

The French Army Law of 1832

Author(s): Douglas Porch

Source: *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Dec., 1971), pp. 751-769

Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2638105>

Accessed: 01/12/2009 03:43

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The Historical Journal*.

VI. THE FRENCH ARMY LAW OF 1832

By DOUGLAS PORCH
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge

SANDWICHED between the Saint-Cyr law of 1818 and Niel's dazzling if futile effort to reform the army in 1867, the Soult law of 1832 has been sadly neglected by historians. Not only is the law a crucial piece of military legislation, but by studying its history one can trace the conservatism of the July Monarchy under the Périer Ministry.

Theories of military organization traditionally split France into two political camps. Until 1870, conservatives favoured a small, tightly organized professional army insulated against political ferment. Liberals, however, influenced by Revolutionary notions of military organization, fought to broaden conscription and organize a trained reserve.

The issues raised by laws on military organization in this period are therefore central to the political and ideological questions which then divided France. Far from being a minor bill, the Soult law, introduced only a few months after Casimir Périer replaced the liberal Laffitte as chief minister, was to be a major test of the Government's ability to seize the parliamentary initiative from the Liberals, still drunk with the success of 1830.

This article sets out to define both the military significance of the Soult law and the political climate which shaped it.

Most historians have assumed that the Soult law merely duplicated the 1818 Saint-Cyr law. Among them was Monteilhet: 'Sauf, en moins, une année de service, la loi de 1832 ne fait que reproduire la loi 1818-1824 . . . Pourquoi attendre une innovation de la loi, quand rien n'a changé ni dans les idées, ni dans les faits?'¹ Bertier de Sauvigny maintains that the 1818 law governed the army until 1872. 'L'armée, jusqu'en 1872, a vécu sur les principes posés par Gouvion Saint-Cyr en 1818.'² Bernard Schnapper makes the same point: 'Après la Revolution de Juillet, la loi du 21 mars, 1832, qui resta pendant quarante ans la charte du recrutement militaire, ne modifia pas les principes adoptés par Gouvion Saint-Cyr.'³ A closer examination of the 1832 law, however, reveals that it did differ in fact and in concept from the 1818 law.

To place the Soult law in its proper perspective, we must briefly summarize the March 1818 Saint-Cyr law and discuss the reaction to it. An ex-Napoleonic Marshal, Saint-Cyr sought to create an army which was closely attached to the nation.

¹ Monteilhet, *Les institutions militaires de la France* (Paris, 1936), p. 21.

² Bertier de Sauvigny, *La Restauration* (Paris, 1955), p. 459.

³ B. Schnapper, *Le remplacement militaire en France* (Paris, 1968), p. 39.

His bill included conscription, territorial legions, a short term of service and a large standing reserve composed of trained, prior service personnel. He also instituted a fixed promotional scheme designed to liberate the army from arbitrary and political advancement.

Though opposed by conservatives, the law was welcomed by moderates, liberals and Napoleonic 'débris'. Armand Carrel, the liberal editor of *Le National* and a graduate of Saint-Cyr, praised 'la charte de l'armée', while the violently anti-Bourbon General Lamarque, whose funeral was to be the scene of a large republican demonstration in June 1832, welcomed the law's democratic provisions:

Le Maréchal Saint-Cyr, en faisant adopter cette loi, avait voulu élever une barrière contre ces abus de pouvoir et laisser une porte ouverte aux officiers plébéiens qu'on veut déshériter de tous leurs droits. Il connaissait, il voyait la tendance de l'esprit de cour et de l'avidité d'une aristocratie qui veut tout envahir.⁴

Unlike the Bourbons, who sought to separate the army from the nation, Saint-Cyr believed that the army should be drawn from the nation and that, as a national institution, it should reflect the values and aspirations as well as the social make-up of society. Guizot, who also supported the bill, pointed out that Saint-Cyr saw the army as a microcosm of the state.

An army in his (Saint-Cyr's) estimate was a small nation springing from a large one, strongly organised . . . having defined rights and duties and well trained . . . to serve their country effectively when called upon. Upon this idea of an army . . . the principles of the bill were naturally framed. Every class in the state was required to assist in the formation of this army. Those who were ambitious . . . were compelled in the first instance to pass examinations and then to acquire by close study the particular knowledge that is necessary to their position. The term of service, active and in reserve, was long and made military life, in reality, a career. The obligations imposed, the privileges promised, and the rights recognised for all, were guaranteed by the bill. Besides these general principles, the bill had an immediate result which Saint-Cyr ardently desired. It enrolled again in the new army, under the head of veteran and reserve, the remains of the old discharged legions . . . a special charter, it secured their future.⁵

Saint-Cyr's law was based on Revolutionary principle and Imperial experience. He resurrected conscription, circumspectly renamed 'l'appel', in an effort to lift the army back to fighting strength. The Bourbons had so far not succeeded in attracting more than 3,500 volunteers into the army in any one year, and in 1816 directed that all volunteers enter the Royal Guard. Though article 12 of the 1814 Charter stated 'la conscription est abolie', article 1 of the law legalized the draft: 'L'Armée se recrute par des engagements volontaires et en cas d'insuffisance, par des appels faits suivant les règles prescrites ci-après.'

Conscription and the system of paid replacements were products of the Revolution and were therefore opposed by the Ultras. The royalist Chateaubriand denounced 'le principe républicain de la conscription' and claimed that national

⁴ Lamarque, *Mémoires* (Brussels, 1835), 1, 203-4.

⁵ Guizot, *Memoirs of my Time* (London, 1858), pp. 166-7.

conscription was incompatible with the monarchy: 'Comment admettre sous un gouvernement monarchique un mode de recrutement qui conduit à la démocratie par le principe d'égalité sur lequel il se fonde?'⁶ Through eloquent persuasion, however, Saint-Cyr managed to convince the majority of the Chamber of the necessity for conscription:

Le système qui pousse vraiment les peuples à la guerre d'agression, c'est le système des grandes armées permanentes de quelque manière qu'elles aient été formées. Il ne nous est pas possible d'en sortir complètement puisqu'il règne encore dans toute l'Europe, mais du moins avons-nous corrigé, autant qu'il est en notre pouvoir, sa pernicieuse nature en réduisant notre armée active au strict nécessaire.

He continued in a more liberal vein, however, that conscription was 'un principe fondamental inhérent à l'essence des sociétés politiques; un principe indispensable à leur existence.'⁷

Saint-Cyr's next consideration was a reserve. The term of service was set at six years, which in practice often worked out at four years, with a six-year reserve obligation for veterans written into article 23:

Les sous-officiers et soldats rentrés dans leurs foyers après avoir achevé leur temps de service, seront assujettis, en cas de guerre, à un service territorial dont la durée est mis à six ans, sous la dénomination de vétérans. Les vétérans pourront se marier et former des établissements.

This provision theoretically satisfied the need for a flexible defence force, swelled and strengthened by the 'demi-soldes' – ex-Napoleonic soldiers living on half pay. It also embodied the Revolutionary ideal of the citizen soldier, living as a civilian but ready to defend the nation in times of danger. This reserve was always suspect in the eyes of the Ultras, both for its complement of Napoleonic soldiers and its negation of the principle of a small, professional royal army.

On 26 January 1818, Saint-Cyr complained to the Chamber that those who opposed the formation of a reserve in reality distrusted the old Bonapartist soldiers who would fill it.

La franchise est ici un devoir, car la question que nous agitions au sujet de l'armée est une question nationale. Il s'agit de savoir s'il existe parmi nous deux armées, deux nations, dont l'une sera frappée d'anathème et regardée comme indigne de servir le roi et la France. Et pour me renfermer dans ce qui me regarde directement, il s'agit de savoir si nous appellerons encore à la défense de la patrie les soldats qui ont fait sa gloire, ou si nous les déclarerons à jamais dangereux pour son repos.⁸

Ultra criticism of the reserve was justified in part when many reservists failed to report for service in the 1823 Spanish Campaign. The Bourbons seized this opportunity and disbanded Saint-Cyr's reserve in 1824. A law of 9 June 1824 increased the maximum army strength from 240,000 men to 400,000, the annual call-up to 60,000 men and the term of service from six to eight years. The reserve was hence-

⁶ Monteilhet, op. cit. p. 4.

⁷ Ibid. pp. 3–4.

⁸ Guillon, *Les complots militaires sous la Restauration* (Paris, 1905), p. 25.

forth to be composed of those 'dispensés' not needed by the army, who returned home untrained. Therefore, though the army had a paper reserve of 220,000 men, it was in fact worthless in the event of war. Soult discovered the weaknesses of this system in April 1840 when confronted with only 237 prior service men in a standing reserve of 135,000.⁹ Even the Second Empire was unable to amend this provision and the reserve in September 1870 contained only 985 veterans in its small contingent.¹⁰ By abolishing the reserve and raising the length of service to eight years, the law of 1824 reintroduced the traditional concept of a small, professional army. It encouraged re-enlistment and the professionalization of cadres, nullifying in part the liberal principles of the 1818 law. As General Foy complained, 'to keep the men two years longer will make them less content with civilian life'.

The final draft of the Soult law undoubtedly was influenced by the 1824 legislation. The strength of the 1818 law lay in its affinity with Revolutionary and Imperial notions of a short term of service army and a trained reserve liable for call-up in the event of a national emergency. Yet it could never be more than a step-child of the Restoration and was soon disinherited. Although Soult's original proposal contained an army and a reserve modelled on Saint-Cyr's, subsequent debate changed the tone of the bill until its service and reserve provisions corroborated the professionalizing tendencies of the 1824 bill. Most historians have followed Monteilhet's lead, however, and mistakenly believe that 'la loi 1818-1824' was one law elaborating Saint-Cyr's concept of military organization.

The July Monarchy, hastily constructed on revolutionary foundations, was eager to surround itself with stable institutions. The army bill, introduced in 1831, was a major test of the Périer ministry's ability to snuff out indiscipline in the ranks and give the July Monarchy the conservative orientation for which it was hesitantly groping.

Presented to the Chambre des Députés by the Minister of War, Marshal Soult, on 17 August 1831, the Soult law retained many provisions of the 1818 Saint-Cyr law. Though Soult paid tribute to Saint-Cyr and the 1818 law, he stressed the need to modify it.

Messieurs, la loi du 10 mars 1818 a déjà subi une épreuve de 13 années. Exécutée, en général, avec une impartialité qui en rend le fardeau moins pesant, elle a passé pour ainsi dire, dans les habitudes de la population. Cette épreuve, en constatant tout ce qu'il y avait de sagesse et d'habileté dans la pensée de l'illustre capitaine (Saint-Cyr), auteur de cette loi, a fait aussi ressortir les lacunes qui ont échappé à sa prévoyance. Le projet que le Roi nous a ordonné de soumettre . . . a pour objet de conserver les dispositions utiles que le temps a sanctionnées, et d'y ajouter celles qu'une longue pratique a signalées comme indispensables.¹¹

Prepared by a governmental commission under Marshal Count Jourdan, the new laws on recruitment and advancement were not intended to change radically

⁹ Monteilhet, *op. cit.* p. 26.

¹⁰ Archives Historiques de Guerre, X^s 67 (henceforth A.H.G.).

¹¹ *Archives Parlementaires*, 2^e série (Paris, 1888), LXIX, 273 (henceforth A.P.).

the 1818 'charte de l'armée', which was considered the legal guarantee of a national army. Soult's 1831 proposal contained several provisions which would have further popularized the army. Although he did not try to resurrect departmental legions, abolished by the Bourbons in 1820, the policy of conscription, which had horrified Chateaubriand, was sanctioned without discussion. In introducing the law, Soult declared 'le premier titre consacré au principe que la base principale du recrutement repose sur un appel dont vous réglerez le produit. Les engagements volontaires, ressource toujours variable ne seront plus qu'un moyen auxiliaire.'¹² Conscription was now accepted as the rule and article 69 of the 1830 Charter accorded the Chamber the right to vote the size of the annual call-up. By 1831, all citizens were liable for the draft. Neither the Restoration nor the July Monarchy included military service among the 'duties' of citizenship, however. Conservatives still looked upon conscription as an 'impôt de sang', but justified national service by the pragmatic need for an army which voluntary enlistment alone was unable to furnish. Soult stated this concisely: 'Il vous sera prouvé, par des données positives, que les engagements volontaires sont et seront toujours insuffisants pour l'entretien régulier de l'effectif de l'armée.'¹³

Conscription was passed without argument, along with the principle of direct legislative control over the size of the annual contingent and the effective strength of the army. This could have been a victory for the liberal principle of civilian control of the army, but the Chamber never used their power to build a large national army. The narrow electorate of 170,000 upper middle-class voters feared the political unreliability of a large, essentially lower-class army. Had Parliament's representative base been broader, 1832 might have opened a new era in civil-military relations. After the dismissal of Laffitte in March 1831, however, the July Monarchy paid only lip-service to democratic principles, and the right to control the size of the army both through the annual draft quota and yearly military budget remained in the hands of a conservative Chamber.

Guizot, however, reflects the commitment of many deputies to the ideal of legislative control of the annual call-up. In reply to the Landes deputy General Lamarque who proposed a measure to fix permanent army strength at 500,000 men, Guizot said: 'voilà le véritable impôt levé en hommes et vous ne devez pas abandonner le droit de le voter annuellement... il s'agit ici d'une prérogative constitutionnelle de la chambre que vous avez inscrite dans la Charte de 1830 comme un des droits nationaux.'¹⁴ Lamarque countered that to subordinate the military to civilian control would compromise both the security of the state and the stability of the army: 'La stabilité est nécessaire aux états comme aux individus. Vous comprenez combien il serait dangereux de laisser flottante et indécise une position militaire dont la stabilité est le premier besoin et qui doit être à l'abri de tout ébranlement.'¹⁵ General Pelet, deputy for Loir-et-Cher, agreed with Guizot; a fixed army could have its advantages, 'mais elle est contraire à la

¹² Ibid.

¹⁴ A.P. LXXI, 170-2.

¹³ A.P. loc. cit.

¹⁵ Ibid.

charte'. Soult, seconding Pelet, pointed out that the changing financial situation also affected the size of the army. The liberal arguments of Guizot, Pelet and Soult prevailed over the General's Bonapartist inclinations and he withdrew his amendment before it came to the vote. In practice, however, the Chamber voted a draft of 80,000 each year. This fixed the maximum strength of the army at 500,000 men, though it never reached this figure. In January 1830, Bourbon military strength stood at 223,073 officers and men, including the Royal Guard. After the numerous resignations, desertions and dismissals which followed the July Revolution, the Orléans regime inherited a depleted force of 183,311 officers and men. By April 1831, army strength was up to 304,060 and remained at this level until the reorganization of 1834. It slumped to 275,597 in 1839 but with the renewed threat of war escalated to 348,311 in 1843.¹⁶

Passed on 21 March 1832, the Soult law raised several of the issues already discussed in 1818. The new legislation continued the system of paid replacements and the 'conseil de révision', a body which heard appeals from conscripts and subsequently designated the 'dispensés'. Many deputies, including Teste, a deputy for the Gard, felt that military service should be a privilege reserved for French citizens:

Le projet du Gouvernement est parti de cette idée véritablement française que notre armée doit être nationale. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de la défense du sol ni des intérêts qui naissent; il s'agit aussi de la défense des institutions du pays et voilà sous quel rapport il est moral, politique d'exiger que, pour servir sous le drapeau français, on soit Français.¹⁷

The desire to keep the French army nationally pure was inherent in article 13 of the 1830 Charter: 'aucune troupe étrangère ne pourra être admise au service de l'Etat qu'en vertu d'une loi.' This amendment was adopted without discussion. Subsequently, article 2 of the Soult law also stipulated: 'Nul ne sera admis à servir dans les troupes françaises s'il n'est pas Français.' The provision may have been designed to exclude from the French army large groups of mercenary soldiers such as the Swiss Guards and Hohenlohe regiment of the Bourbons, although this reasoning was never spelt out in any of the debates on the 1832 bill. Emmanuel Poulle, a deputy from the Var, supported by a number of other frontier deputies, complained that border areas had absorbed a large number of foreigners who enjoyed all the benefits of French law and citizenship, but claimed foreign nationality when called on for military service. Destutt de Tracy, a deputy from the Allier, argued that they formed a potential fifth column within the army. 'Est-il bien prudent, d'ailleurs, est-il bien politique de placer dans nos rangs des hommes qui toujours auront le cœur étranger, qui peut-être formeront des vœux pour nos ennemis?' Colonel Lamy placed the finishing touches on the argument by asserting that conscription was not after all an 'impôt de sang'. 'La conscription est une obligation, un devoir... l'admission dans l'armée du pays

¹⁶ A.H.G., X^s 67.

¹⁷ A.P. LXXI, 215.

reste un privilège national.'¹⁸ Lamy's statement shows that some members of the Chamber intended to reconstruct the post-Bourbon army in the image of the broad-based Republican and Imperial armies which had conquered Europe. But as the initial flush of revolutionary excitement began to wear off and the conservative Casimir Périer firmly grasped the reins of government, the Revolutionary 'nation in arms' proposals of the original bill were abandoned in favour of a short term of service in a professional army. The astute Marshal Soult, sensing this change in the Government's political mood, quickly threw his support behind the modified version of his law.

The practice of replacement underwent some slight but interesting modifications in 1832. In 1818, a conscript was permitted to buy himself out of the draft by hiring a replacement. This system provided military exemption for those whose wealth dictated that their talents could be better employed elsewhere. The Saint-Cyr Law set the replacements' age limit at thirty, stipulated that they meet the army's physical standards and that they should not come from the same conscript class as the men they contracted to replace.

This system did not prove satisfactory. The army objected that replacements were physically and morally weak and, dubbing them 'les vendus', compared them to prostitutes. Replacement companies formed to assemble all eligible men for sale after the annual lottery. Agents with prostitutes on each arm hovered around the barracks to entice those who were about to be discharged to 're-enlist' as replacements. The companies conspired to raise the price of replacement and were notoriously dishonest. They attracted clients, however, for they provided a second replacement if the first one deserted within a year. According to both the 1818 and 1832 laws, if the replacement deserted within a year the conscript was required either to serve out the unfinished term of service himself or hire a second replacement. Larabit, deputy for the Yonne, bitterly attacked these companies: 'Les compagnies des remplacements racolent sur tous les points des jeunes gens corrompus et tarés.' He claimed that these companies had even sent circulars to the local priests asking them to recommend young men whose 'moeurs corrompues s'épureront sous la discipline militaire'.¹⁹

The Soult law took steps to eliminate these abuses in replacement. Article 19 reiterated the physical requirements for replacements and added that they could neither be married nor widowers with children. Nor were those who had been discharged from the army for disciplinary infractions allowed to sign on as replacements. Article 20 required the prospective replacement to provide a certificate from the mayor of his commune stating the length of his residence there, that he enjoyed all civil rights and that he had never been imprisoned for a major crime. In the event that the replacement was a soldier re-enlisting as a replacement, article 21 required a statement of good conduct from his commanding officer.

¹⁸ A.P. pp. 158-61.

¹⁹ A.P. p. 284.

Though small, these changes in the 1818 law are nevertheless significant. In requiring mayoral certification, the Government required that the replacement give proof of an upright life and of his respect for the law. In theory, this restriction relieved Marmont's fear that the system would give the army, one-fourth of whose soldiers were replacements, over to undisciplined vagabonds. With this provision, the July Monarchy sought to give replacement a more democratic veneer by requiring that all replacements furnish proof that they were good citizens. This was a deceptive tactic, however, for replacement by its very nature was undemocratic. All the law really did was to provide the army with replacements who would be reasonably amenable to discipline. Far from sending good citizens into the army, the new law sought to send it potentially good soldiers. These replacements would be doubly suitable to military life. The mayoral certificate guaranteed their reasonably good conduct, while the lack of a suitable civilian alternative to military life had driven them into the army in the first instance. Consequently, the army could count on most replacements becoming permanent members of a stable professional force.

This system had a decisive effect on the social development of the army. Under the Bourbons, many aristocratic families had sent their sons into the army. After 1830, most of these legitimist officers resigned. The upper bourgeoisie, however, the traditional political base of the July Monarchy, did not fill this gap by sending their sons in sufficient number into the army. Consequently, the officer corps assumed a definite lower middle-class character. Castellane complained in 1846 that the officer corps was coming to be dominated by sons of artisans and farmers, while the military schools were filled with sons of officers and government employees. He feared that the army was treading the same path as the church which traditionally opened the priesthood to the lower classes and was assuming a decidedly republican character.²⁰ The practice of replacement, together with the absence of aristocratic or upper and middle-class officers, therefore narrowed the social base of the French army. France was to have the lowest-class officer corps in Europe, drawn mainly from lower middle-class elements. The German Hillebrand was surprised that French officers were not 'classé' as in Germany, while R. H. Roberts blamed the French defeat in 1870 on the educational inferiority of her officers.²¹

The final and most important issues of the recruitment law concerned the duration of service and the reserve. These two topics in fact overlap. By exploring the motivation behind these measures and their subsequent alteration, we can see how the new law departed from Saint-Cyr's legislation.

According to article 29 of the 1832 law, all those who had drawn a 'mauvais numéro' in the draft lottery reported for induction. The army took those, in the order drawn, whom it needed or was financially able to absorb, sending the rest home on indefinite 'congé' or leave. Monteilhet reckons that of 80,000 men

²⁰ Castellane, *Journal*, II (Paris, 1895), 373.

²¹ R. Girardet, *La société militaire* (Paris, 1953), p. 63.

called up each year under the 1832 law 65,000 were left after the revision council had issued exemptions. Of this number, only 33,000 men at the most were actually inducted.²² The rest were sent home to await call-up in case of a national emergency. Conservatives wished to form the reserve solely from those untrained men liable for call-up only by royal ordinance. The dynastic left, however, believed that the advantages of a trained reserve were obvious. It insured military flexibility and provided the army with a trained force which could be rapidly assembled in the event of an emergency. As a civilian force, it embodied the political theory of the 'nation in arms' and for this reason was opposed by conservatives. But in their attempt to ensure its internal stability, conservatives left the army open to defeat by a numerically superior enemy. The absence of a trained reserve was the real failing of the Soult law and largely accounted for the 1870 defeat. In 1866, the French army stood at 288,000 men from whom garrisons had to be furnished for Algeria, Mexico and Rome. The estimated Prussian strength after Sadowa, inclusive of their trained Landwehr and Landsturm, was 1,000,000 men.²³ Worse than limiting the size of the army, however, the law entrenched in post Revolutionary France the tradition of a small professional army unsupported by an adequate reserve.

In 1818, Saint-Cyr had acted partly on liberal principles and partly in the Bonapartist tradition of 'la guerre absolue', which necessitated a large, flexible force augmented by a trained reserve. As many of the Napoleonic veterans retired under the Restoration and July Monarchy, they were replaced by young officers raised in the traditions of a small, long term of service professional army. These officers, in positions of influence by 1866, resisted War Minister Niel's efforts to remodel the army along Prussian lines. Even after 1870, when faced with the proven impotence of a small professional army, many officers raised in the traditions of the Soult law waxed nostalgic when talking of the old, pre-1870 force. General Thoumas, an 1844 graduate of the Metz artillery school, praised the 'anti-bourgeois' spirit of the army under the July Monarchy:

Avant 1854, chaque régiment formait réellement une famille où l'autorité est plus ou moins paternelle . . . mais tous les régiments possédaient en commun l'esprit militaire et, si l'on peut s'exprimer ainsi, anti-bourgeois. Cet esprit s'entretenait par la vie menée en dehors des populations, par le peu de relations des sous-officiers et soldats avec leurs parents.²⁴

The Duc d'Aumâle claimed that a long term of service ensured the formation of a 'national' army: 'La durée de service permettait de former ces sous-officiers instruits, solides, dévoués, que l'on ne connaît aujourd'hui que par tradition: Armée vaillante, unie, leste, désintéressée, sobre, intelligente, nationale.'²⁵

The idea that the army was elite and yet national is confusing. D'Aumâle's

²² Monteilhet, *op. cit.* p. 25.

²³ M. Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War* (London, 1961), pp. 29-30.

²⁴ C. A. Thoumas, *Les transformations de l'armée française* (Paris, 1887), p. 378.

²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 18.

conception of nationalism obviously differs from the Revolutionary idea of the 'nation in arms', i.e. of every citizen's right to bear arms for the defence of his country. The professional army was 'national' in that it desired glory, the international dignity of France and the internal stability of the country. The Count de Mun, for example, subscribed to the conservative definition, believing that if France followed republican military doctrine she might well have 'a nation in arms, but she would no longer have an army'.²⁶

The 1832 law endowed France with a professional army and a professional military establishment. The absence of a trained reserve, however, proved the army's undoing, for it was unable to protect the stability of the government which patronized it. The debates on the reserve are crucial as, in conjunction with other measures, they committed the army to a brand of nationalism and a tradition of professionalism which were to characterize it until 1870.

Article 30 of the government proposal put before the Chamber of Deputies on 17 August 1831 reduced the term of service from eight to five years. At the end of the five years, soldiers faced a two-year reserve obligation. Soult made it apparent in his opening address that the preparatory committee headed by ex-Napoleonic Marshal Jourdan, principal architect of the recruitment law of 19 fructidor, year VI (September 1796), intended to create a short term of service army with a trained reserve. Though the committee's decision was not unanimous, the majority agreed that France needed a large army: '... qu'il était en même temps dans l'intérêt de l'armée qu'un plus grand nombre de jeunes gens pussent passer sous les drapeaux; qu'enfin, la réduction du temps de service à 5 ans rendrait probablement la loi nouvelle plus populaire.'²⁷

The proposal of the Jourdan commission synthesized various Revolutionary and Imperial recruitment systems. The original draft of Jourdan's 1796 law, presented on 28 nivôse, year VI called for a peacetime draft of all men between 18 and 20 years old to serve for four years in the infantry and six in the cavalry. It also included a reserve 'armée auxiliaire' of 100,000 men to be picked by lottery. Delbrel, a deputy for the Lot, objected that a true national army required a personal commitment on the part of all citizens to serve and that the 'armée auxiliaire', by exempting 100,000 men from normal military service, undermined this idea of 'service personnel'. Delbrel collaborated with Jourdan in drawing-up the final proposal which required registration of all 20-year-old males, incorporating the youngest first as dictated by military requirements. No provision was made for a reserve.

The draft of 1798 had proved chaotic, as few cantons were administratively able to call up conscripts by date of birth. A subsequent 1799 law recognized that a system of volunteers and replacements, together with a draft lottery as prescribed in the law of 24 February 1793, would be far easier to administer. This tradition continued throughout the Empire. Valée concluded that after the 1799 law, 'le

²⁶ R. D. Challener, *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms* (New York, 1955), p. 78.

²⁷ A.P. LXIX, 275.

service militaire reste obligatoire; il n'est plus personnel'.²⁸ Although the proposal of the 1831 Jourdan commission was not as revolutionary as Delbrel's 'service personnel', it demonstrates Jourdan's desire to create as broad-based an army as military necessity, administrative practicality and Parliament, which voted the annual draft allowance, would allow.

Soult, however, claimed affinity with the 1818 law: 'La nouvelle loi conserve pour toutes les opérations de l'appel, presque toutes les dispositions de l'ancienne' (the 1818 law). Yet the duration of service and reserve provisions of the final draft of his law resembled the professionalizing tendencies of the June 1824 law, which raised the term of service to eight years and abolished Saint-Cyr's trained reserve, more than the liberal concepts of 1818.

Lawmakers and military men had to choose between two possible reserve organizations in 1830. The first was a trained reserve of veterans like that formed in 1818 and subsequently proposed by the Jourdan committee in 1831. The second involved forming a reserve of 'congés'.

In the post-1815 French army, conscripts were frequently required to serve only a portion of their active duty and were sent home on 'congé de semestre' after four or five years' active service. Rather than create a standing reserve, conservatives proposed to form a reserve out of these congés who, after their release from active service, would be counted in the reserve for the remainder of their service obligation. They claimed that this system was superior to a standing reserve as soldiers could simply be recalled to their regiments if war broke out, eliminating the need for a separate reserve organization.

Yet the congé system had several drawbacks. In the first place, congé was given only in the infantry where soldiers were easily replaced. The cavalry and artillery, which required more highly trained men, seldom released their men until their term of service had expired. Consequently, the conservative proposal would only have provided an infantry reserve. Secondly, the conservative proposal was not in line with the realities of the French recruitment system. To provide a large reserve of congés, the army would have been required to train virtually the entire annual contingent. Yet, for financial and other reasons, the army was seldom able to utilize even half of the annual contingent and was forced to send those it could not use home untrained on 'congé illimité' (unlimited leave). Therefore, rather than a reserve of trained congés, the army had only a paper reserve of untrained congés who were useless in the event of war. These men had done no military service and did not belong to a regiment, while no independent reserve organization existed to organize a general mobilization.

It is apparent that the War Ministry and military leaders raised in the Napoleonic school of large armies wanted to create a trained reserve. Soult, in a November 1830 letter to Marshal Dermoncourt, voiced these very hopes:

La confiance qu'inspirerait à notre jeune armée l'existence d'une réserve, l'avantage de faire rentrer dans les rangs beaucoup de bons et braves militaires libérés, un grand

²⁸ Valée, *La conscription dans le département de la Charente* (Paris, 1936), p. 55.

nombre d'excellents sous-officiers et soldats de l'ex-garde qu'une prévention, souvent injuste, fait mal accueillir dans la ligne . . . Il évalue à 50,000 le nombre d'hommes choisis dans les différentes armes qui devraient composer la réserve d'élite, pour être en rapport avec une armée active de 500,000 hommes.²⁹

One of the few surviving parliamentary commission reports (13 September 1830) strongly criticizes the untrained 1824 reserve :

On crut pouvoir suppléer ces vétérans en n'appelant sous les drapeaux qu'une partie du contingent de soixante mille hommes, et en laissant les autres à la disposition du Gouvernement sous le nom de réserve. Ainsi, on enchainait une partie de la population sans que l'Etat put retirer le moindre avantage.³⁰

When the bill was reported out of committee on 12 September 1831 by Passy, deputy for the Eure, conservatives had raised the term of service to seven years and there was no provision for a trained reserve. Instead, article 3 stipulated that the annual contingent be divided into two parts, one inducted into the army according to military needs and the remainder sent home. Article 29 maintained that those who were sent home could be called up only by a royal ordinance. On the suggestion of General Lamarque, this reserve of untrained conscripts on congé illimité became liable for annual training under article 30: 'Les hommes laissés ou envoyés en congé pourront être soumis à des revues et à des exercices périodiques qui seront fixés par le ministre de la guerre.' Although this seemed a partial victory for the partisans of a trained reserve, it was in practice a defeat, as the July Monarchy, fearing the leftist inclinations of a citizen reserve, never exercised this right.³¹ Articles 29 and 30 therefore created a reserve only in name. This reserve was formally recognized by a royal ordinance of 17 July 1833:

La réserve . . . se compose conformément de l'article 3 de la loi du 21 mars 1832, de tous les hommes appartenant aux classes appelées non comprises dans l'effectif entre-tenu sous les drapeaux soit qu'ils n'aient pas été mis en activité de service soit qu'ils aient été renvoyés dans leurs foyers avant d'avoir accompli le temps de service déterminé par la loi.

In introducing the revised project, Passy justified the seven years' service provision and the weak reserve in a way which was to become familiar in the course of the debates. He maintained that a five-year service provision would mean that more men would have to be called up to keep army strength at 500,000 men. Next, he claimed that soldiers should be trained for at least two years for the cavalry, artillery and engineers. If service time were reduced, Passy said, the army would 'mener au feu des soldats dont l'inexpérience serait fâcheuse'. Conservative military theoreticians always distinguished between military training and military 'education'; a civilian could be trained in the use of arms, but it took a long time to inculcate a true military spirit in him. Passy also noted that a reserve can be quickly assembled at the first sign of war :

²⁹ A.H.G. Fonds Préval supplément 2038.

³⁰ Ibid. Xs 67.

³¹ Thoumas, op. cit. pp. 21-2.

Rarement la guerre éclate à l'improviste. Presque toujours des indices certains l'annoncent longtemps à l'avance, et quand tout fera présager le maintien de la paix, il sera facile au ministre de lever tous les obstacles opposés à l'établissement de ceux des soldats en congé qui . . . ne seront plus exposés à devoir rentrer dans les rangs.³²

In 1870, however, the young Third Republic discovered the impracticability of instituting a *levée en masse* after the war had been declared.

Liberal partisans of a broad-based national army deplored the lack of a trained reserve. Thus, on 4 November 1831, de Ludre, a deputy for the Meurthe, and Count de Laborde, representing the Seine, proposed a joint amendment calling for four years' active service, followed by four years' reserve duty. Laborde expounded the moral and political advantages of a trained, patriotic reserve:

C'est cet article qui constituera l'indépendance du pays, le maintien des institutions, la sûreté de la gloire de France . . . Haine au privilège, haine à la superstition et surtout haine éternelle à la domination étrangère, voilà ce que la Révolution de Juillet a voulu . . . 'plût à Dieu, dit Voltaire, que tous les laboureurs fussent soldats; ils seraient meilleurs citoyens' . . . Une telle réserve serait supérieure aux landwehr et aux landsturm . . . Il conciliera les règles de l'obéissance passive avec les droits des citoyens, de manière à ce qu'elles ne puissent jamais nuire à la liberté.³³

The liberal deputies also objected that a 500,000-man army was too small and pointed out that de Ludre's amendment would boost army strength to 650,000 including a 150,000-man reserve. Instancing Napoleon's brilliant defence of France in 1814, conservatives objected that a small, well-trained army was more efficient than a large citizen army and blamed Napoleon's defeat on betrayal. General Lamarque agreed that a well-trained army was essential, but argued that a small army could not ensure France's defence without a military genius of Napoleon's stature. Had Napoleon been able to call up a trained reserve in 1814, he could have successfully defended his country. Lamarque and de Ludre reminded Soult that in November 1830 he had called for a 960,000-man army, and stated that 640,000 men was the bare minimum 'pour commander le respect aux puissances voisines'.³⁴ De Tracy then calculated that if the upper limit was set at 500,000, the army would normally comprise less than 300,000 men: 'Je demande si on peut donner une nation comme la nôtre son indépendance sur une armée de 250,000 sans réserve.'

One after another, the liberal deputies mounted the rostrum to argue the advantages of a large citizen army and to defend the four years' service proposal. Defending the amendment, General Lamarque again recalled Napoleon's successful use of large armies: 'Vous le voyez, messieurs, ce n'est pas avec 400,000 hommes sans appui, sans réserves, que nous avons vaincu l'Europe et conquis notre indépendance.' He concluded that only when the army acquired a strong reserve would it begin to reflect the goals of the 1830 revolution: 'Alors et alors seule-

³² A.P. LXIX, 538.

³³ A.P. LXXI, 310-11.

³⁴ Ibid. p. 325.

ment, l'armée aura une organisation complète en harmonie avec notre état social.'³⁵

Answering critics who feared that a reserve would be a financial burden, Lamarque calculated that the invasion of a single department would cost France more than ten years' reserve expenses: 'Malheur au pays qui calcule quand il s'agit de son honneur et de son indépendance.' In fact, the financial strain of a reserve appears to have been a bogus issue raised by those who objected to a reserve in principle. When resubmitting the reserve proposal in 1840, Soult assured a legislative commission that a trained reserve would not burden the budget: 'Quant à la dépense, je le répète, nous n'avons rien à vous demander. Nous opérons dans l'armée, et nous restons dans les limites du budget.'³⁶ General Schneider seconded him on 18 March 1841: 'Nous espérons qu'ainsi que M. le Ministre de la Guerre se le promet, il sera possible d'atténuer le chiffre' (of reserve expenses).³⁷ At the time, liberals pointed out that a reserve would be cheaper than a large active army. In reply to Soult's contention that a reserve would cost thirty million francs annually, de Ludre retorted that reservists could keep their old uniforms and equipment; the Government need only furnish arms, which would cost less than six million francs. A reserve could certainly have been formed inexpensively; the financial objection to it only masked a deeper ideological difference.

Odilon Barrot, representing the Bas-Rhin, attacked those who cited the failure of Saint-Cyr's reserve in 1823 as proof of the unworkability of the system. The fault, he maintained, lay in the Bourbon Government's refusal to organize and administer the reserve properly:

L'institution de la réserve de Saint-Cyr était une autorité non seulement militaire, mais encore civile et nationale . . . (Il) avait organisé une réserve à laquelle il manquait peut-être quelque chose; c'était d'avoir eu trop de confiance dans l'intérêt commun qui devait porter le gouvernement à organiser ses moyens de défense. Qu'est-il arrivé? C'est que nous avons eu une réserve nominale inscrite dans la loi mais non dans les actes de l'administration.

He continued that if the deputies thought the 1823 reserve was a 'fiction', as Soult claimed, a reserve composed of *congés* would be too.³⁸

Barrot's argument was born out by a military report of 17 December 1835, blaming the failure of Saint-Cyr's reserve on its lack of organization: 'Les soldats des rangs actifs ont été renvoyés dans leurs foyers, avec la dette plus ou moins considérable d'années de service, mais sans encadrement et conséquemment sans moyens d'action possibles.'³⁹

In conclusion, Barrot opposed the substitution of the National Guard for a

³⁵ Ibid. pp. 317-18.

³⁶ A.H.G. X^s 67, Commission report 53.

³⁷ A.H.G. X^s 67, Commission report 53.

³⁸ A.P. LXXI, 320.

³⁹ A.H.G. Fonds Prével supplément 2036.

trained reserve: 'Devons-nous adopter le système de la commission, qui vous propose de n'établir que les cadres d'une armée active dans laquelle la durée de service sera de 7 ans, et puis, après cette armée active, rien . . . rien que la Garde Nationale?'⁴⁰

Conservatives realized that the National Guard was not an adequate reserve. Reformed after the July Revolution to include men between 20 and 60 years old not called up for military service, the guard retained its revolutionary organization which permitted the lower ranks to elect their officers. After 1830, liberals supported a 'federation' programme which would have organized the guard on a national scale. Conservatives, however, feared the revolutionary inclinations of this armed citizenry and so insisted that they be organized only by local units. The March 1831 National Guard law was therefore designed to fragment the National Guard and to limit the political rights of guardsmen. The bill did provide for the guard to be used as a military reserve as well as to ensure public order, but it stipulated that they could not be used outside the country. In the event of war, no national organization existed to mobilize and co-ordinate the actions of the individual guard units effectively, and it was therefore virtually useless as a military reserve. The prospect of a reserve fashioned from this politically conscious and armed citizenry alarmed conservatives who wanted a reliable army.

The army realized that most anti-governmental activity in its ranks was initiated by civilian agents and consequently it sought to separate its soldiers as much as possible from civilian influence by refusing to quarter troops in private homes. Revolutionary governments had continued the Ancien Régime's practice of quartering troops with civilians, believing that it would build a national spirit, allow revolutionary soldiers to educate the peasantry and encourage class levelling. Conservatives, however, feared the detrimental effects of this revolutionary practice.

In 1825, when trouble broke out in the 51st infantry regiment at La Rochelle, the police were ordered especially to keep a watch on all officers and soldiers who were quartered with civilians.⁴¹ After the colonel of the 2nd infantry regiment said his troops could not be counted on to put down a popular uprising in 1831, the prefect of the Bouches-du-Rhône reported that they were all quartered in private homes: 'M. le Colonel du 2^e ligne, dont les troupes d'élites sont toutes logées chez l'habitant, n'ose pas prendre sur lui de répondre de 400 hommes.'⁴²

Realizing the danger, the army took steps to rectify this situation. In 1831, the army had barely 30,000 beds and was forced to quarter over 80,000 soldiers in private homes.⁴³ The following years 6,824,152.22 francs were spent, almost to double the number of beds, which gives a measure of the importance the army placed on removing soldiers from civilian influence. In a January 1833 report, the

⁴⁰ A.P. LXXI, 325.

⁴¹ A.H.G. D³, 17 Oct.

⁴² A.H.G. E⁵12, 11 June.

⁴³ *Situation du Département de la Guerre* (1831).

War Minister pointed out the necessity of removing troops from civilian homes, especially in republican towns like Lyons:

La concentration d'un grand nombre de troupes sur les points où le maintien de l'ordre publique exigeait leur présence a rendu insuffisants, pour plusieurs garnisons, les moyens ordinaires de couchage qui y étaient établis. Dans la place de Lyon, par exemple, cette insuffisance s'est particulièrement fait sentir; et comme on ne pouvait loger chez l'habitant les troupes qui furent dirigées sur cette ville lors les événements de Novembre 1831, il a fallu créer 12,480 lits nouveaux. Des motifs analogues ont déterminé de semblables augmentations dans plusieurs places.⁴⁴

When riots broke out in Lyons in 1834, the War Minister strictly forbade the quartering of troops with civilians even when the barracks were full.⁴⁵

Republicans denounced this act as an attempt by an authoritarian government to separate the army from the nation: 'Plus ces gouvernements tendent à l'arbitraire, plus dans le besoin de s'affider une armée, ils travaillèrent à isoler le soldat du citoyen.'⁴⁶ Yet conservatives were aware of the dangers of placing soldiers with civilians and were convinced that a trained citizen reserve would be as prone to political mischief as the National Guard.

Another obvious drawback of the National Guard as a military reserve was that the guard contained few veterans. Laborde demanded that the untrained guard be used only as a third line of defence behind the army reserve.⁴⁷

Vous n'appellerez pas soldats citoyens faisant halte l'arme au bras, ces hommes qui n'ont pas encore touché une arme, et qui sont loin d'avoir encore les habitudes des exercices et des manoeuvres nécessaires, pour être en état de lutter avec les réserves semblables des autres pays, les Landwehr par exemple.⁴⁸

Lamarque objected that the National Guard would be a useless reserve, 'des agglomérations d'hommes qui n'auront pour la plus grande partie aucune instruction militaire, qui ne connaîtront pas leurs officiers, qui n'en seront pas connus, et qui seront par conséquent dans l'impossibilité de rendre aucun service'.⁴⁹ In December 1830, General Brenier asked that a reserve organization should replace the unorganized National Guard. A reserve, he said, 'doit remplacer, même immédiatement, l'organisation lente, difficile et vexatoire des bataillons actifs de la Garde Nationale'.⁵⁰ The Duc de Broglie also opposed the reserve proposal in the Chamber of Peers: 'L'idée de placer notre réserve militaire dans le sein de la Garde Nationale est une idée contestable et dangereuse. Autre chose est une réserve militaire, autre chose un Garde Nationale, et ces deux institutions ne peuvent entrer en contact sans se dénaturer mutuellement.'⁵¹ General

⁴⁴ *Situation du Département de la Guerre* (1833).

⁴⁵ A.H.G. E³147.

⁴⁶ 'Du logement des militaires chez l'habitant', *Spectateur Militaire*, vol. xiv, 15 Mar. 1834.

⁴⁷ A.P. LXXI, 311.

⁴⁸ A.P. LXXIII, 522.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 523.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* LXV, 474-5.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* LXVII, 143.

L'Etang, in an 1840 report to the War Minister, noted: 'En Angleterre les milices récemment organisées ne méritent pas plus le nom de réserve que nos Gardes Nationales.'⁵²

Liberals realized that the absence of a trained reserve left the army weak and isolated from the nation. The 1831 law providing for the National Guard to be used as a reserve had satisfied no one. The army did not treat this untrained force as a reserve and liberals realized that the law ended their hopes of shattering the isolating professionalism of the army with a citizen reserve of ex-servicemen.

Contemporary historians agree that the National Guard was ill-suited for a reserve because it was composed of men without military experience and was not on a par with the Prussian Landwehr.⁵³ Professor Girard points out that the National Guard constituted a potentially valuable reserve, but the Péricier Ministry's refusal to organize, equip and train it properly lowered its effectiveness and virtually restricted it to purely local operations.⁵⁴ Monteilhet concludes that the National Guard law of 22 March 1831 left the army with only a paper reserve: 'La Garde Nationale restera une institution politique; sur papier seulement, elle deviendra la réserve de l'armée de ligne.'⁵⁵

The National Guard, therefore, cannot be considered the reserve either retrospectively or in the minds of those who desired a broad-based national army. The guard and the army remained two separate institutions, under the Ministry of the Interior and the War Ministry respectively.

The adjournment of the session gave conservatives time to regroup for the vote of 5 November 1831. The *Journal des Débats* for that day editorially supported the seven years' service measure and the congé reserve system:

Le soldat qui quitte le drapeau pour rentrer dans ses foyers fait toujours partie de l'armée . . . dès lors il ne change point de goût ni d'esprit, il ne perd point ses habitudes militaires et si la guerre réclame ses services, il suffit d'un simple ordre ministériel pour lui faire rejoindre l'armée active. Supposée une invasion, quelques jours suffiront pour mettre en ligne votre armée de 500,000 hommes. Le système de congés est donc la plus propre pour résister l'invasion.

However, the argument is sophistic, for this system would provide a trained reserve only if every conscript did active service. But congés who had served for a certain period were not included in the reserve, but counted in the regimental strength until their service time was completed. The writer complained that those who served four years would be only half-trained:

Regardez au contraire les effets du système de réserve ou de mis en disponibilité. Au bout de quatre ans de service, voilà une moitié de l'armée qui rentre dans ses foyers, avec une instruction incomplète et avec une demi-libération qui ne l'empêchera pas de se croire tout-à-fait libérée; (il) perdra bientôt l'esprit d'une profession à laquelle il

⁵² A.H.G. X⁸⁶⁷.

⁵³ Howard, *op. cit.* p. 32.

⁵⁴ L. Girard, *La Garde Nationale* (Paris, 1964), p. 215.

⁵⁵ Monteilhet, *op. cit.* p. 80.

n'appartiendra plus . . . et croyez-vous que ce soldat, à moitié instruit, se souciera beaucoup d'aller achever son instruction aux revues et aux exercices?

The article concluded that a reserve would disarm the nation by weakening the army, sarcastically calling its supporters, mostly deputies from large cities and the 'patriotic' East, 'les partisans de la guerre'.⁵⁶

Liberals realized that the 1832 proposal merely duplicated the law of 1824. Soult admitted that he would only have a reserve if every conscript was called for active duty: 'J'admets que la totalité des levées passeraient successivement sous les drapeaux et ensuite seraient renvoyées dans leurs foyers.'⁵⁷ General Sebastiani conceded that the commission's proposal contained no reserve, but claimed that the National Guard would be a good substitute. General Clauzel, however, who called for an army of 800,000 men, concluded that the Soult Law failed to provide a reserve: 'Je ne trouve dans le projet du Gouvernement ni dans l'ammendement de la commission aucune réserve.'⁵⁸ In the Chambre des Pairs, General d'Ambrugeac proposed a five-year service and five-year reserve provision. He claimed that his proposal was modelled on the 1818 law, while the Government's merely duplicated the 1824 law: 'La loi actuelle a profité de la loi de 1824; ce n'est, en d'autres termes, que la loi de 1824.'⁵⁹ The peers voted an amendment requiring the army to call up the youngest contingent first if it was forced to recall those previously sent home on unlimited leave without training. This provision would have strengthened the reserve by making these trained men available for the reserve for a longer period after their release. However, it was reversed by the deputies, who required the army to call up the oldest contingent first. On 5 November, de Ludre's reserve amendment was defeated after Guizot declared that it sacrificed the army to the reserve.⁶⁰

The number of military reports after 1834, when Marshal Gérard replaced Soult as War Minister, calling for the creation of a trained reserve testify to the continued desire of many officers for such a contingent. General Pelet deplored the lack in a note to Soult soon after the bill's adoption: 'Avec le système de recrutement actuel . . . la réserve est réduite aux conditions les plus défavorables.' He concluded that the only viable reserve was a trained reserve: 'On ne peut considérer comme la formant réellement que les hommes accoutumés au service militaire et ayant l'habitude des armes. La seconde class (congés) est une réserve fictive.'⁶¹ An infantry committee report by Durant la Salle on 21 June 1841 concluded that a reserve of congés was 'absurd': 'Il était d'ailleurs absurde de comprendre dans une réserve militaire des hommes qui n'avaient même pas rejoint les corps pour lesquels ils étaient destinés.'⁶² Others suggested that all

⁵⁶ *Journal des Débats*, 5 Nov. 1831.

⁵⁷ A.P. LXXI, 320.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* p. 331.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* LXXIV, 563.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* LXXI, 359.

⁶¹ A.H.G. X^s 67.

⁶² *Ibid.*

conscripts must be activated. Soult reflected in 1841 that in 1832 lawmakers thought a reserve unnecessary while the war scare made the quick formation of a regular army absolutely vital: 'Le but de la loi (1832) était de rendre les contingents nombreux afin d'activer les incorporations: on conçoit, en effet, qu'à cette époque il ne s'agissait nullement de l'organisation d'une réserve, il fallait aviser au plus pressé.'⁶³

The results of the Soult law have already been discussed in part. Although Monteilhet claimed that the new law did not alter the 1818 concept of the army, it upheld the 1824 reserves abolition and reinforced the professionalizing tendencies of that law. Guizot boasted that 'its leading principles have resisted assault, survived alteration',⁶⁴ but Thoumas deplored the absence of a trained reserve as 'un défaut absolu capital'.⁶⁵ Writing of the 1904 army bill, Kovacs says: 'Indeed, one cannot help agreeing with the authors of the project of 1904 in their conclusion that the law of 1832, by paving the way for the mercenary army of Napoleon III, sent France down the road leading to the disasters of 1870.'⁶⁶ In 1840, Louis-Philippe dismissed Thiers, realizing that his army was too small to manage an active foreign policy. As chief minister, Guizot came to realize the reserve's inadequacy: 'Dans la réserve, je crains de ne pas trouver suffisamment une armée.' Soult, too, recognized its limitations: 'La réserve serait souvent embarrassante.'⁶⁷ In 1841, he tried unsuccessfully to reintroduce the four years' active duty measure voted down nine years earlier. Army organization remained virtually unchanged until 1871.

⁶³ A.H.G. E⁵ 147.

⁶⁴ Guizot, *op. cit.* pp. 166-9.

⁶⁵ Thoumas, *op. cit.* p. 32.

⁶⁶ Kovacs, 'French Military Institutions before the Franco-Prussian War', *American Historical Review* (Jan. 1946), p. 221.

⁶⁷ Monteilhet, *op. cit.* pp. 25-6.