Abstract

The introduction of the military revolution into armies of the British Isles by officers and soldiers who had served in mainland European armies during the religious and dynastic wars of the seventeenth century was retarded by a martial culture shaped by a chivalric revival characterized by an aristocratic preference for edged weapons over gunpowder weapons and tactics. Aristocratic officers were reluctant to accept the idea that military hierarchies had superseded social hierarchies or that in warfare they should pursue military objectives rather than personal honour. Except for the New Model Army, English military forces before 1688 were backward in developing styles of command and leadership appropriate to the changed conditions of modern warfare.

Roger B. Manning is emeritus professor of history at Cleveland State University and former chairman of the Department of History. He has recently published two books on military history: Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army, 1585–1702 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Professor Manning has also written four other books and numerous articles on aspects of British history.
You may observe in all the Roman wars that they conquered more nations by their expert knowledge in martial affairs than they did by their number or valour. It hath been the manner of all famous generals to bring their numbers to perfection by exercise.


*He that should make war at this day as the best commanders did two hundred years past, would be beaten by the meanest soldier. The places then accounted impregnable are now slighted as indefensible; and if the arts of defending were not improved as well as those of assaulting, none would be able to hold out a day. Men were sent into the world rude and ignorant.*


**WHEN** the growing hostility between England and Spain caused Queen Elizabeth I (r. 1558–1603) to send a military expedition under the command of Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, to assist the Dutch Republic's struggle to be free of Spanish control, even experienced English soldiers found the new style of warfare in mainland Europe chaotic and bewildering.¹ The participation in the continental European wars after 1585 of numerous officers drawn from the aristocracies of the Three Kingdoms contributed to a remilitarization of the English aristocracy and strengthened the martial tendencies of Irish and Scots aristocrats. But it also provoked a cultural reaction against the principles and practices of modern warfare that we call the "military revolution." These innovations in warfare included larger armies equipped with gunpowder weapons and siege warfare employing low-profile fortifications that favoured the tactics of the foot soldier, the gunner, and the sapper rather than the aristocratic mounted knight, and which were sustained by

improved logistical systems organized and paid for by an increasingly bureaucratic state operating with enhanced powers of taxation. This cultural reaction is associated with a movement that historians and literary scholars label the "chivalric revival," and can be dated to the English intervention in the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648)—the Dutch war of independence—in 1585. The persistence of older values among swordsmen and gallants who disliked missile weapons and clung to the use of edged weapons such as the sword and the pike, and who engaged in individual displays of honour through duelling, challenges to individual combats on the battlefield, and other histrionics, hampered the reception of the technological innovations associated with the military revolution and the pursuit of military and political objectives dictated by the needs of state, and often substituted the pursuit of individual honour and glory. This was an assertion that social hierarchies remained more important than military hierarchies in positions of military command, and had the effect of delaying the professionalization of the officer classes of the armies of the Three Kingdoms.  


When the English reestablished contact with the European military world by going to the assistance of the Dutch, the English aristocratic preference for social status over merit and experience caused conflict with Dutch officers when English and Dutch troops were integrated. For example, when a Dutch regiment was placed under the command of Leicester's nephew, Sir Philip Sidney, Sidney ignored the practice in that regiment and other units of the States' Army of promoting officers from within the ranks of the regiment. The Dutch soldiers complained and presented a petition asking that the former practice of commissioning subalterns from the ranks be restored. English aristocrats found it difficult adjusting to the bourgeois values of a mercantile society in a republic where the House of Orange-Nassau provided military leaders but obeyed the commands of the States General. The English commanders were highly offended, and demonstrated a reluctance to accept criticism from more experienced military officers.4

Service in the Dutch army during the Eighty Years' War introduced officers and gentlemen volunteers from the British Isles not only to improved tactical uses of gunpowder weapons, but also to new styles of command and standards of professionalism. Before the time of Maurice of Nassau, stadtholder and captain-general of the Dutch Republic from 1587 to 1625, armies did not train their soldiers; new recruits were expected to learn their craft from older soldiers. Maurice's close-order drill and linear tactics, however, required a high degree of training and physical fitness for both officers and men. Consequently, the States' Army could maintain proficiency only by means of perpetual training. As was appropriate for a bourgeois society where mercantile interests ruled, the drill and training were methodical, and could turn ordinary men with no martial prowess or military background into disciplined and effective soldiers.5 The Low Countries wars employed siege craft and assaults by


infantry on breaches in the low-profile *trace italienne* fortifications, but many English aristocrats persisted in the belief that serving in the cavalry and skill in the use of edged weapons were more honourable pursuits. To be an officer in the infantry of the States’ Army, however, required that one take on the duties of managing and training soldiers on a daily basis. The tactical innovations of Maurice and his associates, which emphasized order, drill, discipline, and flexibility of maneuver on the battlefield, shaped a new ideal for the aristocratic military officer. He was now expected to be well read and educated, as well as skilled, in the arts of war and command.6

Before military academies came to provide an entrée into the officer corps, no formal training was available for young gentlemen who wished to gain the king’s commission. In the early seventeenth century it was customary to serve an apprenticeship in arms in the ranks as a gentleman volunteer, but the practice of purchasing commissions had made this path to gaining a commission less usual by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Reading military treatises and memoirs was recommended as the best way to supplement the actual experience of battle in rounding out one’s knowledge of the art of war. Experience of battle was thought to be insufficient because one person could observe only part of the action, and it was therefore necessary to read histories of warfare to supplement this incomplete knowledge and experience.7 Learning came to be regarded as “the nourishment of military virtue.”8 Richard Kane, who fought in the Nine Years’ War (1688–97) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13), was of the opinion that

whenever a gentleman takes the profession of arms upon him, he ought to study all the parts of it from the [private] sentinel to the general. For there is nothing will recommend him more to the prince or general than that of being known to be an expert and diligent offi-

---


cer, which has raised numbers of men from private sentinels to general officers.\textsuperscript{9}

It was also desirable that an ambitious officer acquire a knowledge of trigonometry and logarithms so that he might supervise construction of modern fortifications on the model of the trace italienne; the purpose of these low-profile citadels and sconces was to allow a few men to defend a strong place against a greater number.\textsuperscript{10} A knowledge of mathematics was also applicable to infantry tactics on the battlefield. The combination of pikemen and musketeers in the same infantry company made battlefield evolutions more complicated, and commands had to become precise and standardized. Whereas armies of the sixteenth century fought in large squares, Maurice of Nassau introduced linear formations, based upon Roman practice, which required extensive and continuous training in close-order drill. Training en masse became at least as important as individual training, and the soldiers of the States’ Army could be seen drilling even in the presence of the enemy. In the cavalry, Maurice discarded the lance in favour of the sabre and firearms in order to banish individual displays of heroism and prowess and to emphasize cohesiveness.\textsuperscript{11}

The tendency of the Spanish to engage in perpetual warfare in the Low Countries produced expert soldiers in the Spanish Army of Flanders, and, if the Republic was to survive, the Dutch were obliged to make an appropriate response. Sir Roger Williams, a Welsh professional soldier who served in both the Spanish and Dutch armies, thought that the army commanded by Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma, was the most well-disciplined and well-ordered army that he had ever seen.\textsuperscript{12} The basic tactical unit employed by the Army of Flanders was the 3,000-man tercio, a self-sufficient organization which consisted only of pikemen and arquebusiers. When first introduced in Italy, it was notable for employing no archers or swordsmen. While fighting the Spanish tercios, Maurice noticed how difficult it was for the Spanish officers to maneuver the tercios when deployed in huge square phalanxes. In Maurice’s reformed


\textsuperscript{12} Sir Roger Williams, \textit{A Briefe Discourse of Warre} (London: Thomas Orwin, 1590), 10–11.
army, the basic tactical unit was reduced to a 550-man battalion consisting of companies of 80 to 115 men. The emphasis on intensive drill and strict discipline necessitated a higher proportion of commissioned and non-commissioned officers, which also opened up more opportunities for advancement. Maurice’s smaller infantry companies also made more efficient use of scarce manpower—a sure mark of emerging military professionalism.13

The first standing armies in England and Scotland date from the time of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms (1638–51), as some historians now prefer to call the British and Irish civil wars.14 Many veterans of the mainland European religious and dynastic wars were to be found in all of the armies that fought in the civil wars,15 but probably most officers acquired their introduction to military affairs from reading. Those who needed to learn about tactics and fortifications often started with Roman authors, but soon learned how the seventeenth-century mode of warfare


For a discussion which questions the efficiency of the smaller Dutch battalions with their larger cadres of officers, see David Parrott, "Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years War: The 'Military Revolution'," *Militärgeschichte Mitteilungen* 18, no. 2 (1985): 8–9.


15. Considerable numbers of officers and soldiers from the British Isles who fought in the British and Irish civil wars were veterans of the continental religious and dynastic wars. By rough estimate, there were 20,000 English in this category and 20,000 Irish. With a smaller population base, Scotland saw 25,000 veterans of the mainland European wars return to fight in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms (Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army, 1585–1702* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], 160–61; Carlton, *Going to the Wars*, 19).
differed from the past. This had the secondary effect of introducing them to the concept of historical change, thus initiating them into humanist culture and making them aware of the idea of progress. The emphasis on learning about war from experience tended to reinforce the empirical approach to the “particularities” of war. This is connected to the explosion of military memoirs in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Sir John Digby was an avid reader of books on “martial affairs” in several languages. Although apparently he had no previous military experience, Digby commanded a troop of horse in the Second Bishops’ War of 1640 which, unlike most Royalist units, was well trained and disciplined and able to cover the retreat of the Royalist infantry at the Battle of Newburn. Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill and subsequently first earl of Orrery, could not forget witnessing the slaughter of a whole regiment in the Irish civil wars because the soldiers were unacquainted with the art of entrenching. He had already achieved fame as a dramatist when he published A Treatise on the Art of War (1677), which was written from notes based upon his reading and his experiences in the civil wars.

The perceived qualifications for military commissions were in a state of flux during the seventeenth century, and were shaped by the frequently conflicting views of a remilitarized aristocracy and experienced professional soldiers, who had often served in more than one mainland European army. The former looked upon the latter with contempt and distrust, and often referred to such men as “soldiers of fortune.” The concept of selecting a military officer or commander on the basis of competence, experience, or even seniority was still regarded as novel in England in the Royalist camp at the beginning of the civil wars.


Hobbes tells us that Henry Howard, third earl of Arundel, was chosen to command the king's army during the Second Bishops' War in 1640 because "his ancestors had formerly given an overthrow to the Scots in their own country" and because of a "foolish superstition" that he might enjoy the luck of his ancestors. Arundel also possessed the added advantage of looking martial. The personal courage and example of leaders such as Prince Rupert of the Rhine counted a great deal in inspiring an army to fight. The arrival of Rupert in the Royalist camp at Nottingham in 1642 gave the king a commander with boldness and dash, which the Royalist armies had previously lacked. Rupert had served in the Dutch army in the Eighty Years' War and the Thirty Years' War (1618–48). Rupert was an experienced officer who interested himself in the technical aspects of war, but at the same time was a proud aristocrat who ignored both military and civilian administrative hierarchies, and would accept orders only from his uncle the king, and even then only on a selective basis.

Long after standing armies and professional officer corps became widespread in the European military world, the belief persisted that battlefield command was enhanced by a certain amount of histrionics—as long as such antics did not obscure military objectives. For many years following the advent of gunpowder weapons, some writers continued to believe that horsemanship was necessary for developing "a martial look, posture and countenance." A colonel of horse was almost invariably a nobleman, and his dignity was regarded as being greater than that of a colonel of foot because of the greater "dignity and worthiness" of the edged weapons borne by those he commanded. On the eve of the British and Irish civil wars, it was also still thought requisite that a cavalry captain should also be of noble descent. By the fifteenth century, it came to be accepted that one could fight chivalrously on foot as well as on horseback. Captains who led infantry companies had found it difficult to maintain order unless they fought on foot with their men. In the late

sixteenth century, the practice in English military forces was to have the general or colonel mounted on a light horse in the midst of the pikemen close to the colours when forming up for battle.22 By the early seventeenth century, it was accepted that only the colonel in a foot regiment should be mounted, and he should dismount before leading his men into battle.23

The ability to recruit soldiers was always a desirable quality in an officer—especially a colonel. This went with the ability to inspire loyalty in their men. Prior to the founding of the New Model Army in 1645, when the Parliamentary forces consisted of armies raised by associations of contiguous counties, loyalty to local officers was always stronger than allegiance to Parliament. Even when their officers were inexperienced, the men of the Army of the Eastern Association preferred them to the experienced Scots professionals who had been hired by their commander, Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick. A colonel and his regiment continued to be judged more by the reputation for valour of his officers than by their military experience and competence.24 Royalist regiments were usually raised by their colonels with very little help or financial assistance from the king. Rather, they depended upon kinsmen and neighbours for help. Richard Atkyns raised a troop of eighty horse for a regiment commanded by George Brydges, sixth Lord Chandos, but Atkyns had to pay the troop out of his own pocket. At least twenty of his troopers were armigerous gentry, and the remainder arrived well armed and mounted, so they were probably gentlemen or, at least, yeomen. Although Atkyns was a kinsman of Chandos, he says that Chandos used his “troop with such hardship that his gentlemen [troopers] unanimously desired me to go into another regiment.”25 Atkyns took his troop into Prince Maurice’s Regiment of the Western Royalist Army. Atkyns himself had no previous military experience, but his Scots servant,


23. Maurice Keen, Chivalry (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), 240; Markham, Five Decades of Epistles of Warre, 161–64.

24. Clive Holmes, The Eastern Association in the English Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 39–40; Edward Davies, The Art of War and England’s Traynings (London, 1619; reprint, Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1968), 130–31. The New Model Army was the first standing army raised by Parliament in England and led by officers whose status was based upon their professional qualifications rather than their social standing as noblemen and gentlemen. The Army of the Eastern Association was a parliamentary military force raised early in the civil wars by an association of the counties of East Anglia primarily to defend that region.

Erwing, had served as a *gens d'armes* in France, and undertook to train his troop. Erwing had been offered a commission as a lieutenant of horse by the Parliamentarians, but chose to stay with Atkyns out of personal loyalty. Whether Erwing was granted a commission in the Royalist army, Atkyns does not bother to mention.26

The ability of the English nobility to recruit tenants for military service had diminished by the early seventeenth century except in the north, the remote parts of Wales, and the Welsh Border. The Scottish nobility, on the other hand, retained a remarkable ability to raise soldiers, which is why almost all of the colonels of regiments of the Scots Covenanting Army were peers or sons of peers, although the actual command of regiments in the field usually devolved upon a lieutenant-colonel who was an experienced professional. Military enterprisers in Ireland as well as Scotland were quite successful in drawing upon tenants and kinship groups in their recruiting endeavours, and royal authorities were anxious to cleanse their jurisdictions of unemployed soldiers as a means of imposing law and order in more remote districts. The functions of recruiting and leadership began to diverge in the seventeenth century. On the battlefield, a colonel who was a peer might find himself subordinated to a major-general who was of a lesser social rank, and military competence and experience might in practice, if not by design, come to weigh more than social rank. In mainland European armies, in order to execute complex formations and maneuvers upon the battlefield, a new and more differentiated military hierarchy had come into existence ranging from corporals in companies to sergeant-major-generals or major-generals. Colonels, when drawn from the landed nobility, usually lacked the technical expertise to execute the new duties associated with modern warfare, although they remained useful for recruiting and other less-demanding tasks. The rank of major-general was associated with the introduction of the military revolution, and since that officer issued the orders on the battlefield, he was invariably an experienced old soldier. It is the emergence and acceptance of a clear and precise hierarchy of military rank as opposed to social rank which signifies the embryonic development of a professional officer corps.27

26. Ibid., 7–8.
Taking the long view of English military development in the seventeenth century, the remilitarization of the English aristocracy obstructed the emergence of a professional officer corps based upon merit. Indeed, the spread of the purchase system for obtaining commissions, which favoured the aristocratic officer, compelled many professional soldiers from the British Isles to continue to seek opportunities in mainland European armies and distant overseas garrisons following the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660. However, there was a moment during the civil wars when a merit system came to prevail. The Self-Denying Ordinance of 1644, by excluding aristocratic officers such as the earls of Essex and Manchester from the Parliamentary armies, established an officer corps based upon competence rather than birth, and it drew officers from the middling and mechanic classes. The criteria for promotion in the New Model Army were based partly upon seniority—especially at the troop and company level—but merit certainly counted in the field and general-officer levels. This experiment was wholly without precedent in English military experience, and would never be repeated to the same extent—even in the twentieth century. When Sir Thomas Fairfax, the commander of the New Model Army, began to nominate officers, both houses of Parliament, which retained the right to approve his nominations, objected to one-third of his nominees because they were religious and political radicals. The peers were offended by their exclusion from command in the New Model Army, and also because the old leadership of the earlier associational armies, including Manchester, Essex, and other lords, had been effectively suppressed.28

During the civil wars the peerage and gentry had furnished Charles I (r. 1625–49) with men and money to raise Royalist armies, and on the eve of the Restoration William Cavendish, duke of Newcastle, reminded his successor, Charles II (r. 1660–85), that the aristocracy were the principal bulwark of the monarchy.29 Therefore, when conferring military


offices the king was obliged to put political considerations ahead of military competence and experience. Along with the enhanced power of the peerage and gentry in Parliament, a House of Commons elected by a more restrictive franchise, and the undisputed hegemony of the squirearchy in county government and command of the militia, this is but one aspect of the aristocratic resurgence which accompanied the Restoration. There was also a longstanding prejudice against professional soldiers, or "soldiers of fortune," and thus many of the best officers from among both Old Cromwellians and Royalists were once again obliged to pursue careers in mainland European armies. Thus, the military culture which had developed during the civil wars and had helped to point England and the other Stuart kingdoms towards great-power status withered. Charles II's land forces were limited to "guards and garrisons," which he was to pay for himself. Military commissions were granted only on the basis of patronage and purchase, which insured that the officer class would be dominated by aristocratic amateurs. Charles lacked the financial resources for a proper standing army such as continental European states possessed, and, in any case, many members of Parliament, remembering Oliver Cromwell and the major-generals, had an abiding prejudice against standing armies and professional soldiers.30

The English navy during the seventeenth century faced problems similar to those of the army, particularly in regard to the task of integrating gentlemen officers possessing martial assertiveness with sailing masters or "tarpaulins," who had risen from the lower deck on the basis of their nautical expertise, to form one professional officer corps.31 This task of producing officers who were both assertive commanders in battle and competent sailing masters can be attributed to the naval doctrine of the line-ahead formation which became official policy under the Commonwealth and was intended not only to promote more aggressive tactics in sea battles, but also to discourage individual naval captains from breaking off from the line of battle and engaging in individual mêlées in order to seek prize money. Those who ignored orders to maintain battle formation risked being tried by court martial for cowardice and a possible death sentence.32

The English navy, like the English army, had been "new-modeled" or reformed during the Commonwealth and Protectorate. As a consequence,

the navy had become a standing force led by officers who had achieved a remarkable degree of professionalization. Unlike the New Model Army, the reformed navy was allowed to continue at the Restoration because it was perceived as a defender of English liberties and interests rather than a threat to constitutional balance. The Restoration navy began with a large body of experienced naval officers inherited from the Cromwellian period, and in order to hold the navy together, Charles II and James, duke of York, as lord admiral, ignored previous allegiances. Professionalism was further promoted by rigorous examinations which midshipmen and gentlemen volunteers had to pass before they could be commissioned as lieutenants. These lieutenants then provided a pool from which the Navy Board could draw upon for new captains.

In November 1688 England's decayed military tradition was revived by the invasion of England by William, prince of Orange. It was spearheaded by two elite corps of the Dutch army, the Anglo-Dutch Brigade and the Scots Brigade, which were composed of officers and soldiers from the British Isles. The flight of James VII and II (r. 1685–89) and Parliament's decision to replace him with his son-in-law William II and III (r. 1689–1702) brought to the English throne "a valiant and warlike monarch." England's new soldier-king then undertook the conquest of Scotland and Ireland and employed British military manpower to reinforce the Allied war effort against the armies of Louis XIV of France in Flanders and on the Rhine. Many of the experienced professional officers of the Scots and Anglo-Dutch Brigades who had helped William launch the largest and most successful amphibious naval and military operation in early modern Europe would subsequently lead the British army during the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession. Of course, it must also be remembered that the Convention Parliament's choice of the prince of Orange as monarch was carried out while London was under Dutch military occupation and with the support of men of shifting allegiances in the Church, Parliament, and the army. William's selection committed England (after the Act of Union of 1707 the United Kingdom of Great Britain) to a long series of wars with France that ended...
only in 1815 and created a military-fiscal state which imposed far heavier burdens of taxation upon the peoples of the British Isles than had been the case under the Stuart monarchs before William, or during the Commonwealth and Protectorate.36

The most important function of a military officer was leadership, the ability to inspire his men to give their utmost and persevere in the face of the enemy. Donald Lupton insisted that the English were brave and proved to be excellent soldiers when properly led and disciplined, as their service in mainland European armies had testified: “They fear not the face or force of the stoutest foe, and have one singular virtue beyond any other nation, for they are always willing to go on.”37 (The Irish and the Scots, when serving in the armies of continental Europe, were also valued for the same qualities of valour and perseverance, and a willingness to make frontal assaults on fortifications). However, in the early stages of the English civil wars, many officers had not learned to exercise the kind of leadership which made soldiers stand and fight. A petition from the officers of the Northern Horse to the king following the Battle of Marston Moor in 1645 complained that most of the troopers had deserted, leaving only the officers and gentlemen volunteers together with their servants.38 When the Scottish Army of the National Covenant invaded England in 1640, the earls of Loudon, Lindsay, and Rothes led their soldiers marching on foot while other lords were mounted.39 Sir Edward Monckton, a Royalist who commanded a company in Sir Edward Metham’s Regiment, led his men from the front. However, he did so mounted on horseback, and consequently lost contact with his men in the smoke of battle. His memoirs never mention any of his soldiers or companions, and give the impression that he fought all his battles single-handed.40 Nathaniel Boteler, on the other hand, after a close study of Roman military history, thought that the best way to motivate soldiers


37. Donald Lupton, A Warre-like Treatise of the Pike (London: Richard Hodgkinson, 1642), 36.


was to recognize persons of merit individually and distribute spoils accordingly. Prior to the storming of the Royalist stronghold of Bristol in 1645, Sir Thomas Fairfax and his council of war decided to distribute 6s. to each soldier to give him heart. Sir Charles Cavendish, a Royalist colonel who had travelled widely and acquired military experience at early age, was open and familiar with his men, and won their loyalty to an unusual degree. John Aubrey quotes the elder Sir Robert Harley, a Parliamentarian officer, as saying that

generally, the commanders of the king's army would never be acquainted with their soldiers, which was an extraordinary prejudice to the king's cause. A captain's good look or a good word does sometimes infinitely win and oblige them; and he said it was to admiration how soldiers will venture their lives for an obliging officer.

The English had been renowned for their military prowess in the past, but they were slow in adopting modern military practice when they reentered the mainland European theatre of war at the end of the sixteenth century. Matthew Sutcliffe, who served as judge-advocate-general of the English forces in the Netherlands, thought that this was a reflection of how much the rules and methods of war had changed. The sometimes undisciplined military performance of English soldiers in northern France and the Netherlands needs to be put into perspective by remembering that they fought on the weaker side when they were allied with the Dutch and the French Huguenots, and always lacked sufficient money, victuals, and equipment. The more experienced continental European commanders who preferred sieges to risky pitched battles were following the sound example not only of medieval precedent, but also of Roman military writers such as Vegetius. The outcome of sieges was usually more predictable than pitched battles, because the strongest of fortresses could always be starved into submission if the besieging army had the patience and staying power and did not succumb to sickness. Far too many English commanders preferred frontal assaults to methodical sieges. Thirsty for instant honour and glory, they were care-

less about the loss of life among their soldiers; many were also amateurs. The preference for frontal assaults that was evident in the Elizabethan wars remained true right through the Wars of the Three Kingdoms.45

Most English commanders and officers had yet to learn the principles of good military leadership. The social gulf between aristocratic officers and private soldiers, who were conscripted by sweeps of vagrants and petty criminals for service in overseas military expeditions, was wide, and communications across that gulf must have been difficult. Sir Walter Raleigh's experience with common soldiers was that they were unmoved by motives of patriotism and religious zeal; only the prospect of plunder would motivate them to attack the enemy. Otherwise, thought Raleigh, they were quick to mutiny.46 In the late sixteenth century, English officers were often indifferent about the welfare of the men who served under them. Following a battle in which his servant was seriously wounded, Sir Roger Williams said of him: "if he dies, it makes no great matter. He was a lackey of mine, which carried my headpiece."47 Most officers assumed that their main function in battle was limited to providing an example of courage to their men. They could have learned from Vegetius that few men are born with courage; it could be acquired only by training and discipline, which, of course, would have required a lot of hard work for both commissioned and noncommissioned officers.48 This emphasis on training would come only during the period when English and Scottish soldiers served under the leadership of Maurice of Nassau, later prince of Orange, as captain-general of the Dutch army.

The demeaning attitude of English officers towards their soldiers derived from a continuing debate concerning what kind of men made the best foot soldiers. Smallhold tenants, cottagers, and labourers were regarded as too servile to make resolute soldiers, and vagrants and vagabonds were unstable and lacked suitable physiques.49 In Tudor and Stuart England, the government and its gentry supporters were preju-

46. Sir Walter Raleigh, The History of the World (London: Walter Burre, 1617), iv. 2. 4 (p.178); see also A Breefe Declaration of that which happened as well without Ostend sithence the vii. of Januarie 1602 (Middelburg: Richard Schilders, 1602), 3.
diced in favour of a military system based upon a select county militia that drew heavily upon yeomen and householders. However, the militia was intended for home defence, and members of the militia could not legally be required to serve overseas. Consequently, overseas military expeditions got what was left over from amongst the vagrants and masterless men swept up by county and municipal authorities in their hundreds.  

Many of the officers of Charles II’s army spent most of their time at court, and not enough time in the field. Except for regiments detached for foreign service, the English home army of the Restoration period never deployed for battle before the invasion of England by William, prince of Orange, in 1688. Under Charles II, it was rare for a unit larger than a company to drill together. Because the concept of a military hierarchy had not yet supplanted social hierarchies in Charles II’s army, a chain of command could not be established. It is difficult to imagine what would have held such an army together in the heat of battle—nor does the performance of James VII and II’s army of 1688 provide a compelling reason to think otherwise. The failure of James’s English army to offer substantial resistance to William’s invading force can be blamed on James’s indecisiveness and the shifting allegiances of his officers, but attention should also be paid to the deficiency of training and discipline which was characteristic of Charles II’s home army.  

Discipline had been weak among the officers of Charles II’s army. In 1678, when war with France seemed likely after England had realigned herself with the Netherlands and Spain, a captain in Sir Henry Gooderick’s Regiment, which had been raised for service in Flanders, resigned his commission in order to challenge his colonel to a duel. Gooderick accepted the challenge and recruited a second for a multiple combat. Gooderick’s second killed the captain, but Gooderick was also wounded. Experienced military commanders recognized that duelling was subversive of military hierarchies and discipline, but this evil practice continued in the English army throughout the seventeenth century.


Before the reign of James VII and II, the English home army had consisted only of guards and garrisons supplemented by small units sent to sea as marines, posted to overseas garrisons in places such as Tangier or attached to mainland European armies in Portugal, the Netherlands, and France. The lack of permanent barracks and extensive military reservations, as well as the widespread fear of standing armies, had precluded holding large-scale maneuvers during the reign of Charles II. James II inaugurated the practice of having the better part of his army, which had expanded because of the threat posed by the Monmouth Rebellion of 1685, assemble for six weeks every summer on Hounslow Heath or Blackheath. The purpose of this encampment was to drill and train the army in large tactical units to increase its proficiency, but it also served, thought the citizens of London, to intimidate the populace. Each summer a mock battle was staged after large and elaborate earthen ramparts were constructed; in 1687, the Siege of Buda was reenacted. Such events constituted a tourist attraction, and courtiers brought their ladies to observe the spectacle, but Dutch propagandists depicted the mock battles as “shooting at butterflies in the air.”

The manuals of drill of the late seventeenth century reveal that colonels had limited contact with the soldiers of their regiments. Colonels were often absent recruiting soldiers, and rarely went into the field with their men. The colonel was responsible for paying, provisioning, clothing, and equipping his regiment. Discipline was also his responsibility, but this duty was usually delegated. Colonelcies and other military commissions were offered to members of Parliament who were allowed to buy commissions during the expansion of the army in 1678 when war with France was expected. A regiment was essentially a recruiting device rather than a tactical unit; it might contain one or more battalions. Battalions were commanded in the field by lieutenant-colonels, who were more likely to be experienced soldiers. The first captain, who served as sergeant-major, by now usually shortened to major, was the source of orders and commands, and was primarily responsible for drilling the battalion, although some of his duties devolved upon the adjutant. However, an official drill manual of 1682 stated that the major and his adjutant were always to be present when the companies were


drilled in order to issue commands. Soldiers were to be instructed by the subaltern officers of the company.\textsuperscript{55}

Of all officer ranks in the English army, that of colonel was the most highly politicized, because one needed a powerful patron to purchase a colonelcy, and, as the army continued to expand during the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession, the office was often used as a stepping stone to a seat in Parliament.\textsuperscript{56} Since a colonel's primary task was recruiting, his understanding of political issues was necessary to recruit and motivate his men because the English people had become more politically aware in the second half of the seventeenth century. There survives the complete text of a speech given by a colonel to his regiment just before they sailed to Flanders to fight in the Nine Years' War. Assuming that the speech was addressed not just to the officers, but to the soldiers as well, which seems to have been the case, the colonel assumes a considerable degree of political sophistication on the part of the rank and file, and further assumes that they will be familiar with many political and economic issues, such as excise taxes and the nature of individual liberties, which he discusses in his speech. He also assumes that they will have a fairly detailed knowledge of Jacobite propaganda, which he tries to counteract with reasonable arguments.\textsuperscript{57} Probably most of the soldiers of the regiment had been impressed, but one soldier, a volunteer, who was bold enough to speak up, said that he was a former Cambridge University student who had been forced to withdraw from the university because his father had been ruined by the high taxes generated by King William's wars. After considering his career options, he had thought about becoming a "knight of the pad," that is, a highwayman, but he turned instead to enlistment in the army: "It was necessity which brought me hither; I neither regarded the justice nor injustice of the cause; I neither fight for King William nor against King James." The young volunteer promised only loyalty to the colonel of the regiment, whom he said enjoyed a good reputation among his men.\textsuperscript{58}

There were a number of reasons why English soldiers received little training before they were sent overseas to fight. Most soldiers who served in the infantry in English armies and expeditions sent overseas during the seventeenth century and many of those who fought in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms were impressed or otherwise forcibly enlisted, and

\textsuperscript{55} Anon., \textit{An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline} (London: John Bill, 1682), 3, 7, 38.

\textsuperscript{56} [Edward Ward], \textit{Mars stripped of his Armour: Or the Army displayed in all its True Colours} (London: J. Woodward, 1709), 7.

\textsuperscript{57} Anon., \textit{A True Copy of a Speech made by an English Colonel to his Regiment, immediately before their late Transportation to Flanders at Harwich} (London?: n.p., 1691), 8-9.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 9-12.
had to be kept under lock and key until they were put aboard transport ships or marched to the front. Even those who enlisted voluntarily for a bounty were also detained for fear that they would abscond with the bounty. Consequently, any training in drill and the manual of arms would necessarily have been quite limited before embarkation. A manuscript copy of "A Method of Discipline for the Behaviour of a Regiment of Foot upon Action," probably written by Richard Kane of the Royal Regiment of Ireland in the reign of Queen Anne (r. 1702–14), states that there was no standard method of drilling soldiers—even on the battlefield where the space for maneuvering tens of thousands of men could be quite cramped—and each regiment clung to its own idiosyncracies despite efforts to get the drill standardized. The author states that a drill manual was finally issued for use by the horse, dragoons, and foot, but it was intended for parade-ground use only, and did not address the question of battlefield drill. The author thought that this was amazing considering the fact that the British army had already fought two extended wars in mainland Europe, the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession, and the officers, who in both conflicts consisted mostly of young subalterns, had little guidance in how to prepare their men for battle. Consequently, it was difficult to get two platoons together in battalion formation who understood the same commands.69 An unofficial manual of drill published in 1690 also limits itself to parade-ground drill for the foot, and one is struck by its complexity. Before the replacement of screw and plug bayonets by the socket bayonet allowed musketeers to repel cavalry charges as soon as they had fired their muskets, infantry formations had been obliged to retain pikemen, although in diminishing proportions. To march and drill pikemen and musketeers together was complicated, since the manual of arms for the former consisted of thirty-six separate commands and the latter forty-four commands. Orders could be effectively transmitted only by the beat of the drum or the sound of the trumpet.60

It was widely assumed among officers of European armies drawn from the nobility that courage was an exclusively aristocratic virtue, and they did not expect to find it among private soldiers. Therefore, tactics were devised which made little demand upon the bravery of private


soldiers, but subjected them to stricter discipline. It had been recognized early on that discipline was more important than courage or physical strength. What little courage the rank and file might possess they derived from the example and demeanor of their officers, who must therefore appear to be cheerful and insouciant when proceeding into battle. It was especially important to hold a battlefield formation together until the enemy fired. In order to maintain battle formations in the face of the enemy and to compel soldiers to stand and fight, officers assumed different positions in a battle formation than they did on the parade ground or marching onto the battlefield. Trooping onto the field of battle, the commander of a battalion marched in front of his men, but when they formed up in ranks for firing, he withdrew to the middle of the second rank, and the ensigns of companies with their colours did likewise. Gustavus Adolphus had demonstrated the foolhardiness of a commander leading from the front when he was killed at the Battle of Lützen in 1632, however much the courage of the Swedish king continued to be admired. Sergeants with halberds were posted on the flanks, and lieutenants with drawn swords marched at the rear on route marches and in battle formations to encourage soldiers to do their duty, to deter desertion, and to kill those attempting to do so. When advancing into battle, the commanding officer of a cavalry squadron was to canter in the first rank rather than in front of his troopers, so that he did not obstruct their fire and was well placed to exhort them when they engaged the enemy. When the cavalry charged, their ranks were so close together that officers did not have room to fall back into the ranks.

On the eve of battle it had been usual for Roman commanders, using all the rhetorical skills they could muster, to exhort their soldiers to be brave and perform their duty: “The oration of a general gives courage to cowards and base minds”; “Before thy soldiers undertake any hard or dangerous enterprise, prepare their minds by thy wise persuasion that whatsoever happens they may be resolute.” Jacques Hurault used classical examples to show that it was good military practice for generals and


captains to make speeches to exhort and hearten their men. Although he
gave instances of commanders from antiquity who led their men with
gentleness and persuasion, Hurault concluded that officers must teach
their soldiers to stand in awe of them by severity of punishment.65 Eng-
lish and Scottish soldiers who served under Maurice of Nassau and Gus-
tavus Adolphus were left with indelible impressions of how those great
generals had animated their soldiers on the eve of battle, and some, such
as Major-General Philip Skippon, who commanded the London trained-
bands in the Parliamentary forces in the early days of the English civil
war, continued the practice when they assumed high command.66 The
earl of Orrery thought that the supposed Roman tradition of a general
exhorting his troops was quite impractical, since the commander of a
field army could not make himself heard to above one regiment at a time,
and he would waste half of the day if he harangued every regiment. Yet
Orrery did believe that it was useful on the eve of the battle for officers
to provide short explanations of what the men would be fighting for. This
more informal speech to soldiers tended to produce a unanimity of spirit
between officers and men.67 George Story, a military chaplain during the
Williamite conquest of Ireland, stated that the practice of generals
exhorting their armies on the eve of battle was “now quite out of fash-
ion,” and he suggested that accounts which depicted such rituals were
often fictions that generals had inserted in dispatches and reports.68 Yet
Richard Kane, who fought in later wars, thought that colonels should say
something “to encourage and excite the men to the performance of their
duty.” Kane also believed that those officers who took the trouble to
explain the reasons for fighting a battle in an easy and familiar manner
were rewarded with the love of their men:

I cannot but take notice of some gentlemen, who instead of treating
their men with good nature, use them with contempt and cruelty; by
which those gentlemen often meet with their fate in the days of bat-
tle from their own men; when those officers who, on the other hand,
treat their men with justice and humanity, will be sure, on all occa-
sions to have them stand fast by them, and even interpose between
them and death.69

66. [John Cruso], Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie (Cambridge: Thomas
Affairs] 1 (23), Hastings MSS, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California;
Carlton, Going to the Wars, 180.
67. Orrery, Treatise of the Art of War, 185.
68. George Story, A Continuation of the Impartial History of the Wars of Ireland
(London: Richard Chiswell, 1693), 123–25.
It was usual for European armies of the seventeenth century to employ regimental chaplains to instruct soldiers in their religious and moral duties and to reinforce the authority of their officers. Comparing the chaplains of regiments raised in each of the Three Kingdoms, the Scots Presbyterian and Irish Catholic chaplains appear to have been the most conscientious and successful in ministering to their soldiers. According to Robert Monro, the field commander of Mackay’s Regiment, the chaplains furnished by the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland to Scots regiments in the Swedish army earned their pay. Gustavus Adolphus continued the practice of paying for two chaplains for each regiment. They not only preached to the soldiers but helped to maintain discipline and were prepared to lead men into battle. During the Bishops’ Wars, the opening phase of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, it was a common practice, according to an English observer, for Scots chaplains to carry swords, pistols, and carbines, although Robert Baillie, who had served as a chaplain, insisted that they did so only to protect themselves against bandits. Another English observer, who had visited the camp of Alexander Leslie, earl of Leven, the former Swedish field marshal who returned home to command the Scots Covenanting Army, remarked that the Scots chaplains were learned and godly men who preached appropriate sermons, in contrast to the Anglican chaplains in King Charles I’s army. In the Anglo-Dutch Brigade of the States’ Army earlier in the seventeenth century, it is not at all clear that every English regiment was assigned a chaplain. It is also questionable how much spiritual consolation English soldiers in the Dutch army received from their chaplains. One such chaplain, Samuel Bachiler, reproved soldiers “who are ready for any employment in wars, whether against friend or foe they care not so they may find pay, booty and prey, regarding only their private ends and particular gains.” Having said that, Bachiler tried to convert English participation in the Eighty Years’ War against Spain into a holy war. In the Nine Years’ War, John Whittle, one of the English chaplains of William, prince of Orange, admitted that his principal duty was to preach and write propaganda for the Orangist cause during William’s invasion of England in 1688. George Story, a chaplain with the Anglo-Dutch forces


71. Samuel Bachiler, Miles Christianus, or the Campe Royal (Amsterdam: Richard Plater, 1628), 712–13.
during the Williamite conquest of Ireland, seems to have been employed to write a full and laudatory history of William of Orange’s campaigns. 72

The most effective use of military chaplains occurred during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, which reminds us that these conflicts were religious wars. The Kirk of Scotland provided chaplains to all the regiments of the various Covenanting armies raised by the Scottish Estates, and this practice was also followed when sending mercenary regiments into foreign service. Archibald Campbell, eighth earl of Argyll, reinforced the authority of the chaplains in his regiment by compelling his men to adhere to the National Covenant—even in the face of mutiny. 73 The English New Model Army, while it harboured some who might be described as ungodly, was for the most part driven by a strong sense of righteousness and confidence that they were the instruments of Divine Providence. This religious motivation derived chiefly from officers such as Sir Thomas Fairfax, the lord general; Oliver Cromwell; and Philip Skippon; and, to a lesser extent, members of the rank and file. The chaplains were appointed by the regimental colonels and tended to reflect the views of their commanding officers. Like the chaplains in other English armies of the civil wars, their main function was exhorting the men to do their duty and providing a moral justification for fighting other Englishmen, rather than attending to spiritual needs on the battlefield. 74

The Catholic priests who served as chaplains to the Irish Regiments or tercios of the Spanish Army of Flanders, while not neglecting the ideological conflict of the Low Countries wars, probably placed the most emphasis on religious instruction and spiritual needs. Each company of an Irish tercio had its own chaplain and, unlike the Protestant chaplains of English regiments, the priests of Irish regiments accompanied soldiers to the battlefield and comforted the wounded and dying. Irish priests were abundant in Flanders because the Irish military and religious communities lived in close proximity to one another. 75

Compatible with Christian moral teaching, most military writers assumed that the best way for a commanding officer to maintain discipline and correct vice was by his own example rather than prescription. Sir William St. Leger, the president of the province of Munster at the start of the Irish Rebellion of 1641, was a veteran of the Dutch army and

72. John Whittle, An Exact Diary of the Late Expedition of . . . the Prince of Orange (London: Richard Baldwin, 1689), 30, 33–34, 39–40; [George Story], A True and Impartial History of . . . the Kingdom of Ireland during the Last Two Years with the Present State of Both Armies (London: Richard Chiswell, 1691), 10; Manning, Apprenticeship in Arms, 262–63, 383.
73. Furgol, Regimental History of the Covenanting Armies, 7–8, 16.
74. Gentles, New Model Army, 93–96.
a very effective commander of the Royalist forces in southern Ireland. He believed in setting a good example for his officers and men by sharing their duties and labours in order to communicate to them the necessity of obeying commands. Few generals were more solicitous of their soldiers than Peregrine Bertie, Lord Willoughby—“brave Lord Willoughby” of the traditional Elizabethan ballad—while campaigning in Flanders in 1589. Willoughby ordered the baggage wagons emptied of his and the other officers’ equipment so that they could transport the sick and wounded among his soldiers. He also paid out of his own pocket to buy shoes and apparel for his soldiers. Leonard and Thomas Digges believed that a wise captain would always keep his men occupied drilling and practicing with their weapons. By combining such exercises with wagers, they would introduce an atmosphere of amusement and competition into such activities.

The writers of military treatises all agreed that the captains of companies were the key officers in the inculcation of good morale and the maintenance of discipline. After the ability to carry out orders on the battlefield, William Blandy thought that the most important quality a colonel should look for in his company commanders was honesty in paying and provisioning his men in full and on time. If the payroll or provisions were late, colonels should be prepared to lend their own money to captains to insure that the men were paid and fed. Solicitude for the welfare of their men would bind the loyalty of soldiers to their officers. In addition a captain needed to be an able orator in order to animate his men on the eve of battle and to compose factionalism while in garrison.

Thomas Styward thought that generals of field armies should make frequent surprise visits to captains’ tents to check on the state of readiness and training, and to make sure that captains were paying and feeding their men in a timely fashion. At the same time, Styward, who wrote before the time of the Maurician reforms, favoured large companies of 300 men in order to save having to pay larger numbers of officers, which

76. Dudley, 3rd Lord North, A Forest of Varieties, First Part (London: Richard Cotes, 1645), 100–101; [William Blandy], The Castle, or the Picture of Pollicy (London: John Daye, 1581), fol. 19; [Edmund Borlase], The History of the Irish Rebellion traced from many Preceding Acts to the Grand Eruption, the 23rd of October 1641; and thence pursued to the Act of Settlement, MDCLXII (Dublin: Oliver Nelson, 1743), 108, 113.


78. Digges and Digges, Arithmetickal Militarie Treatise, 94.

worked against close contact between officers and men and intensive training and discipline.  

The office of captain, like that of colonel, was a proprietary office that was bought and sold; consequently, the profit motive was never far from the minds of incumbents of such offices. During the Nine Years’ War, there existed in London at least two coffee houses where colonels met to broker commissions as if they were taking bids on a public stock exchange. Colonels and captains could increase their margin of profit by returning false musters and pocketing the “dead pays” for soldiers who had died and not been replaced or who never existed in the first place. This practice had been especially widespread among the officers who had volunteered to serve in the English regiments of the Dutch army during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Such officers came to be known as “Low-Countries captains,” and their dishonest practices not only cheated Queen Elizabeth, but also prevented their commanding officers from making accurate estimates of the strength of their garrisons and field forces. Thomas and Dudley Digges also accused such Low-Countries captains of withholding rations. They insisted that the high casualty rates among English troops in the Hispano-Dutch wars were attributable, at least in part, to malnutrition among soldiers impressed out of the slums of London and inadequately fed by corrupt officers in the Low Countries wars.

Considering the fact that many of the soldiers employed in overseas expeditions were impressed from among unstable elements of the population, it is no wonder that military officers feared the ever-present possibility of mutiny. Most mutinies arose from the failure of captains to pay their men in a timely fashion or the failure of their governments to provide the funds. “Pay well and hang well, makes a good soldier” was an

oft-quoted aphorism. Beyond regular and punctual payment, most officers relied upon the exemplary use of corporal punishment to deter indiscipline. It was also widely agreed that captains and lieutenants had a special duty to compose quarrels involving questions of honour, because some soldiers imitated their betters by fighting duels. Edward Davies, who had served as a gentleman volunteer in the Spanish Army of Flanders, believed that shame was a better way to punish the misdemeanours of soldiers than flogging. His was probably a minority opinion, but most writers of military treatises agreed that the captain of a company should not inflict corporal punishments himself, but should have such punishments administered by the provost-marshal. The reasoning behind this advice was that captains must be careful not to destroy the bond of affection with their soldiers, whereas no one loved a provost-marshal. Despite Francis Markham's insistence that the office of provost-marshal was suitable "for a gentleman of blood and quality," the provost-marshal retained his reputation as the "hangman or executioner of the army," and the under-provosts were under instructions to carry halters, manacles, and truncheons with them at all times, so that the provost-marshal could "out-face" unruly persons and prevent mutinies.

Except for a few professional soldiers who had continued to seek employment in mainland European armies during the mid-Elizabethan period, most military men from the English aristocracy had become isolated from the rapid changes in the theory and practice of warfare in the European military world. The official English intervention in the Eighty Years' War in 1585 reestablished that contact and began a relationship with continental European armies which constituted an apprenticeship in arms that lasted through the reign of William III, stadholder and captain-general of the Netherlands and king of England, Ireland, and Scotland (1689–1702). During this period of almost a century and a quarter the Dutch army drew heavily upon the military manpower of the British Isles, and, after 1689, the armies of the Three Kingdoms and the Netherlands were placed under the joint command of mostly Dutch generals. Thus was England (and after 1707 Great Britain) drawn into what is often regarded as the Second Hundred Years' War with France (1689–1815). Although three Anglo-Dutch Wars had for a time disrupted this close relationship, many military men from the British Isles gained experience of mainland European warfare and command in the Dutch army, while others also served in the armies of Sweden, Denmark-

85. Davies, Art of War, 95–97, 118–19, 122; Thomas Trussel, The Soldier Pleading his own Cause (London: Thomas Walkley, 1626), 56.
86. Markham, Five Decades of Epistles of War, 105–8.
Norway, Poland, Russia, France, Imperial Austria, Portugal, Spain, and the Venetian Republic. Some of those who carried with them the cultural baggage of a chivalric preference for edged weapons and individual displays of prowess and honour learned more slowly, but gradually most officers from the British Isles acquired experience in how to train, motivate, and lead their men in a more effective way, and to husband scarce military manpower. With the passage of time, the distinction between aristocratic military amateurs and professional soldiers would diminish although that distinction persisted well into the eighteenth century.\footnote{Manning, \textit{Apprenticeship in Arms}, 431, 433-37, 441-44.}