ukraine were the ashes of smoldering ruins and the suffering of its civilian population. Therefore, Mazepa, pressured by his closest associates and after lengthy reflections and vacillations, decided to make a cardinal change to his political orientation and ally himself with Charles XII, of whose victory the hetman, like all of Europe, was almost absolutely certain. On 29 October 1708 Mazepa and his followers arrived at the Swedish camp near the village of Hirky, next to Novhorod-Siverskyi. The arrival of Mazepa, who had promised to place many thousands of Cossack troops at Charles’s disposal and to supply the Swedes with all necessary supplies in exchange for an alliance, was most fortuitous.

By this time Mazepa had already amassed considerable quantities of food and forage in his capital, Baturyn, as well as gunpowder, the scarcity of which was causing the Swedes increasing difficulties. Baturyn was protected by a reliable garrison of between 7,000 and 8,000 troops loyal to Mazepa, and some 70 to 100 cannon. During the Battle of Poltava, which would decide the fate of Europe, the Russian army had nearly a hundred cannon, and the Swedes thirty-four, only four of which were used during the battle because of the lack of gunpowder. It thus becomes clear why Peter, after learning of this turn of events, dispatched to Baturyn an entire corps consisting of between 15,000 and 20,000 soldiers commanded by his favorite, Aleksandr Menshikov, with orders not to allow the Swedes to take advantage of these supplies at any cost. "Prince Menshikov with part of the army is to go and capture Baturyn, where Mazepa's fellow thinkers, Colonel [Dmytro] Chechel’ and the aide-de-camp Keniksek [Friedrich von Königseck] have established themselves with the Cherkassy [Ukrainian Cossacks]." Not aware of the mood in the Baturyn garrison, Menshikov sought to convince its commanders to admit the Russian troops into the fortress under the pretext of strengthening its defenses. "Because we have news about the enemy's approach toward the Desna and about his intention, in crossing that [river], to march to Baturyn, for that reason the great sovereign
ordered that a regiment of Great Russian infantry be attached to the Little Russian troops to the garrison in that castle in order better to repulse the enemy. ...And for that reason, it is incumbent on Col. Chechel’ immediately to admit the Great Russian troops into that castle and together with them to rebuff the enemy’s attack, to which castle’s assistance the great sovereign himself, together with his army, will deign to arrive.”

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What kind of a city was Baturyn at the time when the Russian troops approached it in the fall of 1708? Unfortunately, not a single plan of medieval Baturyn has been discovered to this day, and after the city was destroyed all the structures of the hetman’s residence (like Mazepa’s suburban manor in Honcharivka) were dismantled for building materials. For obvious reasons, Soviet historians avoided all research on Baturyn- and Mazepa-related topics, mentioning only the “glorious victory” achieved by Menshikov, “a fledgling from Peter’s nest,” over a “little band of traitors,” whom “ordinary Ukrainians did not support.” What’s more, even though Soviet archaeologists recognized that the ruins of Baturyn were an unparalleled archaeological monument of the Cossack era, they too had to steer clear of this topic. Thus, for centuries these meager accounts of contemporaries and eyewitnesses were the only source of information about the socio-topographic structure of Baturyn. On 26 May 1994 the “Hetman Capital” State Historical and Cultural Preserve was established in Baturyn (designated today as an urban-type village) by Presidential Directive no. 201. The international archaeological expedition, launched by the T. H. Shevchenko National Pedagogical University of Chernihiv and the Institute of Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, began its work in Baturyn in the summer of 1995. In 1995–97 and 2000–2010 archaeologists explored more than 5,000 square meters of the cultural stratum within the protected zones of the ruined city. Based on the accumulated research, they were able to sketch the first general plan of the preserve’s defensive zones, which was approved [...] on 6 March 1996 by the Chernihiv Oblast State Administration in order to draw wider public attention to Baturyn.

From 2001 to 2010, the Baturyn archaeological project was sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS), the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (PIMS) at the University of Toronto, and the Shevchenko Scientific Society of America (NTSh-A). Prof. Zenon Kohut, the director of the CIUS, heads the Baturyn project. Dr. Orest Popovych, the president of NTSh-A, is as a patron and academic adviser to this undertaking. The author of this article (Chernihiv National Pedagogical University, Ukraine) heads the archaeological expedition in Baturyn. Dr. Volodymyr Mezentsev (CIUS) is the co-head and an executive director of the Baturyn project on the Canadian side.
Prof. Martin Dimnik (PIMS) collaborates on the historical research of medieval Baturyn and the publication of the project results in North America. Every year during the last decade up to 160 students and scholars from universities and museums based in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Nizhyn, Hlukhiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Melitopol, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and other Ukrainian cities, as well as Toronto, Edmonton, and Montreal (Canada), have taken part in the excavations in Baturyn.

Recent archaeological research has revealed that Baturyn comprised a citadel (Lytov’s’kyi zamok/Lithuanian Castle), the city itself, which was also protected by mighty fortifications (a fortress), the Podil—the lower part of the city—and unfortified suburban settlements (figs. 1–2; all figures are found at the end of this article). Adjacent to Baturyn were numerous suburban granges and farmsteads owned by Cossack officers, the Baturyn St. Nicholas Krupys’kyi Monastery, and others.5 The center of medieval Baturyn was the citadel, an ancient castle dating to the Kyivan Rus’ era, which was restored in the early part of the seventeenth century and began functioning as the residence of the Ukrainian hetmans after 1669. It occupied a high promontory overlooking the left-bank terrace of the Seim River (130 x 100 m). Leading to the citadel there were "entry gates, [with] a tower on the gates [i.e., a gatehouse tower], and three blind towers (hlukhi bashni)."6 On the outer side the citadel was flanked by a 15 m wide rampart and a dry moat (ditch). In Mazepa’s time the moat was 10–11 m wide and between 7 and 7.5 m below the current surface. The lower part of the moat retains a high moisture level, which helped preserve the wooden stakes lining its walls (compactly placed piles and narrow logs with a diameter of up to 0.25 m), which have remained intact up to a height of 2 m; decay is evident to a height of approximately 3 m. According to the results of the 2008 archaeological excavations, oak was used to line the northern (outer) side of the moat. In addition to oak, pine and maple were used for the walls on the side of the fortress (fig. 3). The main structure of the moat consisted of several lines (three to four in the area near the gateway tower and two in peripheral areas) of oak logs tied together (measuring between 2.4 x 2.4 m and 2.8 x 3 m), which were laid out in chessboard fashion (in addition, every second log was either inserted into the ground to a depth of between 0.5 and 0.7 m, or were placed directly on the ground). The external rows of logs (horodni) were reinforced with clay, while the inner rows (kliti) were used to store supplies and to house guards (fig. 4).7 Leading to the citadel was a drawbridge whose three massive supporting oak beams, with a diameter of up to 0.4 m, were placed at intervals of between 1.75 and 2 m. They were discovered in front of the gateway during the 2008 excavations.

According to historical accounts, the territory of the castle included a variety of residential buildings and outbuildings, as well as the hetman’s masonry palace comprising three chambers, a brick treasury, and the wooden Church of the Resurrection. Judging from the ruins that were uncovered during the
excavations, the hetman’s masonry palace was located in the northern section of the citadel. It was built with grooved ("Lithuanian") bricks (for the most part measuring between 28 x 15 and 16.5 x 4.5–5.5 cm). This structure, measuring approximately 26 x 20 m, was rectangular in form, and its design is an example of a typical traditional Ukrainian “house divided into two halves,” with a central corridor and several rooms and halls with brick floors and large stoves decorated with polychromatic ceramic tiles (fig. 5). Very likely it was constructed in keeping with the Ukrainian (Cossack) baroque style, and its closest analogs are the building of the regimental chancellery in Chernihiv (1690s) and Mazepa’s masonry residence in Kyiv.8

The castle Church of the Resurrection was constructed of wood, which explains why it was not possible to find any archaeological traces of this structure. However, the rather large cemetery adjoining the church helped scholars to determine its location in the northern part of the municipal square (fig. 6).9

The actual city (the fortress, or posad, i.e., “suburb,” according to a description dating to 1654), covering an area of 600 x 440 m, lay adjacent to the Lithuanian Castle, forming a semicircle from the south and west. According to this description, “…near the adjacent settlement, from three sides toward a lake, is a palisade [and] an earthen rampart, that rampart is fenced on both sides by oak logs. Three entry gates are built in that earthen city; …there are six corner flanking towers…”10 The fortress had an independent system of defensive structures.11

The dominant architectural landmark of Baturyn was the seven-domed Church of the Life-Giving Trinity (figs. 7a and 7b), first mentioned in documents dating to 1692. This main church of the hetman capital, built in approximately 1690–92, was funded by Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who spent 20,000 ducats on its construction. The participants of the Baturyn International Archaeological Expedition, which took place in 2007–9, were able to excavate the foundations of the church and recreate its design and dimensions. This was one of the largest churches in the Cossack State, with a length of 38.7 m and a width of 24.1 m. It had three naves, three altar apses (a central faceted apse and two rounded side ones), an articulated transept, and a large five-faceted vestibule (babynets) on the western side. Near the church was an empty area, where market fairs probably took place. A large bell tower, known as “Mazepa’s Post,” was constructed near the church.12

Throughout the seventeenth and early part of the eighteenth centuries the network of streets in the hetman capital corresponded to a considerable degree to the directions of the streets in contemporary Baturyn. The streets were densely built up by mansions (sadyby). Their dimensions vary from 500–550 sq. m (14–18 x 25–30 m) on plots of land close to the fortress fortifications to 750–900 sq. m (25–30 x 25–30 m) plots of land located near the castle—further
proof that this was where the representatives of the upper strata lived in the hetman capital. Comparisons between the area of the fortress—approximately 25 ha (600 x 440 m)—and the size of individual dwellings should not give rise to concern among scholars. At the most, the area of the fortress could have been occupied by some 200–250 mansions—that is, approximately 1,500 inhabitants (between six and seven people per building). Even if one takes into account that the majority of households included two residences (occupied by adult children, landless peasants living in a house not owned by them, or hired laborers, who lived in the second house owned by parents or masters), the total population could have reached 3,000–4,000 people, including the permanent residents of the castle, but excluding the military garrison. According to the 1654 description mentioned above, there were 710 households: 436 owned by Cossacks and 274 owned by burghers. By the time of the 1666 census, the number of burghers’ households had increased to 365. However, it should be kept in mind that the majority of the ordinary residents of Baturyn (Cossacks, craftsmen, petty traders, servants, etc.) lived outside the city fortifications in various settlements and in the lower part of the city, while the Cossack elite lived on farmsteads and country estates.

Particularly fascinating are the remnants that were uncovered during the excavations in 2003 and 2004 near the Church of the Resurrection (1803) and in the courtyard of the Sunday school (1903), as well as the remnants of the “grain stores” (velikoi magazein) dating to the late seventeenth–early eighteenth centuries. These were substantial above-ground log-style structures featuring large (2–3 sq. m) open grain pits dug into the clay floors, which were located in parallel rows (fig. 8). During two seasons of excavations nineteen such pits were examined. Judging by archaeological stratigraphy (sequence), these pits, lined with logs, were part of two adjacent structures, and were most likely used to store state grain supplies for the garrison in the event of a siege.13

Unprotected urban settlements enclosed the fortress in a semicircle, and the rather extensive lower part of the town, where, as noted earlier, most of Baturyn’s ordinary residents lived, was located along the Seim River. The rapid development of the city and the complex political situation did not result in the buildup of a new stretch of fortifications in these suburban areas; nevertheless, they were full-fledged parts of the hetman capital. Even masonry churches were constructed in these districts. Between 1696 and 1698, on the site of today’s marketplace construction began on the five-domed Church of Saint Nicholas the Wonder-Worker, for which Hetman Mazepa donated 4,000 ducats. The Church of Saint Mary the Protectress was also constructed in the suburbs. However, most of the churches in Baturyn, as in other cities of the time, were small parish and household-affiliated patron’s churches, such as the wooden Church of the Entrance of the Mother of God, a house church located on the estate of Vasyl’ Kochubei, the general judge.14 A considerable
number of the Cossack elite lived on homesteads, of which there were more than twenty located around Baturyn, according to historical descriptions. Some of them were situated at a considerable distance from the city. For example, Colonel Chechel's homestead was in the village of Trostianka, some 14 km from Baturyn, and Friedrich von Königseck's was in the village of Syvolozh, in the Borzna area.

Ivan Mazepa's suburban residence in Honcharivka has been studied in greater detail. This structure was built on a high (nearly 10 m) promontory overlooking the left terrace of the Seim River, formed by the river's edge and a large ravine that reached the floodplains located south of the intersecting Kyiv-Moscow and Baturyn-Konotop highways. Judging by the configuration and the precise, nearly triangular form, the residence was built according to a clear-cut plan (see fig. 2). The site chosen for its construction was a flat area spanning nearly nine hectares, along the perimeter of which from the outer side (from the west and south) opened up a ditch (2.8 m deep and 6 m wide) with an earthen rampart (its base was 9 m wide but the height of the rampart was only 1.5 m) and five earthen bastions located at practically equal distances from each other. A cross-section did not reveal any kind of defensive constructions within the structure of the rampart or the bastion.

Mazepa's palace in Honcharivka was situated a hundred meters southwest of the edge of the promontory and some 9–11 m from the edge of the terrace. All the bricks of this structure, right down to the foundation wall, were later carted off by local residents. A sketch of this palace, executed in 1744 by Friedrich Wilhelm von Bergholtz, is on display at the National Museum in Stockholm. It shows the walls of the façade, which were still standing at that time. An analysis of the drawing as well as archaeological data show that Mazepa's palace occupied an area of 20 × 15 m and had three storeys with a mansard and a deep cellar. This was the earliest of a series of palaces that were built and decorated in the Western European baroque style in Left-Bank Ukraine. In 2008 the remnants of a rather sizable wooden wing with a deep basement were discovered; a similar structure was located symmetrically to it in the area north of the palace.

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Thus, at the beginning of the eighteenth century Baturyn was a thriving city in the Hetmanate, although it was not comparable to European capitals of the day. Neither should the strength of its fortifications be exaggerated: as Vasyl' Kochubei noted in his denunciation to Peter I, Baturyn's defensive structures had not been repaired for a considerable period, and at the time of the siege they were not in better shape. Nevertheless, Baturyn was a serious threat to the Russian troops, not so much because of its numerous cannon and garrison,
but because of its high concentration of military supplies and foodstuffs, which could provide Swedish troops with a necessary respite and even an opportunity to spend the winter there.

This explains Peter’s concern about Baturyn, as well as the insistence of Menshikov, who arrived in the vicinity of the city together with the voevoda of Kyiv, Dmitrii Golitsyn, by 25 October. The next day, his “Serene Highness” (Menshikov), who was not yet fully apprised of the moods and intentions of the Baturyn garrison, made an unsuccessful attempt to send a delegation to Baturyn for negotiations. He first sent Colonel Ivan Annenkov, followed by Captain Andrii Markevych. Baturyn reacted to the unwelcome guests by dismantling the bridges spanning the Seim River, closing the gates and covering them with earth, and placing cannon along the walls. “And Baturyn...locked itself up from all sides and the three gates; only the fourth, riverside, gates, which were from the Seim River, were unlocked.”17 Then, as Menshikov reported to the tsar on 26 October, “after clearing off into the castle, all the guardsmen as well as other local residents established themselves [there] and, having cleared the bridge, they stood in formation throughout the city with standards and with arms and with cannon...”18 Also to no avail was Count Gavriil Golovkin’s letter to the commander of the garrison, Chechel’, demanding that he admit a regiment of Russian infantrymen into the city, in keeping with the tsar’s decree. Thus, as noted earlier, on 30 October a military council held in the village of Pohribky, near Novhorod-Siverskyi, which was attended by Peter I, Menshikov, and Golitsyn, resolved to capture Baturyn at all costs.

On 31 October Menshikov returned to Baturyn with an even larger army consisting of dragoons bolstered by infantry regiments. He tried again to persuade Mazepa’s loyalist garrison soldiers to accede to their demands through promises and threats conveyed by Prince Golitsyn and, later, by Captain Markovich, who was dispatched by Menshikov, but these communications did not produce the desired result. On the afternoon of 31 October Menshikov and his troops arrived at the Seim River. In response from the “riverside gates,” which opened up at the river, the “Cossack artillery captain” Königseck, issued a command: “six cannon were sent from the castle, and they were pointed against us on the bridges, which, prior to our arrival, had been scattered about.”19 The cannon were also pointed at the dragoons, but the arrival of a group of fifty grenadiers dispatched by Menshikov forced the Cossacks to withdraw to the city.20

During the night a messenger arrived in Baturyn with a letter from Hetman Mazepa, reporting that the Swedish army was rushing to the assistance of the besieged. This news cheered the Ukrainian troops, and on the morning of 1 November they opened fire on a building located in the suburbs where Menshikov’s soldiers had concealed themselves. Ivan Zheliazibushkii, the Muscovite high-ranking boyar (okolnichii), noted in this connection, “from the city they began firing cannon at our headquarters across the river, as well as at the
troops...standing near the bridge.... They also set fire to the suburbs around the city.... And several times he sent messages to them to unlock the city. And they did not obey and began firing cannon.21

The descriptions of subsequent events in Ukrainian and Russian sources are markedly different. According to the author of Istoriia Rusov, on 1 November Menshikov “made the courageous decision to storm it and therefore immediately led his troops against the city fortifications. Mazepa’s troops, which were garrisoned in the city, called serdiuks and formed from freebooters, mostly Ukrainian Poles [i.e., those who hailed from Right-Bank Ukraine—VK] and Wallachians, knowing well what they should expect from the tsarist troops, defended the city and its fortifications with bravery and daring. Several times assaults were repulsed from the city ramparts, the urban ditches filled up with the corpses of those killed on both sides, but the battle continued everywhere around the city. Finally, night and darkness separated the warriors, and the Russians withdrew from the city and crossed the Seim River for a retreat march.”22

However, this information is not directly corroborated by other sources. The eyewitness account of Abraham Cederholm (Tsederhelm), a Swede who participated in the campaign, “about the first attack on the city on Monday” (i.e., 1 November), as cited by Serhii Pavlenko; of the Swedish memoirist, Josias Cederhielm; and information derived from oral folk narratives and other sources23 describe these events in such a vague fashion that they can be interpreted in a variety of ways. This, in fact, led the Russian historians Vladimir Artamonov and Kirill Kochegarov to categorically reject 1 November as the day when Baturyn was stormed.24 Artamonov writes, “Menshikov tried to accomplish the task without bloodshed, and on 1 November he sent the next proposal with one Zazharskii,”25 to which the besieged Ukrainian troops replied with abusive language. There was no sense in continuing the negotiations, all the more so as Menshikov had received a dispatch from the tsar, informing him that the Swedes had crossed the Desna River. “Therefore, if it is possible to finish this night before morning or in the morning, then finish with God’s help. If it is impossible, then better to withdraw, for the enemy is crossing [the river] within four miles of Baturyn.”26

After this setback Menshikov ordered the installation of a battery—according to Artamonov, it was installed in the area of the Konotop gates, which is an entirely reasonable assumption, considering the topography—and at 4:00 p.m. he launched a bombardment of the fortress walls, after ordering his soldiers to prepare fascines and ladders for the assault. According to the account of the English officer, Daniel Defoe, “he launched such savage fire that in one night and a day he made a considerable breach. It could not be called a true one in the full engineering sense, but it allowed [the troops] to begin the storming. The garrison defended itself with great perseverance and killed a multitude of Muscovites in the dry moat.”27
Artamonov sheds light on the further course of events on the basis of an anonymous report entitled “About the Capture of the City of Baturyn,” which he discovered in the Swedish State Archive in Stockholm. In his view, this text was based on Menshikov’s recollections, but for some reason it was never included in any of the editions of Gistoriia Sveiskoi voiny: “And after the onset of night, they prepared for the storming, having readied the fascines and ladders. And they ordered specifically General Major Volkonskii to go by the side of the gates on the right side [and] Colonel Annenkov [to go] up the slope from behind the river, and on the left side 200 Tatars hunkered down to give warning, in order to raise the alarm and shouts and shooting before the storming so that those from the place that we were intending to storm would lure away the people. And thus, on the second day after midnight, at six o’clock, when the alarm was sounded in the rear by the Tatars, a large proportion of those thieves responded to that alarm. Meanwhile, our people began to storm from two sides. And because the ladders were short, we entered the city through the rather intense gunfire with God’s help even without a ladder. After two hours of gunfire we took that fortress, where we killed many thieves and captured quite a few alive.”28

In Artamonov’s account, during the assault Annenkov’s detachment advanced along the long “slope behind the river” that led from the Seim nearly to the center of the fortress, to the area of the central (Kyivan) gates, while Volkonskii’s subunit advanced to the “side of the [Konotop] gates,” which were indeed located on the right side if one faces the fortress. According to the plan, the “Tatars” (Artamonov calls them Kalmyks) were supposed to raise a hue and cry, imitating the sounds of another force storming “from the left side” (c левой стороны для тревоги) in the area between the Kyivan and Sosnytska gates, which corresponds to today’s marketplace.

Notably, at six o’clock in the morning, feinting gunfire and shouting began “behind through the Tatars.” A large part of the garrison threw itself in that direction of the walls. At this very time Menshikov’s Troitsk, Viatka, Nizhgorod, Tver, Smolensk, Rostov, and Siberian dragoon regiments… as well as the regiments that had fought under Bour’s command ascended to the fortress….

Apparently, the darkness and the weak preparation of the gun calculations of the Mazeplist artillery did not permit an effective counteraction to the attackers….

The soldiers and dragoons tore out from behind the walls on both sides. …The decisive role in the capture was played by Annenkov’s attack through the riverside gates. Along the “slope” the attackers quickly broke through to the center of the city.29
Artamonov, who has visited Baturyn and thus is familiar with its topography, is entitled to his opinion that the breach made by Annenkov’s column through the “riverside gates” played a “decisive role.” Annenkov’s subunit was supposed to advance a couple of hundred meters along the narrow but deep (30–40 m) gully located between the fortifications of the citadel and the fortress. Even if one accepts Artamonov’s conjecture that someone inside Baturyn could have opened these “riverside gates,” which were banked up with earth on the inside, to admit the Russians (the followers of Captain Zhuravka allegedly allowed Russian troops to enter the Novhorod-Siverskyi fortress this same way on 27 October), this was hardly a guarantee of success. Even in the total darkness of the narrow gully it was impossible to miss hitting the densely packed group of attackers. In this author’s opinion, the source cited by Artamonov, as quoted above, clearly indicates that entry into the city was gained by a breach in a wall. Storming ladders were not necessary to ensure success for Annenkov’s column, which was supposed to exit the gully inside the fortress, practically in its very center. Of course, the very appearance of a significant number of enemy soldiers behind the fortress’s defenders was designed to disorganize the resistance of Baturyn’s defenders and, in fact, to nullify it.

Perhaps this may be the very incident that sparked the legend and enduring discussions about “underground passages” and a “secret wicket gate,” which, in Artamonov’s opinion, folk tradition could have turned into the “water gates,” through which Menshikov’s soldiers might have penetrated the fortress and which, according to the conjectures of many historians, ensured the success of the storming: the unexpected attack from behind the defenders not only demoralized them, but led to the opening of the gates of the fortress to admit the Russian cavalry. Following in the footsteps of Mykola Kostomarov, Dmytro Doroshenko, and other historians, Serhii Pavlenko cites this information and provides detailed substantiation, while Artamonov, Kochegarov, and a number of other Russian scholars either believe this to be “a piece of nonsense” not corroborated by authentic sources, or simply ignore it. Artamonov admits, however, that “the birth of the legend about a breach in a wall, an underground passage, or secret wicket gate, through which the dragoons made their way into the fortress” is linked to a diary kept by the Slovak pastor Daniel Krman, who was in Baturyn with the army of Charles XII six days after the destruction of the city. Krman reports, as recounted by Artamonov, that “from the words of some Mazepist he recorded an impromptu legend about a treacherous servant of the hetman’s” and that “there were underground empty spaces (l’okhy) there.” Nevertheless, Artamonov is convinced that “these vaults served... as storage places for food and property.” In a note to the book Artamonov refers to an “empty space” that was discovered by the Baturyn International Archaeological Expedition on 2 May 2008, “which started from the cellar of the above-ground structure.” These were indeed remnants of a secret under-
ground tunnel that archaeologists discovered in the middle of the Baturyn citadel. It led from the cellar of an ordinary structure to somewhere outside the fortress, and only some Cossack commanders and the citadel guard could be entrusted to know about this secret passage.

It should be noted that the information about the underground passages in Baturyn is not simply the stuff of legends and folk beliefs. By all accounts, these underground areas had a long-standing history. The Poles began to construct them in the early seventeenth century in accordance with the traditions of Eastern European military architecture, and their expansion kept pace with the growth of the city. They differed from Western European underground passages in one fundamental way: instead of being used to store supplies or hide inhabitants, they were part of an active defensive system, especially for launching speedy and sudden sorties that were supported by frontal fire. Thus, the fortress had a ramified network of underground hiding places, tunnels, and a number of secret trapdoors through which it was possible to launch an unexpected attack, send out scouts, or simply to escape. Eventually, the local residents forgot about these passages, which were no longer used according to their designation. From time to time, though, these underground passages made their presence known whenever cave-ins occurred or the ground opened up in various parts of the city, mostly on the territory or in the vicinity of the former fortress.

The earliest mention of these underground passages was recorded by A. I. Gil’denshtedt, who spent time in Baturyn in the fall of 1774: “On a flat elevation, on the high, steep left bank of the Seim lies an old fortress surrounded by an irregular rampart, the former residence of Hetman Mazepa from 1687 to 1708. The fortress has remained in a neglected state since the time it was destroyed in 1708 at Peter’s behest. At the center of it is a brick church that has also fallen into decay and collapsed. In this fortress is an entrance into underground passages with a width of 1 sazhen’ (2.13 m), a height of more than 1 sazhen’ and 15 lengths; at the end of the longitudinal passages are side [passages] of the same length. These passages, called lokhy by the local residents, are dug into the clay soil and are not lined with stone; in bygone days of troubles they served as storehouses for municipal property.”38 This is the source of Artamonov’s conclusion about the “economic designation” of the Baturyn underground passages.

A large cave-in also occurred in 1896. General M. Brandenburg, who examined it, declared that it was an underground passage. The rather large cavity revealed three underground passages intersecting in one spot (the exact site of the cave-in). Each of the passages was shaped like an arc and was meticulously lined with bricks, which were still so hard that “it was difficult to smash them even with a sledgehammer.”39

Cave-ins still happen in Baturyn to this day. Unfortunately, the only extant
accounts of these occurrences are those recorded by local residents of Batu-ryn. A resident named M. S. Chervoniashchyi (b. 1922) recalled that when a house (no. 5) was being built on the street named today after Hetman Ivan Samoilovych, the builders discovered huge iron doors in a trench beneath the foundation. When the lock was smashed, an underground passage nearly 1.5 m wide opened up, leading toward Kochubei’s orchard. It was possible to walk 10 m along it. Another resident named O. A. Honter (b. 1928) mentions a cave-in that took place in 1939–40 on the corner of today’s lushchenko and Kooperatyvna streets, near a pharmacy. The cave-in was filled up with earth, but according to V. V. Kuz’ko (b. 1940), a telegraph pole caved in on this spot in 1956 or 1957. The cave-in was so deep that the pole was dangling by its wires. It was obvious that this was an underground passage that ran parallel to lushchenko Street. Another Batyr group resident, M. F. Chukhno (b. 1941) remem- bers that in 1965–66 and in 1975 cave-ins happened at this same intersection, but on the other side of Kooperatyvna Street, near the Palace of Culture. Other city residents, including K. I. Parfenenko (b. 1951), O. P. Zhurs’kyi, and several others recalled cave-ins occurring near this building.40

As mentioned earlier, the Batyr International Archaeological Expedition discovered the cave-in mentioned by Artamonov. After a heavy rainfall on 2 May 2008, during the reconstruction of the architectural-memorial complex identified as the citadel of the Batyr fortress in the northern part of the build- ing site, beneath the crypt of the Church of the Resurrection the ground opened up at a depth of 3 m from the current surface, and sections of a seventeenth-century underground passage appeared, heading in a northwesterly direction toward the promontory formed by the edge of the terrace and the dry moat of the citadel. The tunnel had been dug out of the earth, a dense, loamy soil; its walls did not have any artificial supports, and the arch and the walls at the time of the dig were mounds of loose earth, each measuring up to several square meters. Since the tunnel had been open to the elements for a long period of time, rainfall and spring runoffs were gradually destroying the walls and arch. That is why during the process of cleaning up the wall of the crypt site initially it seemed that the passage was nearly 3 m high and 4 m wide, which led to the publication of a number of unsubstantiated claims in the mass media.

A small dig site was set up at the bottom of the foundation pit beneath the crypt, closer to its southern edge, which led down some stairs into the depths, carving into the layer of soil (loose loamy soil) until it reached the original bottom of the underground gallery. Excavations conducted along the passageway within the foundation pit allowed archaeologists to locate the bottom of the passage, a thin layer of tamped-down humus soil from the time the tunnel was still in use, at a depth of 7.1 m from the level of the current surface, and to determine its original width (1.2 m) and height (2.05 m) in the area closer to the entrance into the passageway, which was located in a hidden place (a
cellar, most likely) next to the foundation pit of the future church and partly excavated in dig site no. 10 (structure no. 24, 2003) and no. 22 (2006), when it was mistakenly identified as a “well” because of its significant depth (fig. 9). In the eastern wall of the foundation pit archaeologists were able to determine that the passage continued for a distance of more than 9 m; further excavations past this point in the passage were suspended because of the risk of a cave-in.41 Further restorations of the tunnel were undertaken by professional miners on the initiative of Viktor Yushchenko, then president of Ukraine.

The probable length of the tunnel was determined to be 45 m, the distance from the entrance to the edge of the terrace, where the drilling machine encountered an empty space in the soil during the process of installing supports. Inside the underground passage archaeologists discovered fragments of ceramic stove tiles, animal and human bones with marks left by animal teeth, a heel tap of a boot, a knife, an iron crampon, fragments of a circular dish dating to the eighteenth or nineteenth century, etc.

The construction of the structure that served as the secret entrance likely dates to the time that the hetman residence was moved to Baturyn in 1669. The entrance was dug on the side of the citadel in the direction of the dry moat, and the soil was brought out onto the promontory. A layer of clay partially covered earlier burial sites in the cemetery of the castle Church of the Resurrection, which was in turn scored by burial pits containing the remains of the victims of the 1708 massacre in Baturyn. This layer was laid for the foundation of the hetman’s palace before its reconstruction in 1669, and had covered up all the old foundation pits that predated the excavation of the underground tunnel and the reconstruction of the palace.

Thus, the discovery of an ancient underground passage in the citadel of the Baturyn fortress confirms not only the existence of a whole network of such tunnels in this early modern city, but also the possibility that a subunit of the Russian army made its way surreptitiously through one of the passages at dawn on 2 November 1708.

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There are also grounds to question Artamonov’s claim about the supposedly ill-trained Cossack gunners. As various sources attest, Königseck was a highly experienced specialist, and he paid due attention to his subordinates’ military training.42 Defoe’s account, cited above, confirms that the garrison at Baturyn was properly trained, and a Swedish leaflet published in December 1708 noted that Menshikov lost 2,000 soldiers during the assault.43 Artamonov, however, pays no credence to these accounts. Instead, he cites information from Istoriiia Rusov—which he describes as a “doubtful polemical source”—that Menshikov was told by a Captain Solomakha, who was under the command of Ivan Nis, acting colonel of the Pryluky regiment, that the Cossacks of this regiment
who were defending a section of the fortifications of the Baturyn Fortress had promised to shoot over the heads of the attacking Muscovites.44 This last piece of information corresponds entirely to the information contained in the Mahilioŭ Chronicle, which states, “When the troops began the general assault, a German betrayed the city when, being in command of the cannon on one tower during the storming of the ramparts, he did not fire the cannon at the troops but upward. And, thus, the Muscovites entered through that tower and captured the city.”45 To some extent this explains why the attackers achieved such quick success: the penetration by one of Menshikov’s subunits through a secret underground passageway, and the betrayal of the defenders by the Cossacks manning one of the sectors of the Baturyn fortifications, who merely pretended to direct cannon fire at the attackers, thanks to which the Russians, despite their too-short storming ladders, managed to break through the city fortifications and enter the city at dawn on 2 November 1708.

The subsequent course of these historical events is still the subject of harsh polemics among representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian historical traditions. Ukrainian historians rely on accounts contained in mostly Ukrainian and Swedish sources, asserting that after a two-hour battle the soldiers in the garrison were slaughtered, as was the majority of the civilian population, and then the city was burned to the ground. The Lyzohub Chronicle offers a broad panorama of the apocalyptic, bloody night when the hetman capital was destroyed: “The army was blood-stained and, what is more, the rank and file soldiers, having gotten drunk (since there was an abundance of all kinds of beverages everywhere), were slaughtering and cutting people to pieces, and, because of this, other people sat in fear in hidden places until the fire surrounded the entire city, and those who were hiding suffered; few, however, were saved from the fire and only one little house owned by an old man, which stood beneath the very wall of the western rampart, survived; the wooden church inside the castle burned down, in the city the top part and the interior work of the stone [Church of the] Holy Trinity were burned... Many people drowned in the Seim, fleeing across the ice that was not yet solid, many burned to death hiding in houses, in vaults, in pits, where they suffocated, but they burned to death in the houses.”46

This account is echoed by the author of Istoriiia Rusov: “Menshikov... approached the city and entered it in utter quiet and, once the Serdiuks had gotten drunk on the occasion of their victory the day before and were in deep sleep, with the entire army he attacked the sleeping and those who were waking; he cut the defenseless to pieces and killed without any mercy, and the more important ones he bound one to the other. After thus getting rid of the Serdiuks, Menshikov attacked the unarmedburghers who were in their homes and had not taken any part in Mazepa's plans; he killed every last one of them without sparing either gender, age, or even suckling infants.”47

Then came the turn of the captives, most of whom were executed after being
subjected to torture, and then all others who were simply caught up in the massacre. According to the Swedish historian Anders Fryxell, the author of a history of Charles XII, “Menshikov ordered the corpses of the leading Cossacks to be tied to boards and sent floating along the Seim River so that they would give the news to others about the perdition of Baturyn.”

At first glance, these brief accounts contradict each other: according to the Lyzohub Chronicle, a considerable number of Baturyn residents fleeing the burning city drowned after falling through the thin ice; according to Fryxell’s information, Menshikov ordered rafts onto which the corpses of Cossack officers executed in Baturyn were tied to be set afloat down the Seim River. However, this apparent contradiction may be easily explained: in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the main riverbed of the Seim River passed beneath the walls of the Baturyn fortress. To this day, owing to its swift current, the river freezes later in the year than the other rivers in this region, and its old riverbed, Lake Popivka, whose still waters could indeed have frozen considerably earlier than the main current, reached the city in the vicinity of the “water gates”—beneath the walls of the castle (citadel).

In the view of Ukrainian researchers, between 13,000 and 15,000 people were massacred that day: warriors, civilians (mostly women and children), and peasants from surrounding hamlets and villages, who had fled to the protection of the Baturyn fortifications. After looting the city and carting out everything they could, the victorious Russian soldiers burned the city to the ground in order not to leave anything to the enemy and, at the same time, to instill fear throughout Ukraine. They also set fire to the “great storehouse” (velikoi magazein), including the above-mentioned food storehouses, surrounding villages and hamlets, thirty mills on the Seim River, and even the suburban St. Nicholas Krupyt’s’kyi Monastery. Then they quickly departed because Hetman Mazepa and Charles XII were approaching Baturyn. Menshikov’s flight was so precipitous that he failed to take all of the artillery: he ordered the heavy fortress cannon to be blown up, fragments of which are still being unearthed during the digs at Baturyn. The bells of the Baturyn churches were also blown up. Nevertheless, Menshikov took the time to plunder precious objects, rich collections of weapons and paintings, as well as the hetman’s personal library and archive, which were long considered to be irretrievably lost, but were recently discovered in the archives of St. Petersburg by Tatiana Iakovleva.

The massacre and destruction were so absolute that even two decades later eyewitnesses declared that “the city of Baturyn is entirely deserted, and everything near its bulwarks and walls has collapsed and become overgrown, and there is no new or old structure in both the castles, only two empty stone churches: the Life-Giving Trinity and Saint Nicholas the Wonder-Worker... and there are no church adornments left at all—[including] doors and window frames—and in places the arches have collapsed; the small stone military
house of the former hetmans and the traitor, Mazepa, three rooms, has entirely collapsed. The once-flourishing hetman's residence in the outskirts was in the same condition: "The traitor Mazepa's manor and orchard [was] in Honcharivka...the building is gone..., it was surrounded by an earthen rampart and inside of it [there was] a small birch grove." In that house the stone rooms are deserted and wrecked; the wooden church there is intact with some part of the iconostasis.

Recent archaeological research has confirmed that these accounts are not exaggerated. As a result of the events of 1708, Baturyn's defensive structures were destroyed. The bottom layers of the ditches show clear traces of the huge conflagration that enveloped the fortified city. They are covered with a layer of construction debris from the destruction of the palace, among which were found the bones of the lower part of a man's torso—legs and pelvis—which had been savaged by dogs; a fragment of an iron cannonball; lead bullets; and other similar "calling cards." In 2003 the remains of another skeleton were found in the castle, in the foundation pit of the structure from where the underground tunnel began, at a depth of 4.7 m. Thus, it is difficult to comprehend what Artamonov meant when he claimed that "Ukrainian archaeologists did not locate a solid layer of charred ruins." If he had done an unbiased reading of the reports of the Baturyn expedition or, at the very least, read the articles published by the participants of the digs, he would certainly have not overlooked the findings that have been reiterated practically every year: the destruction of nearly all the structures in Baturyn occurred on the same date, 2 November 1708. Archaeologists studying the remains of the foundations of the hetman's palace in the castle discovered that the fire was so intense that fragments of glass dishes had melted, and in some places the fire had even melted bricks.

More eloquent proof of the massacre that took place in Baturyn was discovered in the northwestern part of the fortified city. During the last thirteen years (1995–2008) dozens of skeletons, many of which show signs of violent death, have been uncovered in the cemetery of the burned Church of the Resurrection. The bottom layer of the burial sites in this area contained the remains of elderly people, who were interred in keeping with Christian burial rites, in wooden coffins that were lowered more than one meter into the ground. This is a typical church cemetery dating to the seventeenth century and early part of the eighteenth. These remains were covered by a second layer of shallow interments, with no traces of any coffins. In one burial site, which contained the skeleton of an elderly woman with a smashed skull, archaeologists discovered a small icon pendant (10.1 x 7.7 cm) severely damaged by fire. Portraying the Mother of God and the infant Jesus, this pendant, executed in oils on a copper disk with traces of gilding, was produced in the workshops of the Kyivan Cave Monastery in the late seventeenth century (fig. 10a). Also uncovered were the remains of an elderly woman with an infant lying on her chest (fig. 11).
Almost at the wall of the destroyed palace archaeologists discovered the burial site of a woman between the ages of twenty and thirty, whose frontal lobe shows the traces of a blow inflicted by a curved weapon, such as a broadsword or a sabre, which had sliced the skull neatly in half. A bone cut-mark analysis indicated that the blow was inflicted by a tall individual who was facing the woman. The blow was made by the right arm in a downward movement from right to left. The cut-mark shows that the broadsword penetrated three to four cm into the skull, after which it split in two by itself. The skeleton of another young woman was found with her face shattered by a blunt instrument (possibly the butt of a musket). The parietal bones of the skull of a young man between the ages of 18 and 21 showed an obvious fracture of circular form with uneven edges, with a diameter of 60 x 55 mm. The bones of the lower third of the forearm of a teenaged girl (15–18 years old) were shattered. The skull of a middle-aged man showed obvious injuries inflicted by a firearm: an entry wound in the area between the left temple and parietal bones, with a diameter of 15 x 17 mm; the jagged exit wound in the right temple bone measures 10.5 x 15 x 15 mm. Buried next to a child between the ages of nine and twelve, with a bullet hole at the back of the head, was a little girl between the ages of five and seven, whose forehead was wrapped with a thin silver band sewn onto a red ribbon. The skull of a middle-aged man showed that a musket bullet had entered and exited. Also found were the remains of a woman, a young man, and a teenager, all with fatal skull fractures. Archaeologists also uncovered dozens of skeletons of children between one and five years old (one of whose skulls is missing), who had been laid in a row in shallow pits (fig. 12).56

Some burial sites had been clearly desecrated: the bones of the deceased had been thrown out of the coffins. This recalls the desecration of Cossack gravesites that took place during the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, when on the orders of Peter I the bones of deceased Cossacks were removed from their coffins and—to instill fear in the living—the skin of dead Cossacks, and even monks, was flayed off. One such burial site in Baturyn (no. 34, 2003) was found in a structure that had wooden walls, a floor, and a covering; measuring 1.75 x 2.75 m, it is located approximately 1.5 m from the current surface. This is the grave of an adult of high social standing, possibly a cleric, and was probably constructed sometime in the early eighteenth century. More than likely it was the burial place of an important personage from Hetman Mazepa's circle. By the time it was discovered, the body had completely decomposed; only bones remained. Thus, there is no doubt that after the fall of the hetman capital this burial site was deliberately wrecked, and the bones were thrown out of the coffin. The motive could hardly have been robbery because a silver cross measuring 68 x 43 mm, with a thickness of 3.5 mm, was found in the vicinity of the bones.57

The majority of the burial sites in the top layer should probably be attributed
to the interment of victims of the Baturyn massacre. The children buried there were no older than ten years old, and in a number of cases they were much younger, as there are several infants. These data imply that during the storming of Baturyn the children of the local elite were hidden in the safest and most reliable place—in the castle, where the death toll turned out to be the highest. As mentioned earlier, the wooden Church of the Resurrection was also destroyed in the fire, which means that the remains of the children who were buried there in November 1708 form the upper layer of this cemetery. Later, there were no people left to bury and no one to do the burying.

Just like inside the castle, archaeologists discovered vivid traces of the total slaughter that took place in various areas of the fortress. Next to house no. 2 (dig site 2, 1996) they uncovered the remains of a child who was buried without benefit of a coffin—another victim of the massacre of 1708. In dig site 1 (1997), archaeologists discovered the remains (a skull) of a teenager in the cavity of a burned house located in the unfortified settlement; the burial pit cuts across the layer of the 1708 fire. Another skeleton, which was discovered in a house destroyed by the conflagration, was discovered in the trench in the fall of 2003. In 2005 archaeologists also discovered the burial site of an early eighteenth-century teenaged girl, who must have hidden inside a grain pit during the slaughter in Baturyn, where she died of smoke inhalation (fig. 13).

The absence of skeletons of adult males among the excavated burial sites is striking. The bodies of the defenders of Baturyn, of whom there were several thousand, as well as the bodies of Menshikov’s soldiers, were probably buried in mass graves that have yet to be discovered. Mostly likely, these graves are located in the ditches of the fortress, now densely built over by private houses, which will make further excavations next to impossible. After their return to Baturyn, Cossacks loyal to Mazepa buried only their massacred children and relatives, whose bodies they discovered among the rubble and charred ruins of the city.58

The eighteenth-century sources and, above all, accounts of eyewitnesses and contemporaries support the archaeological data. For example, a Swedish leaflet dated December 1708 reported, “Only 1,000 men departed from the garrison across the Seim. But the commander and all the remaining residents, women, and children were killed in a pitiful fashion, after which they set fire to the city.”59 The results of the slaughter were also described by the Swedish historian Gustavus Adlerfeld: “Menshikov, who was nearby, rushed in with several thousand men and on 2 November attacked [Mazepa’s residence]. He captured it without particular losses through the hand-to-hand combat of his troops and after that, without distinction as to age and gender, both old and young people were cut down in the most brutal fashion, the remaining women were taken away. The same thing happened to the large guns, of which there were forty, not including mortar. Fifty mills on the Seim around the city were burned, and everything was plundered in
the cruelest and inhumane fashion. Part of the garrison made it safely across the Seim, but the commander was recaptured and he met a dismal end. His name was Kenigsek [Königseck] and he was from Prussia…. It was impossible to gaze upon the terrible devastation without horror; the air was tainted by the stench of the dead and the half-burned corpses.\textsuperscript{60}

Lieutenant Colonel and Adjutant General Baron David Natanael von Siltmanns, a Prussian, thus described the Baturyn massacre: “The route passed very close to Baturyn; I was in the city and saw the ruins. Unable to continue the siege and not wishing to leave the Baturyn ‘nest of treason’ to the adversary, Menshikov not only burned down the fortress, but also killed a great number of the garrison and residents. However, after the two-hour assault not only part of the population but also around a thousand [men] from Mazepa’s garrison nevertheless managed to escape from Baturyn, which was devastated in a terrible hurry.”\textsuperscript{61}

Anders Westerman, battalion chaplain of the Livgardet (Life Guards), a combined cavalry and infantry regiment of the Swedish army, wrote: “On 11 November we mined the capital of Hetman Mazepa, Baturyn, which shortly beforehand was taken by storm by the Russians, devastated, and set on fire.”\textsuperscript{62}

According to a Swedish lieutenant named P. Petre, “the enemy captured the city of Baturyn by storm, plundered it, burned it, and carried off people as captives together with the commander, having turned the main city of Ukraine into a wilderness and charred ruin.”\textsuperscript{63}

Sven Agrell, a clergyman in the Swedish royal service, recorded the following account: “We marched night and day in order to come to the aid of Mazepa’s residence, Baturyn, which until that time was closely encircled by the enemy. But we arrived late, when, a few days before this the enemy took the city by storm, which was fortified no better than all the other cities of this land. Here the enemy behaved in the most brutal fashion and tormented the poor people; the cellars were full of dead bodies of those whom he had chased in there and later set on fire.”\textsuperscript{64} The Slovakian pastor Daniel Krman noted: “Only 300 men were able to escape through a breach in the castle wall, but the majority were killed. We saw the smoking mills, smashed houses, and half-burned, bloody human bodies.”\textsuperscript{65} The high-ranking Muscovite boyar Ivan Zheliabuzhskii left this account: “And we took that city by storm, we killed everyone, and set it on fire.”\textsuperscript{66} An interesting account of the aftermath of the storming of Baturyn was recorded in the diary of Peter I: “The city of Baturyn (where Mazepa the traitor had his residence) was taken not with great losses, and we captured the foremost thieves, Colonel Chechel’ and the general Cossack captain, Königseck, with several of their confederates; and we killed the rest, and burned down that city with everything and destroyed it to its foundations.”\textsuperscript{67}

According to the Chernihiv Chronicle (first quarter of the eighteenth century), when Mazepa arrived at the charred ruins of Baturyn on 8 November
1708—a week after the storming—he saw that “the city and suburbs were full of pools of human blood.” But by far the most vivid description of the horrific events that took place in Baturyn on 2 November was recorded in the Mahilioŭ Chronicle, preserved in the Manuscript Division of the Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library in St. Petersburg:

In keeping with the tsar’s ukase, all the military and city people were utterly cut down and stabbed. In concealed spots and hiding places, wherever the sick, the gray-haired, and innocent young maidens were found, those were raped, and after being raped they were stabbed, and the monastery was plundered and [the monks] were massacred.

At this very time during the siege the more important city people, saving their lives, with their treasures, with their wives, with their children, fled to the Baturyn church, built with the funds of that Hetman Mazepa, and they locked themselves in there. But like lions and predatory wolves, enraged, the Muscovite army, expecting to find treasures there, [and] after dragging a cannon, they shot out the doors that were solid, and whatever lay people and clerics they found there they completely cut them down, they raped maidens on the church altars, and seized the hidden treasures there, and devastated the city and burned it down. To this day none of the people in that city of Baturyn are allowed to build homes and live. The only people left are those in the suburbs, in the virgin forest overgrown with brushwood, and few of them have their own house.

According to the leading specialist on Belarusian and Lithuanian chronicles, M. M. Ulashchik, these early eighteenth-century eyewitness accounts constitute “the principal value of the chronicle...; in many cases, these facts are unique.” This information is likely based on the account of a Baturyn resident who survived the massacre and was able to escape the burning city and settle in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The results of the 2006–9 archaeological excavations of the ruins of the Church of the Life-Giving Trinity, described above in the extract from the Mahilioŭ Chronicle, absolutely confirm this information. For some time after the Baturyn massacre the site of the church was still used for burials. During the 2007–9 archaeological expedition more than 230 gravesites were excavated, a significant number of which contained the remains of victims of the massacre, inasmuch as the burial sites cut across the layer of fire in the church. In one of the women's burial sites archaeologists found a small copper icon pendant with traces of gilding, which was probably the work of late-seventeenth-century icon painters in the workshop of the Kyivan Cave Monastery. The front part of the medallion depicts the Mother of God with the Infant Jesus (fig. 10b) and on the reverse side, a poorly preserved image of a saint; another burial site yielded a
little cross carved out of cypress wood and edged in silver. Additional, eloquent evidence corroborating the Mahiliou Chronicle account is what is now called the “burial of the bride” (fig. 14): a skeleton of a young (16–18-year-old) girl with arms severed below the elbows was found during the excavations in 2008 on the ruins of the church. She was buried in a wedding costume in accordance with the Ukrainian tradition that young girls who have been engaged but not married were buried in their wedding dress and with additional decorations.

The church stood in ruins for an extended period of time. As mentioned above, a description of Baturyn dating to 1726 notes that the church remained vacant. A similar situation is recorded in a description of Baturyn dating to 1760. The church was dismantled during the second half of the eighteenth century by local residents reusing the bricks.

Thus, the new archaeological findings support the evidence provided by written sources of Ukrainian, Russian and Western provenance. They allow us to gain a better understanding of the ways in which Baturyn was captured and assess the scope of the massacre that followed the fall of the city. The new evidence also undermines the efforts of those scholars who tend to downplay the scale of the tragedy that befell the defenders and of the city and its civilian population. One hopes that the cross raised at the citadel on 10 April 2004 commemorating the victims of this little-known tragedy will serve as a persistent reminder of the Baturyn massacre (fig. 15). The destruction of Baturyn not only deprived the army of Charles XII of convenient winter quarters and ample supplies of gunpowder and provisions, it also changed the very course of the Northern War and, ultimately, the course of European history.

Translated from the Ukrainian and Russian by Marta D. Olynk

Notes

4. “Понеже ведомость имеем о зближении неприятельским к Десне и о намерении его, переправляясь оную, идти к Батурину, того ради указал великий
государь во оной замок для лутчаго отпору неприятелю в тот гарнизон прибивыть к малороссийским ратным людям полк великокорсийской пехоты... И того ради надлежит господину полковнику Чечелю в тот замок немедленно великороссийских людей впустить и обще со оным в наступление неприятельское отор чинить, к которому замку на выручку сам великий государь со всем войском особою своею быть изволить." *Piš’ta i bumagi Imperatora Petra Velikago*, 13 vols., vol. 8, *July–December 1708*, pt. 2 (Moscow, 1951).


7. Volodymyr Kovalenko and Iurii Sytyi, "Batyrny, vidkrytyi arkheolohamy (Chastyna persha)," in *Batyrny’ska starovyna: zbîrnyk naukovykh prats; prysviachenyi 300-littiu Batyrny’skoï trahedii*, comp. V. Kovalenko (Kyiv, 2008), 127.


10. "Òkol’ posada, s treh stron ko ozeru sdelan gorod, zemlyanoi val, po obé стороны того валу огорожено дубовым бревенем. В том земляном городе сделаны три вороты проезжие; ... глухих наугольных шесть башен." AluZR, 10:816.


17. “А Батурин...заперся со всих сторон и трех ворот; только одни четверть ворота бегоровые, что от Сейма, незаперты были.” *Otryvok starinnoi rukopisi o Kochubei i Iskre*, *Chernigovskie gubernskie vedomosti*, no. 35 (1856).
18. “А сердюки все, также и прочие тутошие жители, убравшиеся в замок засели и, розметав мост, стояли по городу в строю з знамены и с ружьем и с пушками....” *Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov; hereafter RGADA)*, cat. 9, no. 1, box 2, fol. 895.
19. “Из замку высали шесть пушек, и оны навели против нас на мосты, которые уже прежде прежде приходу нашего были у них разбросаны.” Ibid.
20. “Потом в двух лотках малых переправили мы на ту сторону гренадиров человек с 50, что увидя те, кои при мостах с пушками стояли, тотчас великою тревогою в город побежали и нам мосты очистили.” Ibid.
21. “Сталы из города по нашей гоупт квартире чрез реку, також и по войскам... близ места стоячим, ис пушек быть... Также предместье кругом города все зажгли...И он посыдал к ним многажды, чтоб город отперли. И они не послушали, и стали палить из пушек.” I. Zhelabuzhskii, “Zapiski,” in *Rossiia pri tsarevn e i Petre I: zapiski russkikh liudei*, comp. A. P. Bogdanov (Moscow, 1990), 324.
24. V. Artamonov, K. Kochegarov, and I. Kurukin, *Vtorzhenie shvedskoi armii na Getmanshchinu v 1708 g.* (St. Petersbourg, 2008), 60.
26. “Того ради, ежели сей ночи к утру или по утру совершить возможно, с помощью Божею оканчивайте. Ежели же невозможно, то лучше покинуть, ибо неприятель перебирается в четырех милях от Батурин.” *Pis’ma i bumagi*
RAPE OF BATURYN

27. "Он открыл такой жестокий огонь, что за одну ночь и день пробил доста-
точную брешь. Ее нельзя было назвать настоящей в полном инженерном
смысле, но она позволяла начать штурм. Гарнизон защищал себя с большим
упорством и перебил в руки множество московитов." Izmena Mazepy i shturm
Baturina po knige D. Djoba, napisannoi s ispol'zovaniem zapisok britanskogo ofitsera

28. "А по наступлении ночи, изготовляя фашини и лешицы, к штурму изгото-
вились. А именно господину генералу-майору Волконскому подле ворот
правую сторону, полковнику Анненкову сзади от реки возви ити приказали,
а с левой стороны для тревоги 200 человек татар засели, дабы они пред
штурмом тревогу и крик и стрельбу учинили, чтоб те из той мест, кой мы
штурмовать намеримся, людям отманить. И таким образом, во 2 день по
полудни, о 6 часах, когда сзади чрез татар учинилась тревога, тогда большая
часть их воров, на тое тревогу пошли. А тем временем наши з дву сторон
штурмовать начали. И понеже лешицы были коротки, то и без лешицы, с
помощью Божию, на город чрез немалую стрельбу вступили. По двоичном
огню оную фашению взяли, в которой воров многих побили, а достатных
живым побрали." "О izmenie Mazepy i o vziati goroda Baturina," cited in Arte-
monov et al., Vtorzenie shvedskoi armii, 169.

29. "Затем, в 6 часов утра, «сзади через татар» началась обманныя стрельба и
крики. Большая часть гарнизона бросилась к той стороне стен. В это же время
к фронтцем поднялись Троицкий, Вятский, Нижегородский, Тверской, Смо-
ленский, Ростовский, Сибирский драгунские полки Меншикова..., а также
полки, сражавшиеся под командой Боура....

"Темнота и слаба подготовка орудийных расчетов мазепинской артилле-
рии, видимо, не позволяли эффективно противодействовать атакующим....

"Солдаты и драгуны врвались за стены с двух сторон.... Решающую
же роль во взятии сыграл приступ Анненкова через береговые ворота. По
взвозу штурмующие быстро прорвались в центр города." Artamonov et al.,
Vtorzenie shvedskoi armii, 64.

30. Kartina zhidni i voennykh dieianii Rossisko-Imperatorskago Generalissima, Kniazia
Aleksandra Danilovicha Men'shikova, Favorita Petra Velikago, pt. 1 (Moscow,
1803), 87.

31. Pavlenko, Zahybel' Baturyna, 96.

32. N. I. Kostomarov, Mazepa (Moscow, 1992), 252; D. Doroshenko, Narys istorii

33. Artamonov et al., Vtorzenie shvedskoi armii, 67.

34. "Рождение легенды о щели, подземном ходе, или тайной калитке, через кото-
рую драгуны проникли в крепость." Ibid., 90.

35. "Со слов какого-то мазепинца записал экспромт-легенду о предатель-слуге
гетьмана"; and "Подземные пустоты ("льохи") были." Ibid., 90–91.
36. "Служили эти погреба...для хранения продуктов и имущества." Ibid., 67.
38. "На ровной возвышенности, на высоком крутом левом берегу Сейма лежит старая, окруженная неправильным валом крепость, с 1687 по 1708 г. бывшая резиденцией гетмана Мазепы. С тех пор, как по велению Петра, крепость эта была разрушена в 1708 г., она до сих пор остается в запустении. Посреди ее – кирпичная церковь, также пришедшая в ветхость и развалившаяся. В этой же крепости находится вход в подземные ходы, имеющие 1 саж. ширины (2,13 м – Авт.), более 1 саж. высоты и 15 длины; в конце продольных ходов есть боковые такой же длины. Ходы эти, называемые местными жителями "лехами", выкопаны в глинистой почве и не обложены камнем; в бывшие беспокойные времена они служили для хранения городского имущества." Natalia Olefirenko, "Vidkryto pidzemnyi khid Tsytadeli," Holos ‘t’mans’ koi stolytsi, no. 3 (2008): 4.
41. Ibid.
43. Artamonov et al., Vtorzenie shvedskoi armii, 69.
44. Ibid., 67.
46. "Войско заошное, а паче рядовые солдаты, понапившися (понеже взде везді изобилие было всього напою) кололи людей и рубали, а для того боячись прочие в скрытых местах сидели, аж когда огонь обойшел ввесь город, и скрыты построили; мало еднак от огня спасалось и только одна хатка, под самою центою вала от запада стоячая уцелела неякого старушка; церков же в замку деревянная сгорела, в городе Троицы Святой каменная верхами и работою внутри огорела.... Многош в Сейме потонуло людей, утекаючи через лед еще не крепкий, много погорело, крившихся по хорам, в льодах, в погребах, в ямах, где паче подушлись, а на хорах погорели." Sbornik lieto- pisei, otmosiashchikhsa k istorii iuzhnoi i zapadnoi Rusi (Kyiv, 1888), 47–48.
47. "Менщиков...присудив до міста і ввійшов у нього з усією тихістю і, коли Сердюк з нагоди вчоращьої їх вікторії повивалися і були в глибокому сні, напав він з усім військом на сонних і на тих, що прочинувались, без оборони рубав і колов без жодного милосердя, а значніших із них одного з одним перев’язав. Позбувшись таким чином Сердюків, Менщиков ударив на мішан беззбройних, що були в своїх домах і зовсім у задумах Мазепиних участі не
брали, вибив усіх їх до ноги, не милуючи ні статі, ні віку, ні самих молочних немовлят." Istoriia ruisiv, 262.


49. Pavlenko, Zahybel' Batoryyna, 96–99; see also Serhii Pavlenko, Ivan Mazepa (Kyiv, 2003), 371–76.

50. A. Lazarevskii [Oleksander Lazarev'skyi], "Istoricheskii obshchestvo Nestora-Istoricheskii v isistoricheskom obschestve Nestora-leotpista, vol. 6 (Kyiv, 1892), 112.

51. "Город Батурина весь пуст, а впрочем, бо волости и стены все поразились, и весь зарос, и в обоих замках никакого строения старого и нового нет, только две церкви каменные пусты: Живоначальная Троиц да Николая чудотворца ... и в них никакого церковного вборо — дверей и окончи — нет, и в местах своды обвалились; да бывших гетманов и именика Мазепы бывал войсковой каменный малый дом, три полаты, весь поразился." Chernigovskie gubernskie vedomosti, no. 2 (1852).

52. "На Гончаровке именика Мазепы дворовое место с садом; ...строения ныне нет... обведено земляным валом и внутри онаго гай березовый небольшой." Lazarevskii, "Istoricheskii obshchestvo Baturina," 114; AluZR, vol. 10, 816.


58. Surveys of local residents have confirmed that people living in the area corresponding to the territory of the fortress have often come across human skeletons—from two or three to several dozen at a time—while performing various domestic chores on their properties. Unfortunately, archaeologists have not succeeded in uncovering any mass graves to date.

59. "Из гарнизона через Сейм ушли оттуда только 1000 человек. Но комендант со всеми остальными жителями, женщинами и детьми были перебиты бедственным образом, после чего они подожгли город." Artamonov et al., Vtorzenie shvedskoi armii, 68–69. Emphasis here and in subsequent quotations is mine—VK.
60. "Меншиков, который находился недалеко, поспешил с несколькими тысячами человек и штурмом напал 2 ноября [на резиденцию Мазепы]. Он взял её без особых потерь рукопашным боем своих войск и после того, как старые и молодые, без различия возраста и пола, жесточайшим образом были порублены, были уведены оставшиеся женщины. То же произошло с большими орудиями, которых было сорок, не считая мортир. Пятдесят мельниц на Сейме вокруг города было сожжено и все жесточайшим и бесчеловечным образом было расхищено. Часть гарнизона счастливо ушла через Сейм, но коменданта было снова пойман и потом плохо кончил. Его звали Кенинсек и он был родом из Пруссии... Нельзя было без ужаса смотреть на страшное опустошение, воздух был заражен воюю от мертвых и полуобгорелых трупов." Cited in ibid., 92.

61. "Маршрут проходил совсем близко от Батурин, я был в городе и видел руины. Не имея возможности сидеть в осаде и не желая оставлять противнику батуринское "гнездо измены", Меншиков не только сжёг крепость, но и перебил большую часть гарнизона и жителей. Однако после двухчасового штурма из разорённого в страшной спешке Батурин всё-таки успела бежать не только часть населения, но и около одной тысячи мазепинского гарнизона." Ibid., 87-88. Ignoring the author's eyewitness account, Artamonov comments, "Here Siltmanns did not mention the mass deaths of the people in this city."

62. "11 ноября мы миновали столицу гетмана Мазепы Батурин, который незадолго до этого был взят штурмом русскими, разорён и сожжен." Ibid., 89.

63. "Неприятель штурмом овладел городом Батурин выграбил его спалил и увел в качестве пленных народ вместе с комендантом, превратив главный город Украины в пустыню и пепелище." Ibid.

64. "Мы шли ночью и днём, чтобы выручить резиденцию Мазепы—Батурин, которая к тому времени была плотно окружена врагом. Но прийти мы поздно, когда за несколько дней до этого неприятель штурмом взял город, укреплённый не лучше, чем все другие города этой земли. Здесь противник действовал самым жестоким образом и тиранил бедных людей, погреба были полны мертвыми телами тех, кого он загнал туда и потом подъёл." Ibid., 90.

65. "Только 300 человек смогло спастись через щель в стене замка, а большинство было перебито. Мы видели дымящиеся мельницы, разбитые дома и наполовину обгоревшие окровавленные людские тела." Ibid., 91.


68. “Крови людської в місті і на передмістю було полно калюжами.” 

69. “Тим часом Олександр Данилович Меншиков великою силою обловив Батурина і добував. І хоч козаки з міста Батурини значну москві завали відсіч, однак не змогли відбитись, бо коли військо загально пішло на приступ, один німець місто зрадив, коли, маючи командування на одній башті над гарматами під час приступу на вали не стріляв з гармат на військо, але в гору. І так москва через та башту увійшла і здобула місто. А за царським указом в пень весь люд військовий і міський в пень витяла і виколола. По скритих же місцях і схованках, де кто знайшов хворих сивоголових і панянок невинних, тих гвалтували, а зґвалтувавши кололи, і монастир пограбували і вирізали.

Того ж самого часу під час облоги люди міські, що значніші, рятуючи життя своє, зі скарбами, з жонами, з дітьми повтікали до церкви батуринської, коштом того ж гетьмана Мазепи вимуруваної, і там замкнулись. Але військо московське яко леві і хижі вовки, оскажені, сподіваючись там здобути скарби, притягнувши гармату, двері, що були міщі, повестріляли, а яких там людей світських і духовних знайшли, в пень витяли, панянок по вівтарях церковних гвалтували, і скарби там скриті порозхвали, і місто спустошили і спалили. В тому місті Батурині і по цей день ні кому з людю не дозволено будуватись і жити. В пущу, чагарником зарослу, залишилось, тільки люди на передмісті, і то мало хто, має своє помешкання.” “Mogilevskaja khronika,” 277.

70. “Главную ценность хроники…; эти данные во многих случаях уникальные.” 

Figure 1. City of Baturyn, aerial photograph of the central part of the eighteenth-century city, 2006.
Figure 2. Baturyn, the hetman capital, reconstruction of the city plan by V. Kovalenko and Iu. Sytyi). I—the citadel (Lithuanian Castle); II—fortress; III—Honcharivka; IV—Kyrylo Rozumovs’kyi’s palace; V—Kochubei’s territory.
Figure 3. Excavation of the trench at the citadel of the hetman capital, 2008.

Figure 4. Excavation of the rampart of the hetman capital, 2006.
Figure 5. Plan of the hetman’s palace on the citadel with traces of archaeological excavations.
Figure 6. Castle Church of the Resurrection and the hetman’s palace on the citadel (reconstruction in 2008).
Figure 7. Church of the Life-Giving Trinity in the fortress.
A—at work; B—reconstruction of the plan.

Figure 8. Grain stores dating to the seventeenth or early eighteenth centuries in the fortress.
Figure 9. Underground passage in the citadel.
Figure 10. Copper icon pendants with traces of gilding dating to the seventeenth century. A—from an interment in the cemetery of the Church of the Resurrection, excavated 1995; B—from an interment in the cemetery of the Church of the Life-Giving Trinity, excavated 2008.
Figure 11. Interment of a woman with an infant in the cemetery of the Church of the Resurrection.
Figure 12. Interment of victims of the 1708 tragedy in the cemetery of the Church of the Resurrection.
Figure 13. Skeleton of a girl aged 12–14 in a grain pit on the territory of the fortress.
Figure 14. “Burial of the bride” in the ruins of the Church of the Life-Giving Trinity in the fortress. A—general view; B—remnants of headgear on a skull; C—remnants of a belt.
Figure 15. Commemorative cross honoring the victims of the 1708 massacre at the citadel in Baturyn, sculpted by A. Haidamaka.