INTRODUCTION: THE UNION OF FINLAND WITH RUSSIA

> "A new and brilliant career was opened for the inhabitants of the eastern parts of Finland through their incorporation into the Russian Empire at the beginning of the last [18th] century and they have followed in their forefathers' footsteps during Russia's many campaigns against the Turks and Persians ... At the beginning of this [19th] century the same career has become common to all the inhabitants of Finland ... " [1]

The opportunity for the new military career mentioned by the newspaper Åbo Underrättelser was provided by the union of Finland with Russia in 1809. Swedish Finland was invaded by the Russians on 21 February 1808 and its conquest was complete by November. By the Peace of Hamina of 17 September 1809 Sweden ceded the country to Russia, but the Emperor Alexander I had already settled the constitutional status and the main features of the government of Finland in consultation with the Finnish Diet, meeting at Porvoo, between March and July 1809. The inhabitants of Finland were guaranteed their laws, privileges and Lutheran religion and the country obtained an administrative autonomy which gave the Swedish-speaking upper class (ståndspersoner) [2] far greater freedom to run

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1. Åbo Underrättelser, 12.II.1831, no. 12; introduction to 'Biografiska anteckningar' concerning Finnish officers in Russian service.
2. Ståndspersoner (in Finnish säätyläiset), the term rendered here as upper class although it has no precise equivalent in English, comprised members of various social groups who derived their position in society from office, education, property or relative wealth. The composition of this upper class is considered below, p. 235-236.

the land's affairs than had been the case when Finland was part of Sweden. [3]

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The Emperor of Russia, as sovereign of Finland, took the title of Grand Duke of Finland. Because of his guarantee of the laws and privileges of the country, the Emperor did not possess in Finland the autocratic power that he enjoyed in Russia. Instead he acquired the extensive monarchical rights formerly exercised by the King of Sweden under the Form of Government of 1772 as modified by the Act of Union and Security of 1789. As sovereign, the Emperor and Grand Duke - who was conventionally referred to as the Emperor except in certain formal documents - possessed wide executive power, including the rights to organise administrative institutions and to appoint to public offices. He shared legislative power with the Diet but determined for many years if and when it should be summoned. The Diet, composed of the four Estates of nobles, clergy, burghers and peasants, represented the nation. It had the right to enact and revise laws and to approve taxes. However, the ordinary revenues of the state, which were paid into a separate Finnish treasury, were long adequate to meet ordinary expenditure and no additional taxation requiring the vote of the Diet was needed. The Diet was not summoned between 1809 and 1863, by which time its meeting had become imperative to deal with a series of legislative and financial problems. Regular convocation of the Diet was secured by a law promulgated in 1869 and in 1906 the old Diet of the four Estates was abolished and replaced by a unicameral Diet elected by universal suffrage.

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3. See Eino Jutikkala, A history of Finland, (London, 1962), ch. 7, on the settlement of 1809 and on Finland's autonomous position. The following description of the administration of Finland also draws on L. Mechelin, A précis of the public law of Finland, (London, 1889), and K. J. Ståhlberg, Suomen hallinto-oikeus. Yleinen osa, (Hki, 1913).

The highest administrative body in Finland throughout the autonomy period was the Imperial Senate of Finland, which was set up by the Emperor in 1809 as the Government Council and renamed the Senate in 1816. The Senate was divided into the Economic Department (Swedish Ekonomie-departementet) and the Judicial Department (Justitie-departementet), both of which met separately as well as coming together to form the Plenum of the Senate. The Governor-General of Finland, who was the Emperor's personal representative in the country, was Chairman of the Senate and of its two departments. However, because Governors-General were Russians who knew little or no Swedish - which for most of the period was the language used by the Senate - the conduct of business was usually left to the Vice-Chairmen of the departments who, like the other senators, were Finns appointed by the Emperor. The Economic Department, which was responsible for civil administration and economic affairs, came to resemble a cabinet with the Vice-Chairman as prime minister and senators responsible for the various administrative departments (expeditioner) into which it was divided. The Judicial Department acted as a court of last instance and supervised the administration of justice. The Senate met at Turku until 1819 when it transferred to Helsinki, the new capital.

Certain matters could be decided by the Senate itself - the number of these grew with the passage of time - but others required the decision of the Emperor. The procedure in these cases was for the Senate to record its views for transmission to the Emperor. This was done through two intermediaries. The first was the Governor-General, who was entitled to add his own comments to those of the Senate. He sent the documents to the second intermediary, the Minister Secretary of State for Finland, whose task was to report to the Emperor matters submitted by the Senate and the Governor-General. The Minister Secretary of State was a Finnish official appointed by the Emperor and his office

was in St. Petersburg. Initially matters submitted to the Emperor were discussed and formulated by the Committee of Finnish Affairs which was set up in 1811. Its minimum of five members, who were Finns, included a chairman and the Secretary of State and its office was located in St. Petersburg. However, this Committee was abolished in 1826 and the Secretary of State - from 1834 Minister Secretary of State - alone was retained. A second Committee of Finnish Affairs functioned from 1857 to 1891, its business being to examine matters referred to it by the Minister Secretary of State at the request of the Emperor.

The Minister Secretary of State put forward to the Emperor a proposal note in Russian summarising the matter under consideration; in very important cases full translations were supplied of the documents submitted by the Senate and the Governor-General. The Emperor's decisions were expressed either in rescripts, signed by him and counter-signed by the Minister Secretary of State, or the Minister Secretary of State prepared a letter setting out the decision as annotated by the Emperor on the proposal note. All decisions were notified by the Minister Secretary of State to the Governor-General who reported them to the Senate which promulgated and executed them. The Minister Secretary of State was also the intermediary between Russian ministries and other major Russian institutions and the Finnish authorities on matters touching on Finnish as well as Russian interests. He did not, however, report to the Emperor matters concerning the foreign relations of Finland since these were all handled and reported by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The duties of the Governor-General have been mentioned only in connection with his chairmanship of the Senate. He was also responsible for supervising the work of the Senate and for ensuring that its orders were carried out. His standing in relation to the Senate was enhanced in 1826 when he acquired the right to report matters directly to

the Emperor. However, imperial decisions taken as a result of his reports were issued through the Minister Secretary of State in the usual way. Until 1905, when the Finland Military District was incorporated with that of St. Petersburg, the Governor-General exercised both civil and military power in Finland since he was also the commander-in-chief of all troops stationed in the country, both Russian and Finnish. It should be noted that although there was a Finnish Military Department, subordinate to the Economic Department of the Senate, for handling the administration of the Finnish military and naval units which were set up during the autonomy period, Finland never had either a War Minister and a War Ministry or a Navy Minister and a Naval Ministry. The Governor-General had a staff to deal with matters relating to the Finnish troops and in respect of purely military and naval affairs, as distinct from administration, these troops were the concern of the Russian War Ministry and the Russian Naval Ministry.

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The Finnish army that had fought against the Russians in 1808-09 - nearly 22,000 men - was formally disbanded in 1810 and the country was freed from the burden of military service while it recovered from the effects of the war.[4] Disbandment also acknowledged that the Finns might not be willing to fight against Sweden, the most likely enemy. It was realised that the change of sovereign was not universally welcomed. Some members of the upper class, for example, thought of themselves as Swedes and still feared and hated Russia as the traditional enemy. However, the growing conviction towards the end of the eighteenth century that the Swedish government was neglecting Finnish interests had aroused extensive separatist feelings and

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4. Manifesto of 15/27.III.1810, Samling af placater, I. See also below, p. 242.

fostered a readiness to accept Russian rule as an inevitable and probably beneficial change.

Those Finns who assumed a leading role in the government of the country after 1809 naturally took a positive view of the connection with Russia and welcomed the autonomous status that Finland had attained. These men regarded themselves as Finns and Finland as their fatherland. They believed that Finland could only preserve its special political privileges by demonstrating its usefulness to Russia as a loyal and protective frontier land. It has been suggested that these ideas were largely accepted by the Finnish upper class during the reign of Alexander I, whose conciliatory policy contributed to their acceptance. [5]

The revolution in Sweden in 1809 and the choice of Marshal Bernadotte as heir to the throne weakened loyalties to the old motherland and although the tradition of service in Sweden persisted it affected fewer and fewer young Finns. [6] After the severance of the political connection with Sweden the idea of serving the new sovereign in Russia as well as in Finland could not be regarded in any way as reprehensible.

Russian Emperors and Empresses had long been eager to acquire the services of their non-Russian subjects and of foreigners as soldiers, administrators and technicians. [7]

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5. Finnish attitudes to the connection with Russia at that time are discussed in Carl von Bonsdorff, Opinioner och stämningar i Finland 1808-1814, (Hfors, 1918. SSLF, 141); L. G. von Bonsdorff, Den ryska paciferingen i Finland 1808-09, (Hfors, 1929), p. 397-433; Keijo Korhonen, Suomen asiain komitea. Suomen korkeimman hallinnon järjestelyt ja toteuttaminen vuosina 1811-1826, (Hki, 1963. Hist. tutk., 65), p. 190-214; Keijo Korhonen, Linjoja puoleltatoista vuosisadalta, (Turku, 1963), p. 11-13.
6. Examples are given by Jarl Gallén, 'La Finlande militaire au temps du Grand-Duché (1809-1917)', Revue internationale d'histoire militaire, 23, 1961, p. 195-196.
7. On non-Russians in Russian service see, for example, Erik Amburger, Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Russlands von Peter dem Grossen bis 1917, (Leiden, 1966), p. 513-517.

The habit - and the social and economic necessity - of state service, both military and civil, was of long standing among the upper class in Finland as in Sweden, [8] and both Finnish and Russian authorities were encouraging to those who sought employment in the Empire. The possibility of enjoying a new and glorious career in the Russian armed forces, to which the quotation from Åbo Underrättelser referred, was quickly understood by those Finns able to take advantage of it.

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8. See Kaarlo Wirilander, Herrasväkeä. Suomen säätyläistö 1721-1870, (Hki, 1974. Hist. tutk., 93), p. 105; Michael Roberts, 'Sweden', in A. Goodwin, ed., The European nobility in the eighteenth century, (London, 1953), p. 140-143.

5.2. THE ARMED FORCES IN FINLAND

At the beginning of 1808 the armed forces in Finland comprised 21,854 men, of whom 13,752 were in the indelta army and 6,013 in enlisted army units, while the naval forces numbered 2,089 men, enlisted and indelta. [1] The number of posts for officers, non-commissioned officers and military officials was 1,478 according to Wirilander. [2] The old army was disbanded by the imperial manifesto of 15/27 March 1810, the ostensible aim being to free the country from the expense of military service while it recovered from the effects of the recent war. Officers were well treated, being guaranteed their homes, which formed part of their emoluments, and their pay. [3] There was general and well-justified satisfaction among the officers of the former army with the arrangements made on their retirement. [4] But for the nature of the settlement of 1810, the disbandment of the old army, which reduced by half the number of posts in state service, [5] would have had a catastrophic effect on the livelihood of the upper class. The settlement in fact caused former officers not to be tempted into posts in the Finnish civil service or into Russian military service. The overwhelming majority either lived exclusively on their retirement pay or supplemented it with occupations independent of the state. [6] This attitude was the more understandable since the average age of these officers was high, being 50 for field officers, 44 for captains and 40 for lieutenants and ensigns. [7]

The manifesto of 1810 disbanding the old Finnish army mentioned the eventual and gradual formation of Finnish

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1. Martti Santavuori, Suomen sotahistoria, I, (Hki, 1941), p. 252-254.
2. Wirilander, op. cit., p. 113.
3. Samling af placater, I.
4. Bonsdorff, Opinioner och stämningar, p. 116.
5. Wirilander, op. cit., p. 438.
6. Wirilander, op. cit., p. 191, 265.
7. Wirilander, op. cit., p. 208.

enlisted regiments to replace the Russian troops then in Finland. Proposals that a Finnish army should be revived were discussed keenly during the period 1810-12 by Count Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt, Baron Robert Henrik Rehbinder and other Finns prominent in the guidance of Finnish affairs. They felt that a Finnish army would demonstrate Finland's existence as a nation and in that respect the arrangements for raising an army were linked with the desire to call a meeting of the Diet. The re-creation of a Finnish army would also permit the withdrawal of Russian troops, thus alleviating grievances over their quartering, encourage young men to stay in Finland instead of seeking education and service in Sweden, and tempt back to Finland officers who had settled in the former motherland. The dangers inherent in the diminution of the military class in Finland would be averted. It was believed that for economic reasons unemployed officers would want to join a revived Finnish army. [8] However, in the autumn of 1811 the Emperor rejected a proposal drawn up by Gustaf Fredrik Stjernvall, the governor of Uusimaa-Häme province, to raise by conscription an army of 12,000 men. While Sweden was regarded as a likely enemy, and while feelings of sympathy for Sweden continued which might lead to refusals to serve, the Emperor did not consider the time opportune to raise Finnish units to relieve Russia of the burden of supplying a garrison in Finland. [9] The Emperor did, however, approve the establishment of the Topographical Corps at Haapaniemi, which developed into the Finnish Cadet Corps. [10]

The Finnish leaders returned to the question of raising Finnish troops in 1812 when war between France and Russia

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8. On the proposals and attitudes see Bonsdorff, Opinioner och stämningar, p. 110-121, and G. A. Gripenberg, 'Anteckningar rörande den år 1812 uppsatta finska militärens historia', FMT, 11, 1892, p. 66-75.
9. Armfelt thought that the Emperor had been influenced by Bishop Jakob Tengström. Bonsdorff, Finländska militärfrågor vid ryska tidens början, p. 6-33. See also M. Borodkin, Istoriya Finlyandii. Vremya Imperatora Aleksandra I, (SPb, 1909), p. 432-435.
10. See above, ch. 2.

provided the occasion to demonstrate Finland's loyalty in a practical way. [11] In September 1812 the Emperor agreed to the formation of three Finnish light infantry regiments, each of two battalions, totalling 3,600 men. [12] There were to be 273 posts for officers, non-commissioned officers and officials. [13] The regiments were to be formed on the same basis as the former Savo Light Infantry Regiment, which meant that they were not to be in continuous service but were to assemble for training for a period in the summer only. [14] Two regiments were to be raised by enlistment and one, in Viipuri province, by conscription. [15] Although some officers and men of the old army joined the new regiments, recruitment proceeded slowly, [16] and fears were expressed that the enterprise would bring upon Finland more dishonour than credit. [17] However, the 3rd (Viipuri) Finnish Light Infantry Regiment was able to carry out garrison duty in the Russian capital from March 1813 to August 1814 when most troops had been withdrawn from St. Petersburg.

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11. Bonsdorff, Finländska militärfrågor vid ryska tidens början, p. 59-141.
12. Rescript of 6/18.IX.1812. Samling af placater, I. The Finnish armed forces during the autonomy period are discussed in an excellent short survey by Jarl Gallén, 'La Finlande militaire au temps du Grand-Duché (1809-1917)', Revue internationale d'histoire militaire, 23, 1961, p. 193-211. For more details of the troops raised in 1812 see G. A. Gripenberg, 'Anteckningar rörande den år 1812 uppsatta finska militärens historia', FMT, 11-13, 1892-94. (See bibliography for page references.)
13. Wirilander, op. cit., p. 113-114.
14. Gripenberg, op. cit., FMT, 11, 1892, p. 73; 12, 1893, p. 190-191.
15. The Viipuri government (Old Finland) had been reunited with the rest of Finland, which was not liable to conscription, by the decree of 11/23.XII.1811. Samling af placater, I.
16. Gripenberg, op. cit., FMT, 11, 1892, p. 72-75; 12, 1893, p. 137-139, 146-147, 302-303; 13, 1894, p. 325. Bonsdorff, Finländska militärfrågor vid ryska tidens början, p. 106-107, 125-129. Thirty-seven officers of the old army entered the new troops. Kaarlo Wirilander, 'Suomen upseeriperheiden sijoittuminen vuoden 1809 jälkeiseen yhteiskuntaan', Historiallinen aikakauskirja, 53, 1955, p. 107.
17. Gripenberg, op. cit., FMT, 12, 1893, p. 136-137.

In 1819 the first two Finnish light infantry regiments were changed into infantry while the third retained its former title. [18] In 1827 the Finnish troops were reorganised as three brigades of rifles each of two battalions, with an additional training battalion in Helsinki. [19] In 1829 the training battalion became the Guards Finnish Rifle Battalion. [20] Thanks to the reorganisation, the number of posts in the Finnish troops for officers, non-commissioned officers and military officials rose to 617. [21] However, this relatively large military establishment did not last long. In 1830 the Finnish battalions, with the exception of the Guard, were disbanded, partly for economic reasons and partly because the Governor-General was keen to have Finns in naval rather than in military service since he valued their talents as sailors. [22] This marked the end of the first phase of Finnish military activity during the autonomy period. The formation of the Finnish Naval Ekipazh in 1830 with an establishment of 1,017 men increased somewhat the exiguous armed forces of the Grand Duchy. [23] However, while the

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18. Gripenberg, op. cit., FMT, 13, 1894, p. 252-253.
19. Gripenberg, op. cit., FMT, 13, 1894, p. 345-346. This training battalion had been formed in 1818.
20. Gripenberg, Lifgardets 3 Finska skarpskyttebataljon 1812-1905, p. 29. This is the most complete history of the battalion. Although the battalion formed part of the Russian guard corps, its peace-time station was Helsinki and Finland paid part of its cost and attended to its administration. It saw active service in Poland in 1830, was on garrison duties at Riga and Brest-Litovsk in 1849, in Poland and Lithuania during the Crimean War, and on active service during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. It was disbanded in 1905.
21. Wirilander, Herrasväkeä, p. 114.
22. Gripenberg, 'Anteckningar rörande finska sjöekipagets historie', FMT, 17, 1898, p. 668-669, 671. The savings were used to help pay off a loan from Russia for the construction of the fortress of Bomarsund. Gripenberg, 'Anteckningar rörande den år 1812 uppsatta finska militärens historia', FMT, 13, 1894, p. 514-519.
23. Proclamation of 21.V.1830. Samling af placater, VI. The establishment of the Ekipazh was augmented slightly by the proclamation of 28.XI.1833. Samling af placater, VI. The designation 1st Finnish (27th) Naval Ekipazh was used from 1841. Gripenberg, 'Anteckningar rörande finska sjöekipagets historie', FMT, 20, 1901, p. 181-182.

Ekipazh and the Guard were the only Finnish military units there were only 284 posts for officers, non-commissioned officers and military officials. [24] The command organisation of the Finnish troops was abolished and certain departments concerned with military administration were wound up.

The abrupt contraction of the Finnish armed forces was a big blow to the employment prospects of the upper class. The terms offered to officers serving in 1830 were not so favourable as those of 1810. Field officers and officers above the rank of lieutenant were discharged with the right to receive pay for life or until they were provided with other employment by the state. If any wanted to enter the Russian army they were to be accepted. Lieutenants, second-lieutenants and ensigns were permitted to be transferred to whatever Russian army regiments they wished but if they did not want such a transfer they were to be retired without pension and were to be paid only to the end of 1830. [25] Quite a large number of Finnish officers transferred to Russian service. [26] The contraction of the Finnish troops in 1830 contributed to the entry of the upper class into Russian military service. In particular many former cadets at the Finnish Cadet Corps, for whom there were no openings in the small Finnish forces, entered the Russian army. [27]

The existence of Finnish troops had little or no effect on the size of the Russian garrison in Finland which was rather more than a division in strength after the conclusion of the war with France. The principal formation was the 21st Infantry Division, which comprised four infantry regiments (Vyborgsky, Petrovsky, Neyshlotsky [Nyslott], and Vil'manstrandsky) and two light infantry regiments. There were also various artillery, garrison and other troops. In

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24. Wirilander, op. cit., p. 438.
25. Proclamation of 7.X.1830. Samling af placater, VI.
26. Gripenberg, 'Anteckningar rörande den år 1812 uppsatta finska militärens historia', FMT, 13, 1894, p. 515.
27. Wirilander, op. cit., p. 192. See also Table 8.

1820 or 1821 the 21st Infantry Division was redesignated the 23rd and this in turn was renumbered the 19th in 1833. In 1835 the Russian troops in Finland were extensively reorganised, the infantry regiments and some garrison battalions being formed into twelve Finland line battalions which made up the 21st Infantry Division. This division was renumbered the 22nd in 1844. The Russian garrison in Finland in peace time totalled about 12,000 men. Naturally, this total was greatly increased during the Crimean War, because of the threat of allied invasion and the fear of Swedish intervention, until about 68,000 troops were in the country. The twelve Finland line battalions formed twenty-two battalions during the war but were reduced to ten in 1856 and the garrison fell below its pre-war level. In 1863 the Finland line battalions were reorganised as four infantry regiments (85th Vyborgsky, 86th Vil'manstrandsky, 87th Neyshlotsky and 88th Petrovsky) and as the Vyborg and Sveaborg Fortress Regiments.

In 1865 the 22nd Infantry Division ended its long sojourn in Finland and was moved to Novgorod, being replaced by the 23rd Infantry Division. This division, composed of the 89th Belomorsky, 90th Onezhsky, 91st Dvinsky and 92nd Pechorsky Infantry Regiments, also had a fairly long stay in the country. In 1883 it was replaced by the 24th Infantry Division, comprising the 93rd Irkutsky, 94th Eniseysky, 95th Krasnoyarsky and 96th Omsky Infantry Regiments. This formation left Finland during the 1890s and the Russian garrison then consisted mainly of the Finland rifle regiments, the first two of which had been formed in 1892 from four reserve infantry cadre battalions in the St. Petersburg Military District. There was also an artillery regiment and infantry, artillery and mine units in the fortresses of Sveaborg and Viipuri. The strength of the Russian army in the country, which had fallen to about 9,500 men by the end of the century, was increased after the disbandment of the Finnish troops in 1901. In 1914 the garrison comprised sixteen Finland rifle regiments organised into four brigades,

5.3. THE ATTRACTION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND NAVY

It is not difficult to see from the preceding accounts of social change in Finland and of the armed forces in Finland why the Russian army and navy attracted Finnish officers for the greater part of the autonomy period. The opportunities in Finland for any kind of occupation suitable for members of the upper class were relatively few for at least the first half of the nineteenth century. Service in Russia by widening the possibilities of employment undoubtedly reduced the pressure on civil and military posts in Finland on the part of men from military and noble families. [1] Even when Finnish military units existed, the Russian forces were attractive in themselves to Finns. This was not surprising since the Finnish troops were not only small and limited in character but also unstable. Economic difficulties were allowed to put an end to the first two phases of military activity in Finland; political conditions delayed the start of the first phase and ended the third. In these circumstances the Russian army had a clear appeal as the army of a great power, in which career opportunities were both wide and constant and in which the ever present prospect of active service gave stimulus and purpose to the military life.

To enter Russian service was, however, an action which in many cases was not undertaken without careful thought. Even when relations between Finns and Russians were good, as in the 1830s and 1840s, "the Russian element was and remained something foreign, which could never be made our own". [2] In spite of their satisfaction with the settlement of 1810, and in a sense because of it, few of the officers of the old Finnish army entered Russian service. One calculation claims that about fifteen Finnish officers who had taken part in the war of 1808-09 entered the Russian

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1. Wirilander, Herrasväkeä, p. 192, 226.
2. Schauman, Från sex årtionden i Finland, I, p. 19.

army between 1808 and 1813, and that about another ten who had either served in the Swedish army or were entering military service for the first time joined during the same period. [3]

Many officers of the old Finnish army did not want to enter the Russian army for reasons of principle and because of a deeply rooted fear of moving to the utterly strange surroundings of Russia. [4] Moreover, quite apart from the problem of the Russian language, [5] the expense of service in Russia was an off-putting factor. This matter had been raised by Johan Fredrik Aminoff, a member of the Committee of Finnish Affairs, in a letter of 11 May 1812 to the War Minister, Count Aleksey Ivanovich Gorchakov. Writing on behalf of a volunteer, Aminoff suggested that while many Finns wanted to enter the Russian army, a great part of them was prevented from doing so because they had so little money that they could not exist if appointed to serve in such an expensive place as St. Petersburg. He proposed that this situation would be remedied if they could be appointed to units in Finland. [6] In a proclamation of 26 June/8 July 1812, which was intended to encourage Finns to enter Russian service, Steinheil, the Governor-General, stated that they could, if they wished, be engaged by units stationed in Finland to reduce their expense in joining units in distant parts of the Empire. [7] This proclamation does not seem to have had a great effect. [8]

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3. Bonsdorff, 'Kejsar Alexander I och finska officerskåren', p. 248.
4. Wirilander, 'Suomen upseeriperheiden sijoittuminen vuoden 1809 jälkeiseen yhteiskuntaan', p. 109.
5. Bonsdorff, Finländska militärfrågor vid ryska tidens början, p. 129, describes the reluctance of Finnish officers to learn Russian words of command.
6. Borodkin, Istoriya Finlyandii. Vremya Imperatora Aleksandra I, p. 437-438.
7. Samling af placater, I.
8. Borodkin, op. cit., p. 437-438, quoting Aminoff to Gorchakov, 11.V.1812, no. 448. Borodkin commented that, "Thus were privileges obtained when there was still nobody wishing to serve". He added that Steinheil's ardent words to the Finns "resounded in the wilderness".

The formation of Finnish troops did, however, lead to some transfers of officers from Finnish to Russian service. By 1818 it had become necessary to state that the seniority in Russian service of these Finnish officers was to be reckoned from the date of their commissions in Finnish service. [9] Transfers were more numerous during the 1820s, [10] and on one occasion at least they were officially encouraged: special arrangements were made for officers who wished to transfer to the Russian army on the Danube to take part in the war against Turkey in 1828. [11] By this time, of course, the first generation brought up since the beginning of Russian rule was entering military service. Old antipathies had lessened or disappeared and a greater willingness to enter the Russian army was to be expected. This showed in the increase in transfers from the Finnish troops as well as in direct entry into Russian service. Transfers were not, however, all in one direction. Attempts by Finnish officers in the Russian army to transfer to the Finnish troops whenever more lucrative posts became vacant were a source of complaint in 1825. These transfers delayed the already slow promotion in the Finnish troops. [12]

By the 1830s the attitude of the Finnish upper class to the Russian army, and in particular to the Russian troops in Finland, had undergone a profound change compared with the beginning of the autonomy period. A contemporary wrote that in many respects the Russian units in Finland were considered to be in a closer relationship to the country when there were no proper Finnish troops in existence. The Russian regiments were named after Finnish towns, about half of their officers were native Finns and many of the

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9. SVP, 1838, ch. II, kn. I, st. 646, citing Imperial Order of 15.IV.1818.
10. See for example letters and orders relating to transfers between 1818 and 1819, and 1823 and 1830 in Kenraalikuvernöörin Suomen sotaväen esikunnan arkisto, Ha 3. 14.
11. Gripenberg, 'Anteckningar rörande den år 1812 uppsatta finska militärens historia', FMT, 13, 1894, p. 513.
12. Gripenberg, op. cit., FMT, 13, 1894, p. 338.

Russian soldiers had married Finnish wives. [13] Relations between Finns and Russians were in general good and the influx of Finns into the Russian army grew continuously at any rate until the 1850s. [14] Entry as non-commissioned officers was resorted to more frequently, particularly as the educational requirements were low.

> "Parents of rank of slender means in country districts therefore often found it sensible not to strain their boys' brains unnecessarily and pay for their upkeep at some school but to let them grow up free at home until they reached the required age and height to be able to enter on a military career. It was even for a time really fashionable for students, even of the finest birth, who for several years had developed every possible elegance on the streets of the university and the capital and little by little attained a complete aversion to all scholarly labours, suddenly to dress themselves in coarse grey greatcoats and after half a year appear in renewed brilliance with the epaulettes of a Russian ensign." [15]

This was also the period of the expansion of the Finnish Cadet Corps, the institution of scholarships at Russian cadet corps, and the foundation of the Yunker School in Helsinki. Places at all these establishments were keenly sought by Finns, as has been already described.

One of the men most active in developing the scholarship system and the teaching of Russian in Finland was the Minister Secretary of State, Count Alexander Armfelt. Even as a young man he had favoured the encouragement of Finns to enter Russian service. In a memorandum of the mid-1830s he wrote,

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13. Frans P. von Knorring, Gamla Finland eller det fordna Wiborgska Gouvernementet, (Åbo, 1833), p. 181.
14. Schauman, op. cit., I, p. 15, 18.
15. Schauman, op. cit., I, p. 17-18.