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The French Losses in the Waterloo Campaign.

IT may be said that till within the last few years there were no definite data available for the calculation of the losses of the French army during the Waterloo campaign. Siborne, the most careful of English writers on the subject, contented himself with stating that they were 'immense, but difficult to estimate,' and did not commit himself to figures. More modern narrators of the campaign from this side of the Channel have either copied his example or reproduced French estimates, which are themselves usually echoes from Gourgaud's 36,940,¹ or the 36,500 of the *Victoires et Conquêtes*.² Henry Houssaye, whose volumes on 1814-15 have completely superseded the earlier French accounts, because of his infinitely greater care in consulting original documents, gives much higher figures. He allows for 35,000 men lost at Waterloo alone, 12,800 at Ligny and Quatre-Bras, some 2,000 for Grouchy's casualties at Wavre and Namur, and a few hundred for the skirmishes with the Prussians on June 15, in all a total of 51,000 men.³ This estimate is undoubtedly far nearer to the truth than any which had hitherto appeared, but I think that it is now possible to arrive at a result which approaches even closer to exactitude.

The new evidence which enables us to attack the problem from a secure basis is contained in M. Martinien's '*Tableaux par Corps des Officiers tués et blessés pendant les Guerres de l'Empire 1805-1815*.' This magnificent work of 824 pages consists of regimental lists of all officers killed and wounded in the Napoleonic campaigns, extracted item by item from the records of the regiments at the Archives of the Ministry of War at Paris. It is no mere table of figures, but gives the name and rank of each person cited, and even notes the death of all officers who, though returned as merely wounded, ultimately succumbed to their injuries within a couple of months of the engagement in which they had been disabled. The whole being drawn up by regiments, not by battles, the inquirer must go through the titles of all units engaged in a campaign, if he wishes to obtain the total of losses in it, and then add up the

¹ See Gourgaud, p. 134.

² See *Victoires et Conquêtes*, xxiv. 229.

³ See Houssaye's *Waterloo*, pp. 184, 213, and 439-440.

results for himself. This I have done for all the regiments which took part in the Waterloo campaign, in the hope that by the aid of the figures thus obtained we may arrive at some general facts concerning the French losses in 1815. The results are embodied in the annexed tables. It will be seen that they differ very appreciably from the totals given by M. Houssaye; e.g., he asserts that 720 French officers were killed or wounded on 18 June, and cites M. Martinien as his authority. But the 'Tableaux,' published a year later than his book, show that the real total was not 720, but 1,405. Similarly his estimate for the casualties of Ligny and Quatre-Bras is 346, but Martinien's list of names gives no less than 707 killed and wounded officers.

But it is not only the losses of the whole army considered in general that M. Martinien's tables display to us. We can also deduce from them how the stress of each battle bore upon the larger units of Napoleon's host, the corps, divisions, and brigades. To show the proportion in which each suffered, it is only necessary to prefix to its losses the total number of officers present at the opening of the campaign. These figures I have procured from another admirable work, which has appeared within the last few years, Couderc de Saint-Chamant's *Dernières Armées de Napoléon* (1902). Not till this book came to hand was it possible to arrive at the exact number of officers who took the field with each unit. But by printing in full the last morning-states of the Waterloo army, those of 10-15 June, recovered from the miscellaneous documents of the *Section Historique*, Captain Couderc has enabled us to see what precisely is the meaning of M. Martinien's lists of losses. For example, if we had only the latter before us, we could merely know that at Waterloo the 1st Léger and the 21st of the Line each lost twenty-three officers. But when we note in Captain Couderc's columns that the former regiment had 61 officers in the field, while the latter had but 42 officers, we realise that the one lost only 37 per cent. of its commissioned ranks, the other more than 50 per cent. These percentages of loss in the various units of the army have turned out to be so interesting that I have devoted several paragraphs of comment to them.

The method in which the figures thus collected can be utilised is that which has been applied in many similar cases by military statisticians—the multiplying of the number of casualties among the officers by twenty, as a rough but fairly accurate way of arriving at the number of casualties among the rank and file. This proportion is not that of the actual officers and men present at the opening of the campaign, which seems to have stood at 23 to 1, but allows for the undoubted fact that 'the epaulette attracts the bullets;' i.e. that in all the Napoleonic wars, no less than in the wars of to-day, the officer took more than his fair pro-

portional risk, because his duty sent him to the front. That this figure of 20 to 1 errs rather on the side of understatement than of overstatement seems to result from an examination of the French losses in the Peninsular war. In ordinary line *versus* column engagements, such as the imperial troops were wont to wage with the British in Spain, the average number of casualties of men per officer was decidedly over twenty. The figures of Albuera, Salamanca, and Vittoria were never properly returned by the French commanders, but those of the other main battles of the Peninsular war stand as follows :

Talavera .	266	officers killed or wounded :	7,002	men ::	1	officer :	26	men	
Busaco .	243	„	„	4,241	„	1	officer :	17·4	men
Barrosa .	113	„	„	2,451	„	1	officer :	21·6	men
The Pyre-									
nees .	977	„	„	10,448	„	1	officer :	27·7	men
Nivelle .	174	„	„	4,096	„	1	officer :	23	men
Bayonne &									
St. Pierre.	268	„	„	5,095	„	1	officer :	21·3	men

At Busaco, if Masséna's return is accurate, the proportion of officers to men disabled is abnormally great ; at Talavera and the Pyrenees it is abnormally light. Taking the whole series of battles together, we find that the proportion is one officer killed or wounded to 23·2 men. But we must remember that the Waterloo army was heavily officered ; the regiments had their full *cadres* in the commissioned ranks, even when (as in many cases) they were not up to regulation strength in men. In several cavalry regiments the officers stood to the men in a proportion so high as 1 to 12, and in the infantry 1 to 24 was the average. In the Peninsula, on the other hand, it is a repeated complaint of the French commanders, especially of Soult in 1813-14, that the regiments were short of officers. Statistics bear out this allegation : in Masséna's army in 1810 the infantry showed one officer to 26 men ; in Soult's army in 1813 there was but one officer to 28 men. We should allow, therefore, that in the Waterloo campaign fewer men per officer were likely to fall, simply because there were fewer men per officer in line. If we find that the Peninsular battles show an average of 23 men hit to one officer, when 26 or 28 men per officer were present, we may grant that a loss of 20 men per officer should be the probable figure for 1815, when only 23 men per officer were in line.

The headings of the columns in the annexed tables for the most part explain themselves. But it is perhaps necessary to point out that the casualties in the column headed ' Small Fights ' include (1) the losses of 15 June suffered by the Guard Cavalry, the Reserve Cavalry (Excellmans and Pajol) and Vandamme's infantry,

while driving in Ziethen's corps towards Fleurus; (2) the casualties of 17 June which Subervie's Lancers suffered at the combat of Genappe, when they were engaged with the 7th Hussars and the Household Cavalry of Wellington's rear-guard; (3) the casualties of Maurin's cavalry, and of Gérard's and Vandamme's infantry during Grouchy's retreat on 20 June; (4) those of Teste's division of the 6th Corps, while defending the walls of Namur against the pursuing Prussians on 21 June, on the second day of this same retreat. The third item is far the heaviest, and accounts for just over half of the total of 109 officers killed and wounded in the 'small fights.'

I have included the losses of Ligny and Quatre-Bras in the same column, as they were fought on the same day by different fractions of the French army, and there can be no confusion between them. Those of Quatre-Bras belong to the 2nd Corps (minus Girard's division), L'Héritier's cuirassiers, and the light cavalry of the Guard: they amount to 33 officers killed and 158 wounded. The far heavier losses of Ligny (76 officers killed and 440 wounded) are distributed between the 3rd and 4th corps, Girard's division of the 2nd Corps, the Reserve Cavalry corps of Pajol, Excelmans, and Milhaud, and the infantry and heavy cavalry of the Guard. Of the casualties of the staff in these two battles I have identified and distributed those of the generals by name, but in regard to the 26 aides-de-camp, *adjoints de l'état-major* &c., the only possible course (since M. Martinien gives them simply as 'losses on 16 June') was to credit them to Ligny and Quatre-Bras in the proportion of the other losses of the day—viz. 19 to the first named, and 7 to the second engagement.

Division	Regiment	Officers Present	Ligny and Quatre-Bras		Waterloo		Wavre		Small Fights		Total		General Total
			k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	
Ist CORPS D'ERLON													
Infantry	54th Line	41	—	—	6	14	—	—	—	—	6	14	20
Allix . .	55th "	45	—	—	5	14	—	—	—	—	5	14	19
	28th "	42	—	—	6	11	—	—	—	—	6	11	17
	105th "	42	—	—	11	22	—	—	—	—	11	22	33
Donzelot .	13th Léger	61	—	—	7	20	—	—	—	2	7	22	29
	17th Line	42	—	—	5	16	—	—	—	1	5	17	22
	19th "	43	—	—	9	13	—	—	—	—	9	13	22
	51st "	42	—	1	8	11	—	—	—	—	8	12	20
Marcognet	21st Line	42	—	—	7	16	—	—	—	—	7	16	23
	46th "	43	—	—	3	21	—	—	—	—	3	21	24
	25th "	40	—	—	1	30	—	—	—	—	1	30	31
	45th "	43	—	—	3	28	—	—	—	—	3	28	31
Durutte .	8th Line	40	—	—	1	19	—	—	—	—	1	19	20
	29th "	40	—	—	2	8	—	—	—	—	2	8	10
	85th "	40	—	—	5	17	—	—	—	—	5	17	22
	95th "	40	—	—	1	18	—	—	—	—	1	18	19
Cavalry	7th Hussars	28	—	—	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	9	9
	3rd Chasseurs	29	—	—	1	10	—	—	—	—	1	10	11
Jacquinot .	3rd Lancers	27	—	—	2	6	—	—	—	—	2	6	8
	4th "	22	—	—	3	6	—	—	—	—	3	6	9
		792	—	1	86	309	—	—	—	3	86	313	399

Division	Regiment	Officers Present	Ligny and Quatre-Bras		Waterloo		Wavre		Small Fights		Total		General Total
			k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	
2nd CORPS REILLE													
<i>Infantry</i>	3rd Line	42	—	5	5	20	—	—	—	—	5	25	30
Bachelu	61st "	41	3	11	4	13	—	—	—	—	7	23	30
	72nd "	40	2	3	1	8	—	—	—	—	3	11	14
	108th "	61	3	14	5	15	—	—	—	—	8	29	37
Prince Jerome	1st Léger	64	—	3	5	18	—	—	—	—	5	21	26
	2nd "	95	—	12	5	10	—	—	1	—	6	20	26
	1st Line	69	6	21	5	13	—	—	—	—	11	34	45
Girard ¹	2nd "	65	1	5	6	20	—	—	—	—	7	25	32
	11th Léger	42	—	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	20	20
	82nd Line	27	1	21	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	21	22
	12th Léger	51	—	23	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	23	23
Foy	4th Line	44	1	24	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	24	25
	92nd Line	40	4	2	1	12	—	—	—	—	5	14	19
	93rd "	41	1	1	6	11	—	—	—	—	7	12	19
	4th Léger	59	6	23	2	6	—	—	—	—	8	29	37
<i>Cavalry</i>	100th Line	51	1	14	1	8	—	—	—	—	2	22	24
	1st Chasseurs	40	—	2	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	16	16
Piré	6th "	34	—	1	2	11	—	—	—	—	2	12	14
	5th Lancers	25	1	9	—	3	—	—	—	—	1	12	13
	6th "	34	3	8	—	9	—	—	—	—	3	17	20
		965	33	222	48	191	—	—	1	—	82	413	495
3rd CORPS VANDAMME													
<i>Infantry</i>	15th Léger	62	3	11	—	—	1	14	—	1	4	26	30
Lefol	23rd Line	62	1	12	—	—	4	1	—	—	5	13	18
	37th "	59	1	10	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	11	12
	64th "	40	2	11	—	—	1	8	—	—	3	19	22
Habert	34th Line	55	3	14	—	—	2	2	—	1	5	17	22
	88th "	57	12	16	—	—	—	2	1	—	13	18	31
	22nd "	55	—	17	—	—	1	6	1	2	2	25	27
	70th "	45	1	10	—	—	2	2	—	—	3	12	15
	2nd Swiss	21	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	—	—	9	9
Berthezène	12th Line	41	—	13	—	—	—	—	1	4	1	17	18
	56th "	42	1	7	—	—	—	3	—	1	1	11	12
	33rd "	39	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	13	2	13	15
	86th "	44	—	7	—	—	—	—	2	8	2	15	17
<i>Cavalry</i>	4th Chasseurs	31	—	—	—	9	—	—	1	2	1	11	12
	9th "	25	—	2	—	10	—	—	—	—	—	12	12
	12th "	29	1	2	1	10	—	—	—	—	2	12	14
		707	25	132	1	29	11	48	8	34	45	241	286
4th CORPS GÉRARD													
<i>Infantry</i>	30th Line	41	8	13	—	—	—	—	1	2	9	15	24
Pécheux	96th "	41	3	5	—	—	—	—	2	2	5	7	12
	63rd "	44	2	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	8	10
	75th "	42	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	4	1	4	5
Vichery	59th Line	41	2	11	—	—	3	5	—	—	5	16	21
	76th "	41	1	12	—	—	2	9	—	—	3	21	24
	69th "	40	5	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	5	10
	48th "	42	2	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	13	15
Hulot	9th Léger	45	4	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	10	14
	111th Line	45	2	10	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	11	13
	44th "	44	1	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	9	10
<i>Cavalry</i>	50th "	36	3	10	—	—	—	2	—	—	3	12	15
	6th Hussars	25	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	2	2
Maurin	8th Chasseurs	25	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	6	6
	6th Dragoons	20	2	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	7	9
	16th "	24	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	4
		596	35	117	—	—	6	23	4	9	45	149	194

¹ This division was detached from its corps, and fought at Ligny, not Quatre Bras.² This division was detached from its corps, and fought at Waterloo, though the 3rd Corps was present at Wavre.

Division	Regiment	Officers Present	Ligny and Quatre-Bras		Waterloo		Wavre		Small Fights		Total		General Total	
			k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.		
6th CORPS LOBAU Infantry	5th Line	42	—	—	4	18	—	—	—	—	4	18	22	
	11th "	61	—	—	2	16	—	—	—	—	2	16	18	
	Zimmer .	27th "	39	—	—	1	16	—	—	—	—	1	16	17
		84th "	45	—	—	5	11	—	—	—	—	5	11	16
		5th Léger	42	—	—	4	9	—	—	—	—	4	9	18
	Jeannin .	10th Line	40	—	—	2	21	—	—	—	—	2	21	23
		47th "	Never joined	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		107th "	44	—	—	4	11	—	—	—	—	4	11	15
		8th Léger	42	—	—	—	—	2	4	—	1	2	5	7
	Teste ³ .	40th Line	Never joined	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	65th "	22	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	7	1	7	8	
	75th "	42	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	4	1	4	5	
		419	—	—	22	102	2	4	2	12	26	118	144	
<i>CAVALRY RESERVE</i>														
1st CORPS PAJOL														
P. Soult .	1st Hussars	97	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	7	7	
	4th "		—	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	9	
	5th "		—	5	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	6	6
Subervie ⁴ .	1st Lancers	122	—	1	1	18	—	—	—	1	1	15	16	
	2nd "		—	—	—	8	—	—	14	—	—	17	17	
	11th Chasseurs		—	—	2	10	—	—	—	—	2	10	12	
		219	—	15	3	26	—	—	—	23	8	64	67	
<i>2nd CORPS EXCELMANS</i>														
Strolz .	5th Dragoons	146	—	7	—	—	1	2	—	—	1	9	10	
	13th "		—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	4	4	
	15th "		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	3
	20th "		—	—	—	—	—	—	1	6	1	6	7	
Chastel .	4th Dragoons	141	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	12		
	12th "		1	8	—	—	—	—	—	1	8	9		
	14th "		2	3	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	5		
	17th "	1	7	—	—	—	—	—	1	7	8			
		187	4	37	—	—	1	6	1	9	6	52	58	
<i>3rd CORPS KELLERMANN</i>														
L'Herétier	2nd Dragoons	138	—	—	6	12	—	—	—	—	6	12	18	
	7th "		—	—	1	15	—	—	—	—	1	15	16	
	8th Cuirassiers		—	13	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	17	17	
	11th "		1	3	2	15	—	—	—	—	3	18	21	
Roussel .	1st Carabineers	122	—	—	8	18	—	—	—	—	8	18	21	
	2nd "		—	—	3	10	—	—	—	—	3	10	18	
	2nd Cuirassiers		—	—	2	14	—	—	—	—	2	14	16	
	3rd "		—	—	2	11	—	—	—	—	2	11	13	
		260	1	16	24	94	—	—	—	—	25	106	135	
<i>4th CORPS MILHAUD</i>														
Wathier .	1st Cuirassiers	117	—	—	4	18	—	—	—	—	4	18	17	
	4th "		—	—	4	10	—	—	—	—	4	10	14	
	7th "		—	—	8	11	—	—	—	—	8	11	14	
	12th "		—	—	4	12	—	—	—	—	4	12	16	
Delort .	5th Cuirassiers	39	1	—	2	12	—	—	—	—	3	12	15	
	6th "	22	—	2	16	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	18	
	9th "	34	—	2	11	—	—	—	—	2	13	15		
	10th "	32	1	4	2	11	—	—	—	3	15	18		
		244	2	8	21	96	—	—	—	—	23	104	127	

³ This division was detached, and fought at Wavre, though the corps was at Waterloo.⁴ This division was detached and served at Waterloo, though Pajol was at Wavre.

Division	Regiment	Officers Present	Ligny and Quatre-Bras		Waterloo		Wavre		Small Fights		Total		General Total
			k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	
<i>Artillery</i>	Horse . 18 batteries of 1st, 2nd, and 4th Regiments Field . 26 batteries of 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 8th Regiments	44	—	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	3
		90	2	1	4	7	—	—	—	2	6	10	16
		184	2	1	6	8	—	—	—	2	8	11	19
Train .	28 companies of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th battalions	57	1	1	1	3	—	—	—	—	2	4	6
Engineers	'Etat-major particulier' Sappers and Miners	?	—	1	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	9	9
		46	—	—	3	9	—	2	—	—	3	11	14
		46	—	1	3	17	—	2	—	—	3	20	23
IMPERIAL GUARD													
<i>Infantry</i>													
<i>Old Guard</i>													
Friant .	{ 1st Grenadiers 2nd "	86	—	—	1	11	—	—	—	—	1	11	12
		—	—	1	1	15	—	—	—	—	1	15	16
Morand .	{ 1st Chasseurs 2nd "	89	—	—	1	6	—	—	—	—	1	6	7
		—	—	—	—	11	—	—	—	—	—	11	11
<i>Middle Guard</i>													
Roguet .	{ 3rd Grenadiers 4th "	65	—	2	3	13	—	—	—	—	3	15	18
		—	—	2	4	13	—	—	—	—	4	15	19
Michel .	{ 3rd Chasseurs 4th "	80	—	—	8	17	—	—	—	—	8	17	25
		—	—	—	4	11	—	—	—	—	4	11	15
<i>Young Guard</i>													
Duhesme .	{ 1st Tirailleurs 3rd "	80	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	6	6
		—	1	—	1	8	—	—	—	—	1	8	9
Barrois .	{ 1st Voltigeurs 3rd "	82	—	—	2	8	—	—	—	—	2	8	10
		—	—	—	2	7	—	—	—	—	2	7	9
<i>Heavy Cavalry</i>													
Guyot .	{ Grenadiers à cheval Dragoons Gendarmes	117	—	—	2	17	—	—	—	1	2	18	20
		—	1	—	3	16	—	—	—	—	4	16	20
		4	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	1	2
<i>Light Cavalry</i>													
Lefebvre-Desnouettes	{ Lancers Chasseurs	139	—	2	1	9	—	—	—	—	1	11	12
		—	—	—	6	14	—	—	—	—	6	14	20
Artillery .	{ 9 field batteries 4 horse "	54	—	—	2	9	—	—	—	—	2	9	11
Train .		?	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
		806	3	7	41	193	—	—	—	1	44	201	245

STAFF AND NON-REGIMENTAL OFFICERS

Rank	Officers Present	Ligny and Quatre-Bras		Waterloo		Wavre		Small Fights		Total		General Total
		k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	k.	w.	
Généraux de division ⁵	—	1	4	3	13	—	1	1	1	5	19	24
Généraux de brigade ⁶	—	1	11	4	16	1	—	—	—	6	27	33
Adjutants-commandants	—	—	2	1	8	—	1	—	—	1	11	12
Adjoints d'état-major	—	1	11	—	9	—	—	—	—	1	20	21
Ingénieurs-géographes	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Aides-de-camp	—	—	11	3	21	1	—	—	1	4	33	37
Commissaires des guerres	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Total	?	3	40	11	68	2	2	1	2	17	112	129
Grand total of whole campaign	?	109	598	267	1,138	22	79	17	95	415	1,910	2,325

⁵ These were:—Killed at Ligny, Girard, of the 2nd Corps; wounded at Ligny, Habert, of 3rd Corps, and Doman and Maurin, of the cavalry. Wounded at Quatre-Bras, Kellermann. Killed at Waterloo, Destaux, Michel, and Duhesme, of the Imperial Guard; wounded at Waterloo, Bailly de Monthion, Barrois, Colbert, Friant, Guyot, of the Guard, Durutte, of the 1st Corps, Bachelu and Foy, of the 2nd Corps, Zimmer, of the 6th Corps, Delort, L'Héritier, Roussel, of the cavalry reserve, Radet 'Grand Prévôt de l'armée'. Wounded at Wavre, Gérard, commanding 4th Corps, Teste of 6th Corps. Small Fights: killed, Letort, of Imperial Guard, on 15 June, near Charleroi; wounded, Vandamme, commanding 3rd Corps, in front of Namur, 20 June.

⁶ These were:—Killed at Ligny, Le Capitaine, of 4th Corps; wounded at Ligny, Billard and Dufour, of 3rd Corps, Berruyer, of 4th Corps, Devillers and Fiat, of Girard's division of 2nd Corps, Farine, of reserve cavalry; wounded at Quatre-Bras, Gauthier, of 2nd Corps. Killed at Waterloo, Aulard, of 1st Corps, Baudoin and Jamini, of 2nd Corps, Donop, of reserve cavalry. Wounded at Waterloo: Gohrecht, Noguez, and Bourgeois, of 1st Corps, Campy and Vathiez, of 2nd Corps, Farine, Guiton, Dubois, Picquet, Travers, Blancard, of reserve cavalry, Cambronne, Harlet, Henrion, Lallemand, of the Guard, Durrien, of the staff. Killed at Wavre, Penne, of 6th Corps.

⁷ Of this Quatre-Bras 33 killed, 157 wounded = 190; Ligny 76 killed, 443 wounded = 519.

The first observation called forth by a study of these tables is that the French losses at Ligny must have been considerably understated by all the historians. We note that at Quatre-Bras 191 officers fell; on an estimate of 20 men hit to each officer, this should give a total casualty list of 3,800 men: as a matter of fact the number was somewhat greater, for Ney and Reille report 4,300 disabled,⁴ a proportion of 22 not of 20 to 1. But at Ligny we find that 516 officers were killed or wounded, while in deference, apparently, to Napoleon's statement that he had lost only some 6,000 or 7,000 men, the historians, down to M. Houssaye himself, state the French casualties at figures varying up to, but never exceeding, 8,500 men. This proportion, which would give only 16 men hit per officer, seems entirely improbable. There was nothing in the character of the fighting at Ligny which would make it likely that the officers should suffer in such an abnormal proportion: neither the long cannonade, nor the street firing in Ligny and the two St. Amands, ought to have proved so peculiarly deadly to the commissioned ranks. I am driven to conclude that it would be safer to estimate the total French loss at 10,000 men; even this would be lower than the proportion of 20 to 1 which we have agreed to accept as normal.

Descending to details, we find that by far the heaviest casualties at Ligny fell upon Girard's division of the 2nd Corps, the unit detached from Reille which fought so desperately in the Hameau de St.-Amand. It lost 90 officers out of 164 present, more than

⁴ These figures seem perfectly genuine and certain; see Houssaye, pp. 213, 440, and the notes of Gourgaud, who gives the figure at 4,140, Foy, and others.

54 per cent. This fact corroborates all the narratives which speak of it as practically *hors de combat* at nightfall, and accounts for Napoleon having left it behind him on the field of Ligny, to recuperate itself, when he marched off upon the following day.

Of the other troops present at Ligny Vandamme's corps lost 157 officers out of 707 present, a portion of about one in five, or more exactly 22·2 per cent. Gérard's corps suffered 152 casualties among 596 officers present, or about 25·5 per cent. The Reserve Cavalry, who were mainly occupied in observing the Prussian left wing, and of whom only one or two divisions were seriously engaged, seem to have lost only 66 officers out of some 700 present, about 8 per cent. The Imperial Guard suffered even less: the infantry had 5 officers wounded and one killed, the heavy cavalry two killed. It is clear, therefore, that Gourgaud's estimate of 100 of all ranks killed and wounded for the whole Guard is not far wrong, though 160 would be nearer the mark. M. Houssaye's hypothetical estimate of 300 must be hopelessly erroneous; it would give 37 men hit per officer. The figures also render incredible his statement that the 4th Chasseurs of the Guard were so cut up at Ligny that they were reduced from two battalions to one at Waterloo: they had not in the battle of Ligny one single officer killed or wounded, and probably not a score of men. It is clear, therefore, that they had still two battalions on the day of Waterloo, and that Ney's final charge on 18 June was conducted by six not (as M. Houssaye asserts) by five battalions of the Guard.⁵

The figures for Quatre-Bras have nothing very noticeable in them. Reille's corps had 801 officers present (Girard's division being detached at Ligny) and lost 165, one in five, or 20·4 per cent. The unit that suffered most was Foy's division, which had 52 casualties among 191 officers, i.e. 27 per cent. Kellermann's cuirassiers, who gave the English squares so much trouble, must be considered to have got off very lightly with 17 officers hurt out of some 50 present in the one brigade that was engaged. Of these 17, only one, by a curious chance, seems to have been killed outright. Piré's Lancers, who broke the British 69th and nearly rode over the 42nd also, had four officers killed and 17 wounded out of 59—exactly the same proportion of losses as that suffered by the cuirassiers.

Passing on to 17 June we find that the only serious fighting on that day was the combat of Genappe, where Subervie's Lancers, the head of Napoleon's pursuing column, drove in the British 7th Hussars, but were themselves ridden down by the Life Guards. They are recorded to have lost 15 officers out of 73 present, a

⁵ M. Houssaye (p. 389) quotes General Petit's narrative as his authority for the statement that the 4th Chasseurs were thus cut up at Ligny and were a battalion short at Waterloo. But there is no such allegation in this narrative, printed *in extenso* in the *English Historical Review* for 1903, pp. 325-6.

sufficient proof that the sharpness of the check has not been exaggerated in British accounts of the skirmish. Of Wellington's two regiments engaged, the 7th lost 4, the 1st Life Guards 1 officer—so that it seems probable that the total French casualties were as three to one compared with the British.

We now come to the awful slaughter of Waterloo. M. Martinien's figures show 267 officers killed and 1,138 wounded as the casualty list of the great battle. This total of 1,405 would seem to give a probable loss of 28,100 for the French army, putting unwounded prisoners aside. Of the latter, as we gather from Wellington's and Blücher's despatches, there were about 7,500 or 8,000, of whom a very small proportion were officers; for at Waterloo, as in other battles, the rank and file surrendered freely when cut off, while the officers either resisted and were shot down, or made desperate efforts to get away and succeeded. In the rout and pursuit after nightfall, during which the majority of the prisoners were taken, this last was more especially the case. Nearly the whole of the remainder of the unwounded captives were taken during the charge of the Union Brigade, when the British cavalry got in among the infantry of Allix, Donzelot, and Marcognet and captured whole companies *en masse*.⁶ Two thousand men laid down their arms in ten minutes at this point, but I am compelled by M. Martinien's figures to believe that, while the rank and file yielded, the officers resisted and were cut down. For in the 45th and 105th regiments, which bore the brunt of the charge and both lost their eagles, I find that 64 officers out of 85 present were killed or wounded, though the number of unwounded rank and file taken was very large indeed. But while it is certain that in this part of the field the officers as compared with the men suffered much heavier casualties than their normal one-to-twenty percentage, I imagine that the general average of losses must have been corrected in the pursuit after dark, where the rank and file surrendered, but the officers, having greater initiative and a stronger dislike for capture, got off and escaped.

I should conclude, therefore, that we must place the total loss of the French army at Waterloo at something like 37,000 men out of the 72,000 present, or about 50 per cent. This would allow for the 1,405 officers whom we know to have been killed or wounded, for 28,100 rank and file killed or wounded, and for 7,500 unwounded prisoners, of whom I should guess that not more than 100 were officers.

When we turn to look at the details of the losses of the various

⁶ Several narrators speak of one of the main features of the battle-field next morning as being whole rows of muskets neatly laid down in line opposite Picton's position, where organised bodies of French had surrendered simultaneously, on being cut off by the Union Brigade.

units of Napoleon's army, the first fact that strikes us is the very moderate casualty list of those divisions which were opposed to the Prussians, as compared with that of those which fought the British. The force with which Lobau so long held back Blücher consisted of the two infantry divisions of Zimmer and Jeannin, the Young Guard under Duhesme and Barrois, and Domon and Subervie's Cavalry, with the addition late in the day of three battalions of the Old Guard (one each of the 2nd Grenadiers and the 1st and 2nd Chasseurs). The casualty list of these units stands as follows :

Zimmer's division	. 187	officers present,	73	killed or wounded,	or 39	p.c.
Jeannin's division	. 126	"	"	41	"	" or 32·5 "
Young Guard	. 161	⁷	"	"	84	" " or 21 "
Domon's cavalry	. 80	⁷	"	"	80	" " or 37·5 "
Subervie's cavalry	. 106	⁷	"	"	29	" " or 27·3 "

The losses of the three battalions of the Old Guard cannot be separated from those which the other battalions of their regiments suffered in the main battle. But taking the rest of Lobau's force together, we find that it lost 207 officers out of 649 present, or a percentage of 31·8. This would be considered sufficiently heavy in any ordinary battle, but at Waterloo it contrasts very strongly with the awful casualty list of the divisions which were engaged with the British army, where no less than 44 per cent. of the officers present were disabled. After making all due allowance for the fact that Lobau's men were acting on the defensive, and partly protected by the buildings of Planchenoit, it still remains astounding that they should have held their own for five hours against an adversary who had at first a threefold and afterwards a sevenfold advantage in numbers. One can only conclude that the Prussian fire was far less deadly than the English—one of the many consequences of column as opposed to line formation. It was not without reason that Soult observed to Napoleon that morning, '*Sire, l'infanterie anglaise en duel, c'est le diable.*'

Taking together all the fractions of the imperial army which were opposed to the English alone, we get the following results:—

1st Corps	. 788	officers present,	395	killed or wounded,	or 50·6	p.c.
2nd Corps	. 685	⁸	"	"	240	" " or 37·7 "
Middle Guard	. 141	⁹	"	"	73	" " or 51·8 "
Reserve Cavalry:						
Kellermann	. 243	⁸	officers present,	118	killed or wounded,	or 48·5 p.c.
Milhaud	. 284	⁸	"	"	117	" " or 50·0 "
Guard Cavalry	. 255	⁸	"	"	69	" " or 27 "
Total.	. 2,296	"	"	1,012	"	" or 44 "

⁷ Deduction being made of the losses of these units at the battle of Ligny and the combat of Genappe.

⁸ After deducting previous losses at Quatre-Bras and Ligny.

⁹ After deducting previous losses at Ligny.

I have had to leave the infantry of the Old Guard out of the calculation, as five of its battalions were engaged with the British and three with the Prussians, while M. Martinien's tables only give the losses by regiments not by battalions, so that they cannot be properly distributed between the two halves of the battle. It will be noted that the Old Guard's casualty list was only 46 officers out of 174 present, i.e. 26·4 per cent., a smaller proportional loss than that of any other unit of the French army, save the infantry of the Young Guard. The literary tradition which will have it that the famous squares of the Old Guard perished *en masse*, while covering the retreat of the emperor, is obviously erroneous. These veterans suffered far less than the line and the cavalry.

On the other hand, we note that the 1st Corps, which, after enduring the charge of the Union Brigade, maintained for the rest of the day a bitter strife with the infantry of the British left wing, lost a full half of its officers killed and wounded. If we allow for the unwounded prisoners made by the British cavalry in addition to the casualties, it is evident that much more than half of this unfortunate corps was destroyed. The cuirassiers of Milhaud and Kellermann, who delivered the great charges on Wellington's squares during the afternoon hours, also suffered a loss of about 50 per cent. So did the six battalions of the Middle Guard, with which the emperor delivered his last thrust at nightfall against Wellington's right centre.

It is somewhat surprising to find that the Guard cavalry, who joined in the same charges as the cuirassiers, show the much smaller casualty list of only some 27 per cent. This is partly, but not wholly, accounted for by the fact that the emperor retained four of the light Guard squadrons about his person till the end of the day. They were only engaged for a few minutes with Vivian's Hussars after nightfall, and can have suffered little. But, even allowing for this, the numbers lost seem small: is it possible that there is some small omission of names in M. Martinien's rolls of the lancers and chasseurs? Those of the horse-grenadiers and dragoons show a far higher proportional loss, yet we know that the light cavalry was as deeply engaged as the heavy.

The greatest individual losses in cavalry regiments at Waterloo are those of the 6th Cuirassiers, 16 officers disabled out of 20 present; the 11th Cuirassiers and 1st Carbineers lost almost as heavily in proportion. In the infantry the greatest sufferers were the 105th line, 33 casualties out of 42 present, the 45th and 25th, with 31 casualties each out of 40 and 43 respectively present—all in the 1st Corps—and then the 61st of the line of the 2nd Corps, with 17 casualties out of 27 present. The heaviest losses of the Guard infantry were in Roguet's brigade, which supplied half the column that delivered the last great attack on Wellington's right-

centre: in it 37 officers fell out of 61 present. But a score of regiments in the 1st and 2nd Corps show heavier proportional losses than this.

It only remains to speak of Grouchy's casualties at Wavre and Namur. Those at Wavre were very moderate, as might be expected from the rather slack way in which the marshal pushed the inferior Prussian force in front of him. Four of his seven infantry divisions seem hardly to have been engaged: Berthezène, Pécheux, Teste, and Hulot have only 12 officers wounded between them. The other three divisions show 16 officers killed and 51 wounded out of 472 present, a mere 14 per cent. The cavalry was lightly engaged, and shows only 15 officers hit. The marshal's total loss must have been well under 2,000 men. The combat in front of Namur on 20 June, indeed, must have been almost as serious a business, though so little is made of it in most histories. Probably the total of Grouchy's losses from 18 to 21 June may have amounted to 3,200 men, as he would seem to have lost about 162 officers in that period.

Our general estimate, therefore, of the French losses in the whole campaign is somewhat as follows:

Quatre-Bras . . .	4,300	killed and wounded.
Ligny . . .	10,000	„ „
Waterloo . . .	29,500	„ „
„ . . .	7,500	prisoners unwounded
Wavre . . .	1,800	killed and wounded.
Small fights . . .	2,100	„ „
Total . . .	<u>55,200</u>	

These figures, as it will be seen, exceed those of M. Houssaye by some 4,000 casualties—partly owing to what I am inclined to consider his under-estimate of the loss of Ligny, partly on account of Waterloo, where I think that he is about 2,000 short, partly because of the high figure which must apparently be allowed for the small fights, more especially the combat of 20 June. As the emperor took the field with 126,000 men, he lost some 43 per cent. of his army in the week between 15 June and 22 June.

C. OMAN.