The Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising: A characterization of the Ukrainian revolt

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Abstract. The Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising, including questions of typology, etiology, and periodization, may be studied from varying perspectives. Accepting 1648 to 1659 as the period of the uprising, this essay provides an outline of the uprising from its onset to the Union of Hadiach and second Pereiaslav agreement. An examination of demographic, economic, social, religious and national factors shows why the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising was one of the most “revolutionary” revolts in early modern Europe. The essay concludes with a discussion of the relationship of the Jewish massacres to the context of the uprising and points to changing views on their size and significance.

In his study of revolutions published in the 1938, Crane Brinton maintained that scholarship on the English Civil War and the American Revolution no longer reflected partisan positions on the events. He asserted that even passions in France over 1789 were cooling down in the increasing flood of printer’s ink.1 Why then does the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising arouse feelings still fresh despite the three hundred-fifty years that separate us from the event?

The reasons for these differing attitudes are not obscure. Issues such as the relationship between the king and parliament in England, the establishment of an independent state in North America, and the formation of a republic in France have been long resolved. In contrast, the existence of a Ukrainian nation, Russian rule of Ukraine, the decline of Polish sovereignty, and the position of Jews in Ukraine remained open and disputed questions until the end of the twentieth century. Despite the illusory calm in the Eastern bloc that prevailed until the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, instability marked the relations of Eastern Europe’s cultures and traditions. Both before and after the recent changes, accounts of ancient grandeur, mistakes, and betrayals fired popular imaginations that saw modern relations and conflicts as rooted in the past. The events of the mid-seventeenth century that brought about the emergence of a Ukrainian polity, the decline of the Polish state, the transformation of Muscovy into the Russian Empire, and the attacks on East European Jewish communities
are not viewed in a detached manner by present-day bearers of these traditions.

The history of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising has long been written in an atmosphere of political and cultural agendas and tensions. In the early modern period, proponents and opponents of the revolt wrote its history in order to serve the interests of polity, social stratum, and creed. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the event assumed symbolic significance for movements and rulers who wished to shape the political and cultural map of Eastern Europe. Considering three incidents should suffice to convey that writing the history of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising has never been an arcane academic pursuit.

In 1898, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the major Ukrainian academic institution in Eastern Galicia, marked the 250th anniversary of Khmel'nyts'kyi's Uprising in a volume including contributions by noted scholars such as Ivan Franko and Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi. In the longest piece, a study of popular risings in East Galicia (Galician Rus', Halyts'ka Rus'), Stepan Tomashiv's'kyi carefully documented that the masses of the region had joined in the great revolt, even though their risings had been quickly suppressed. He asserted his hope that his research would influence his contemporaries’ views in statements such as: “And to Galicians themselves, who do not see for themselves a tradition of resounding moments of national life after the Middle Ages, it will be, we think, not without benefit to reflect upon these outbreaks of their forefathers, now when we are marking the 250th anniversary of the great crisis of Rus'-Ukraine.”

He insisted that the period had demonstrated that the western Ukrainians could have achieved a better situation only in concert with the broad masses of the entire Ukraine and that for Galicia the major positive consequence of the period was that the general “Ukrainian national idea” had first emerged then. His history was clearly meant to raise the spirits of the Ukrainians who suffered national and social discrimination from the dominant Polish elite of the province and to strengthen the Ukrainian movement through extensive scholarly study of the documents on the western Ukrainian lands during the period associated with the national and social liberation of central and eastern Ukraine.

In 1905, the Polish historian, Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński, published a booklet with the subtitle “The Bloody Guest in Lviv.” Marking the 250th anniversary of Khmel'nyts'kyi’s unsuccessful siege of the Galician capital in 1655, the booklet voiced the determination of the Polish majority in the city to dominate its Ukrainian minority and the surrounding Ukrainian lands. Gawroński ended his discussion
with the statement: “The Ruthenian nation did not possess the elements necessary for state life. ‘Destiny,’ – writes [Johann Christian von] Engel – ‘did not create Ukraine for independent life.’” Gawroński’s increasingly racist statements about Ruthenians (Ukrainians), which were meant to reenforce Polish determination to rule territories with Ukrainian majorities, were to reach their apogee in his biography of Khmel’nyts’kyi published in 1906–1909 and awarded recognition by the Cracow Academy of Sciences.⁴

On 12 January 1954, Pravda published the twenty-one theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Tercentenary of the “Reunion” of Ukraine with Russia.⁵ Commemorating the Pereiaslav Agreement negotiated between Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi and the Muscovite government, the Party theses set the official line for public celebrations and scholarly works. The theses, which even had an official English-language text, asserted: “In this war of liberation the Ukrainian people were led by an outstanding statesman and soldier, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. The historic merit of Bogdan Khmelnitsky lies in the fact that, while expressing the age-old aspiration and hope of the Ukrainian people – close unity with the Russian people – and while giving leadership to the process of building Ukrainian statehood, he correctly understood its purposes and prospects, realized that the salvation of the Ukrainian people could be achieved only through unity with the great Russian people, and worked perseveringly for the reunion of the Ukraine with Russia.” The Pereiaslav Agreement was called the “turning point” in the Ukrainian people’s history and a “blow at the aggressive designs of the Turkish Sultans and the Polish szlachta.” No longer an annexation or a union, Pereiaslav was now a “reunion,” thereby implying a return to a oneness of the past, and far from the “lesser evil” of early Soviet writing was now “progressive.” The document traced in detail Russian-Ukrainian friendship down to 1954. The fanfare of that year designated Ukrainians “junior brothers” in the Russian-dominated USSR and initiated a period in which Khmel’nyts’kyi became the icon of Russian-Ukrainian unity.

The Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising and the establishment of the Cossack Hetmanate (1648–1659)

The scholarship on the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising is voluminous.⁶ Although many incidents and intentions remain unexplained, largely for lack of sources, the general outlines of the uprising have long been
established. Yet the very name given to the phenomenon – uprising, revolution, massacres, rebellion, war etc. – as well as the descriptions that precede it – social, Cossack, Khmel’nyts’kyi, national-liberation etc. – have determined what events and groups are selected for discussion. The historiography of the uprising also varies as to what period should be covered. Some historians have viewed 1648–1649 as a social revolt that expired at the Zboriv Agreement. Soviet historians saw 1648–1654 as a coherent period culminating in the “reunion” with Russia. Many historians have seen the death of the hetman in 1657 as marking a new period. A number of historians have maintained that the working out of the uprising took far longer, until 1667, 1676 or even 1709, depending on whether they have concentrated on international or domestic issues. Here the name Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising is used as a general conventional description, though the use of a leader’s name certainly influences any typology. The decision to discuss the uprising until 1659 is more significant, because thereby the attempts of the Hetmanate and its elite to come to a new accommodation with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at Hadiach, the increasing dissension in Ukraine, and the second Pereiaslav Agreement with Russia are included. Such a periodization also includes the time of the attacks on Jewish communities after the Muscovite and Swedish invasions, which have often been discussed in conjunction with the massacres of 1648–1649 in the literature.

The Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising arose in the atmosphere of uncertainty created by Wladyslaw IV’s planning of a war against the Turks, which was to be undertaken in alliance with Muscovy and financed by Venice. The Cossacks, both the 6,000 registered Cossacks and the numerous nonregistered Cossacks, were an integral part of Wladyslaw’s design. The Commonwealth’s Diet opposed Wladyslaw’s plans for the war, and as a result the king conducted secret negotiations with the Cossacks. The Cossacks saw in these negotiations with the king the possibility of mitigating the harsh settlement imposed after their revolts in 1635–1638. The negotiations dragged on inconclusively for two years creating an atmosphere that was rife with rumors of a conspiracy between the court and the Cossacks to provoke a war in the southeast and to undermine the position of the nobility and increase the king’s powers.

In early January 1648, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, who had been one of the chief negotiators with the king, fled to the Zaporozhian Sich, the traditional Cossack stronghold on the lower Dnipro. He had been persecuted and arrested by the official of a great magnate and had
not received redress from the Polish authorities. He raised the standard of revolt, overthrew the government installed officers, and was proclaimed Cossack hetman at the Sich. He soon established contact with the Cossack regiments in the settled territory north of the Sich. In February, he secured the support of the Crimean Khanate, which was troubled by Władysław’s alliance with Muscovy and his plans to attack the Tatars in initiating a campaign against their suzerain, the Ottoman sultan. In April, Khmelnyts’kyi left the Sich with 8,000 men to meet the Polish forces under Crown Great Hetman Mikolaj Potocki and Crown Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski that had been sent to quell the insurrections. At Zhovti Vody (15–17 May), Khmelnyts’kyi and his Tatar allies overwhelmed part of the Polish forces under Potocki’s son Stefan and at Korsun’ (26–27 May) they defeated the main Polish force under Potocki and Kalinowski, taking the hetmans prisoner. Negotiations between the two sides commenced, and Khmelnyts’kyi established his headquarters at Chyhryn. The death of Władysław on 20 May complicated the situation as the elective Polish throne became the object of contending domestic and foreign candidates.

The devastating campaign of the magnate Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (Jarema Vyshnevets’kyi) through Polissia and Volhynia in June and July, as he retreated with his private army from Left-Bank Ukraine, broke the post-Korsun’ armistice. Khmelnyts’kyi resumed his offensive and defeated the Polish army at Pyliavtsi (23 September). In early October he invested Lviv, lifting the siege at the end of the month with the payment of a ransom, and in November he besieged Zamość. Khmelnyts’kyi’s military victories encouraged the outbreak of peasant rebellions against landlords, which began on the Left-Bank in May and spread westwards with the Khmelnyts’kyi campaign. Emissaries from the rebel army frequently incited the revolts, but in many areas peasants and urban poor organized their own revolts. In the Right-Bank, the Cossack colonel Maksym Kryvonis led a fierce campaign against the established order. The social war, accompanied by looting and brigandry, took the lives of numerous landlords, Catholic clergymen, and Jews.

The Khmelnyts’kyi revolt had a significant impact on the election of the new king. Of the two leading candidates, both brothers of Władysław, Jan Kazimierz was perceived as the candidate for accommodation with the rebels, whereas Karol Ferdinand was viewed as the pro-war candidate. The peace party, led by Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński, triumphed with the election of Jan Kazimierz in November, and sought to limit the influence of militants such as Wiśniowiecki. The
new king negotiated an armistice with the Cossacks. Khmel’nyts’kyi withdrew from Zamość, entered Kyiv in triumph in late December and took up residence in Pereiaslav. During this period, the religious aspect of the revolt became more pronounced as the Orthodox clergy hailed Khmel’nyts’kyi as a saviour from the Catholic Poles.

In February 1649 the commissioners appointed by the Diet arrived in Pereiaslav to start negotiations, but neither side was willing to make substantial compromises. The commissioners offered amnesty to the rebels, the confirmation of Khmel’nyts’kyi as hetman, and a register of 12,000 Cossacks. The Cossacks’ demands went beyond these limited concessions, with Khmel’nyts’kyi, who was simultaneously receiving foreign emissaries, emphasizing his desire to be an independent ruler in the discussions. The two sides did decide upon a truce to last until May under which Volhynia and Podillia were to be a neutral zone.

In May, despite the weakness of their forces and military leadership, the Poles renewed their campaign and on 9 July Khmel’nyts’kyi besieged the main Polish forces at Zbarazh. Jan Kazimierz attempted to relieve the besieged forces but was surrounded at Zboriv (15 August). Khmel’nyts’kyi’s Crimean ally, Khan Islam Giray, saved Jan Kazimierz from total defeat by agreeing to a separate peace, thereby forcing Khmel’nyts’kyi to agree to less advantageous terms. A peace treaty was negotiated to at Zboriv on 18 August. The chief terms of the Zboriv Agreement were that a Cossack register of 40,000 would be created, numerous posts in the Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv palatinates were to be limited to Orthodox Ukrainians, major privileges were to be given to the Orthodox Church, the Polish hetmans who had been handed over to the Tatars were to be released, and Jewish settlement in the three palatinates was to be banned. The agreement was ratified by the Diet in January 1650, but the implementation of the treaty conditions was the cause of immense friction between the two sides. The post-Zboriv period witnessed the attempts by the landlords to assert their right to return to their estates and peasant flight ensued wherever they or their officials succeeded in doing so, including to Sloboda Ukraine, a territory under Muscovite rule.

In early September 1650 Khmel’nyts’kyi and his Crimean allies invaded Moldavia and forced the hospodar, Vasile Lupu, to agree to provide the Cossacks with financial support and to arrange the marriage of his daughter, Rozanda, to Khmel’nyts’kyi’s son Tymish. The Moldavian campaign exacerbated the already tense relations with Poland. In February 1651, the Polish army under Kalinowski, much augmented by Diet appropriations, invaded the Bratslav palatinate. Soon there-
after, in April, after a year of negotiation, Khmel’nyts’kyi accepted “vassal status” (which may have been first provisoriy negotiated in 1648) from the Ottoman sultan. The Polish army suffered minor defeats at Vinnytsia (March) and Kam’ianets’ (May). The Cossacks, however, were unable to prevent the divided Polish forces from uniting and as a result the Cossacks and Tatars suffered a major defeat at Berestechko (28–30 June). As at Zboriv, Khmel’nyts’kyi’s Crimean allies agreed to a separate peace with the Commonwealth and withdrew from the battle. An army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, under Field Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł, captured Kyiv in early August. In that month, a desultory follow-up campaign by the Commonwealth forces foundered for lack of funds to pay the troops. This problem prompted the renewal of negotiations. A new agreement was signed at Bila Tserkva (28 September) whose provisions were decidedly less favorable for the Cossacks than were those of Zboriv: the Cossack register was reduced to 20,000; the Bratslav and Chernihiv palatinates lost their special status; Khmel’nyts’kyi vowed to break off his Crimean alliance and to end his independent foreign policy; and the territory was once again open to Jewish settlement and the restoration of the noble-landowning order.

The temporary calm in relations in the post-Bila Tserkva period between the Commonwealth and the Cossack officer stratum (starshyna) that had become the new governing elite in Ukraine soon broke down. The officer stratum was subject to increasing pressure from below, owing to popular discontent with the return of the noble landlords. In addition, in February 1652, the Diet refused to confirm the conditions of the Bila Tserkva Agreement. A Cossack council (rada) was held in Chyhyryn in early May to plan a new offensive against Poland and to organize a Moldavian campaign.

In May 1652 Khmel’nyts’kyi’s son Tymish set off with a Cossack army for Moldavia in order to force the wavering Vasile Lupu to agree to the terms of the 1650 accord. En route, Tymish decisively defeated a Polish army sent to intercept him at Batih in early June. On 31 August the marriage between Tymish and Rozanda Lupu took place.

In the autumn of 1652, the Commonwealth and the Cossack Hetmanate had reached a diplomatic stalemate. The Polish nobility did not want to return to the terms of Zboriv and the Cossacks did not want to adhere to the Bila Tserkva Agreement. With the Ukrainians concerned about the dependability of the Crimean Tatars and their realization that the Ottomans would not provide real support, they started to seek an alliance with Muscovy more seriously.
In March 1653, the Poles resumed their campaign with a two-pronged attack into Podillia and the Kyiv palatinate. Also in the spring a Transylvanian army under György Rákóczi II, acting in concert with disaffected Moldavian nobles, deposed Vasile Lupu and established Gheorghe Ștefan on the throne. A Ukrainian army led by Tymish went to Lupu’s aid; Tymish and Lupu were defeated by Ștefan and forced to retreat. Tymish regrouped his forces, entered Suceava, and was then besieged there by a Transylvanian-Wallachian-Moldavian army (August-early October). Tymish was mortally wounded and after his death on 17 September the Ukrainians were forced to sign a truce and retreat from Suceava.

In August the negotiations with Muscovy over the terms of an alliance started and continued throughout the autumn. In October, the Muscovite assembly of the land (zemskii sobor) affirmed offering protection to the Ukrainians. On 18 January 1654, a Ukrainian Cossack council swore allegiance to the tsar, but the Muscovite representatives refused to swear an oath in the name of the tsar. For the next two months the Muscovite officials accepted oaths of allegiance from various segment of Ukrainian society. In March, a Cossack delegation to Moscow negotiated the specific terms of the agreement, laying a new foundation for the Cossack Hetmanate and stimulating the evolution of Muscovy into a Russian imperial state.

The Pereiaslav Agreement meant Moscow’s entrance into the struggle with the Commonwealth. In the summer of 1654, a Russian army with Ukrainian reinforcements invaded Belarus and captured Smolensk. In Podillia, Polish and Crimean armies (an alliance had been arrived at in July in response to the Ukrainian agreement with Muscovy) put great pressure on the Cossack armies. The Russians were slow in coming to the Ukrainians’ aid, thereby straining relations. The Poles campaigned actively during the winter of 1654–1655, and while the Ukrainian army with Russian support held off the Tatars and the Poles at Okhmativ (29–30 January 1655), Tatar attacks reached Khmel’nyts’kyi’s capital, Chyhyryn.

The outbreak of the First Northern War (1655–1660) had major consequences for the Ukrainian position. The Swedes invaded the Commonwealth in July 1655 and occupied Warsaw by early September; in October, Charles X declared himself king of Poland. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to all intents and purposes collapsed as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania made its own arrangement with the Swedes and Jan Kazimierz took refuge in Silesia. The Russians and the Ukrainians took advantage of the Commonwealth’s predicament: they
took Vilnius in June, besieged Lviv in September, and defeated the Poles at Horodok in the Ruthenian palatinate on 29 September. The overwhelming Swedish victories, however, alarmed the Russians, and in the late autumn they concluded truce with the Poles. Khmel’nyts’kyi, angered at the Russian betrayal as well as its interference in Ukrainian affairs, started to negotiate with Transylvania and Sweden. In the spring of 1656, Russian-Swedish hostilities broke out with a Russian campaign launched down the Dauvgas toward Riga. This campaign stalled outside of Riga in October, and the Russians were compelled to withdraw.

On 3 November 1656, the Commonwealth and Muscovy signed the Treaty of Vilnius, which called for Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich’s succession to the Commonwealth’s throne in return for Russian aid against the Swedes and mediation with the Cossacks. In the face of Polish-Russian rapprochement, Khmel’nyts’kyi joined Transylvania in an offensive-defensive alliance. Sweden and Brandenburg had already signed an anti-Polish agreement (January 1656, reaffirmed in November). In early December, Sweden and Transylvania joined in an anti-Polish alliance that included the Hetmanate’s participation in the projected partition of the Commonwealth. At the same time, Jan Kazimierz concluded a treaty with the Habsburgs that provided for Imperial aid against Sweden and mediation with Brandenburg, Transylvania, Muscovy, and Ukraine. Rákóczi invaded the Commonwealth in January 1657, but his campaign was troubled from the outset and, having antagonized his Ottoman overlords and deserted by the Swedes, he met with a crushing defeat in July at the hands of the Crimean Tatars. A Cossack force sent to assist him had rebelled against its leadership.

On 6 August 1657, Khmel’nyts’kyi died. His death represented a major crisis for the inchoate polity, above all as to whether Khmel’nyts’kyi’s dream of dynastic succession would prevail, despite his Tymish’s earlier demise, or whether Cossack free elective traditions would win out. His young son Iurii succeeded him as hetman with Ivan Vyhovs’kyi the chancellor as regent. The weak Iurii quickly renounced his office and Vyhovs’kyi received the post of acting hetman and was confirmed at a council at Korsun’ in October. At the Korsun’ council, the struggle between pro-Russian and pro-Polish factions within the Cossack camp came to the fore. Vyhovs’kyi argued for repudiation of the relation with Moscow and for an agreement with the Commonwealth. He was opposed by a group led by Martyn Pushkar and Iakiv Barabash. In October 1657, Vyhovs’kyi concluded a mutual offensive-defensive pact with Sweden, which was approved at a council in February 1658.
This open defiance of the tsar did not at first lead to a clear break since Sweden’s fortunes in Eastern Europe declined before concrete action was taken. After a year of increasing tension, which saw the destruction of Pushkar’s and Barabash’s forces in June and an attack on the Muscovite troops in Kyiv in August, Moscow moved against Vyhovs’kyi.

On 6 September, Vyhovs’kyi concluded the Union of Hadiach with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, a treaty that served to further the dissension among the Cossacks. The main terms of the Hadiach Union were that three palatinates (Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv) were to be reconstituted as a Ruthenian Principality; Vyhovs’kyi was to be “hetman of Rus’,” the Cossack register was to be 30,000; the Union of Brest would be abolished, and Cossack officers were to be ennobled. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was to be reconstituted as a triune federation, in which the Ukrainian lands controlled by the Cossacks were to be an equal member. It did not however grant the western Ukrainian lands requested by Vyhovs’kyi to the Rus’ Principality. Powerful forces in the Commonwealth, including the Catholic Church, opposed the Union of Hadiach. The lower orders in Ukraine saw the Union as an instrument of social reaction. In January, Vyhovs’kyi led his army of Cossacks, Poles and Tatars against the Russians and those Cossacks who allied with them. After several months of indecisive campaigning, the Russians were soundly defeated at Konotop in June. The Russian defeat did not end anti-Vyhovs’kyi and anti-Hadiach sentiment in Ukraine. In late September, a council at Bila Tserkva packed with anti-Vyhovs’kyi forces reelected Iurii Khmel’nycykyi as hetman. Negotiations between the pro- Iurii Khmel’nycykyi Cossacks and Moscow started with regard to renewing the Russian-Ukrainian relationship. On 27 October 1659 a new agreement was reached that limited Ukrainian autonomy more than that of 1654 had. With the renewal of Polish offensives in the following year, the stage was set for a period of international and internal strife that greatly undermined the political and social structure that had taken hold in the large territory in which Khmel’nycykyi’s revolt had succeeded. Eventually it would lead to the division of Ukraine on the Dnipro River. On the Left-Bank and at Zaporizhzhia, where the new order endured, the last chance for creation of an independent or fully autonomous Ukrainian polities was lost in 1709 at the Battle of Poltava. Nevertheless, the Zaporozhian Sich and the Cossack Hetmanate that had emerged from the uprising endured as Ukrainian polities down to the last quarter of the eighteenth century.
Etiology and typology of the Uprising

While the general account of the uprising has been long established, the questions of its origins, character, and significance have been the subject of considerable controversy. As I have argued elsewhere, the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising was one of the most “revolutionary” upheavals in early modern Europe in that it overthrew an existing political, social, and economic order and established a new political-social order with its own “social myth” that endured for over a century on a sizable part of the Ukrainian territory.\(^{10}\) Here I shall only be able to indicate why the uprising in contrast to most early modern revolts had such widespread support and enduring nature. I shall then attempt to locate issues relating to the history of the Jews of Ukraine and the Jewish massacres in the context of this analysis of the uprising.

_Ukraine_, as its name conveyed, was the frontier borderland of the Polish-Lithuanian state. By the mid-seventeenth, the name was used for the Dnipro Basin of the Polish Kingdom, the lands where the forest-steppe and steppe zones, Slavic settlement and Turkic nomads met. It was, to use Bercé’s typology, a classic military borderland.\(^{11}\) War and violence were endemic in this land where nobles’ private wars, Tatar raids, and naval expeditions by frontiersmen across the Black Sea were constant. Its nominal suzerain, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth faced the question of how this territory could be defended and how this periphery could be integrated into that state’s political-social system. In the mid-sixteenth century, the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (federated into the Commonwealth in 1569) had carried on defense largely through use of the services of the various social strata of the borderland, but by the mid-seventeenth century the Kingdom of Poland, which had annexed Lithuania’s Ukrainian lands in 1569, depended more and more on a small standing army and the private armies of magnates (wealthy noble landlords).

In the sixteenth century the government had enlisted the support of the frontiersmen called Cossacks who followed a life of fishing, hunting, and raiding. These frontiersmen had emerged at the interstices of the Turkic steppe and the Slavic world beyond the Rapids of the Dnipro where they organized themselves as military forces based on various forts on islands or Siches. The government could not decide whether to integrate the Cossacks into the military system, a practice usually resorted to in time of major wars, or to reduce the number of Cossacks to an absolute minimum and to control totally the few units permitted in the official registers. This wavering policy had destabilized the Ukrainian frontier from the late sixteenth century and engendered
numerous Cossack revolts. By 1638 the government seemed to resolve the issue by quashing the Cossacks. The decade of the “Golden Peace” that followed was peaceful only if one discounted the armed struggles among the noble-landlords and the increasing violence directed against the restive populace by the magnates and their factota.

At the same time, Ukraine was a land of exponentially increasing population. Increasing security, population growth in the Polish, Belarusian and northern and western Ukrainian lands that provided immigrants, and demand for agricultural and forest products stimulated the greatest population expansion in Europe of the time. The later seventeenth-century phrase “Fecund is the Cossack mother” testified to the demographic boom. Jack Goldstone’s thesis that the single most important explanation of why revolts occur is demographic expansion is borne out by the Ukrainian case. Just as the population exploded, traditional frontier ways of life were being abolished: there would be few sons who could be Cossack warriors in the new order and many who would be enserfed peasants.

In contrast, theories that economic downturns or economic downturns after periods of expansion (J-curve) engender revolts do not apply to Ukraine. While an economic crisis encompassed much of Europe in the 1620s and the sixteenth-century demographic and economic expansion in the western and northern territories of the Commonwealth had begun to sputter, no slowdown occurred in the Ukrainian lands. Some of this expansion resulted from the settlement and cultivation of new lands, a process similar to the one that occurred in Hungary in the eighteenth century. Evaluating economic processes in the Ukrainian lands in general and the Dniпро Basin in particular is difficult because they lay on the fault line of the greater economic zones of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. Lively overland trade was conducted between these territories and Central Europe, and the Dniпро Basin stood across Muscovite trade routes to the Black Sea Basin and the Balkans. This situation made for very different economic interests. For example, the Black Sea trade was particularly important for the Armenian merchants of Lviv, while the raids of the Anatolian coast brought great wealth to the Cossack-frontier population. Those involved in livestock trade from the Ukrainian lands to Central Europe had different interests from those engaged in the grain trade to the Baltic. Internal markets for the expanding population competed for the same products with the external trade.

Although the degree to which grains were exported from the Dniпро Basin to the Vistula Basin and across the Baltic is still debated, the
conversion of the Vistula Basin, including western Ukraine, into a grain-producing and exporting zone had great impact on the economy of the Dnipro Basin.\textsuperscript{15} The economic model of the Polish territories—manorial estates worked by serf labor from which noble landlord had the right to export agricultural products directly—spread eastward in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. As land-hungry nobles sought to assert their claims to land and corvee, economic relations became more explosive in Ukraine. The second serfdom, as this process has been frequently called, was established without organized resistance in the Polish territories. It was less successful in the highland Carpathian territories in western Ukraine, but these were areas unsuitable for manorial economies. In Volhynia and above all in the Ukraine per se, which had long constituted a refuge for run-away peasants, resistance was much greater. Struggling against a violent system that sought to reduce them to an onerous servitude, the non-noble population of the Dnipro Basin and the enserfed peasants farther west could only preserve freedom if this system were destroyed. This situation ensured widespread support of the Cossack revolts of 1625 and the mid 1630s and massive participation in the 1648 revolt. Comparative research on serf and slave revolts should be used to increase our understanding of the events of 1648.

The transformation of society in Ukraine along the Polish model of corporate orders in which almost all rights were reserved to the nobility—the citizens of the Commonwealth—produced social tensions.\textsuperscript{16} The various orders of military servitors of the Lithuanian period were reconstituted along the great divide of nobles and commoners. Boyars and other minor servitors who did not make it into the nobility found themselves at a disadvantage in the new system. The percentage of nobles in the Ukrainian territory was well below the 5–10\% of the Polish territories (far higher in Masovia), making for less support of the dominant order. Inhabitants of towns were granted burgher rights, but the royal cities in the Dnipro Basin did not rival the great cities of Gdańsk, Cracow or the western Ukrainian Lviv. In the cities governed by Magdeburg Law, the Ukrainians usually suffered discrimination as schismatics, though the degree of discrimination was less in the east where Catholic burghers were few. The numerous private towns were hardly more than agricultural settlements, and their inhabitants fell more and under the sway of landlords and their agents who continually increased demands on them, reducing their distinction from the rest of the non-noble population. At the same time, the varied population of non-noble burghers in the frontier area, which included non-registered Cossacks, various military servitors and provisioners of the castles and
peasant populations unaccustomed to labor services were being pressed into a peasant order that was bound to perform labor services. Boyars, Cossacks, burghers and peasants were deprived of the chance of social mobility since they did not belong to the noble nation, but they often possessed wealth and military prowess exceeding that of the petty nobles of other territories of the Commonwealth.

The great princes of the territory, who had long held sway in Volhynia and the Dnipro Basin, were involved in a scramble for lands and offices with immigrants from the Polish territories. Together they formed a small magnate stratum that controlled the economic and political life of Ukraine. In the degree of magnate dominance, the Ukrainian lands were in advance of the core Polish territories. The new economic relations changed the relation of the great men of these lands from warrior lords who led a frontier population into magnates who strove to benefit from the new economy by maintaining an administrative apparatus to extract marketable goods and who maintained private armies to enforce their will. The magnates and their serving people attempted to enforce a new economic and social system on a populace, many of whom were excluded from rights, lands, and freedom in the new order. Magnates also struggled against each other and preyed on lesser noble landlords, but the bond of noble brotherhood and the openness of the magnate stratum to successful middle and even petty nobles limited these tensions. Noble society throughout the Commonwealth was replete with raids and force internally and against other groups of the population, but the violence reached its height in the Ukrainian frontier where war was a way of life and the magnate “kinglets” possessed such overweening power. As the magnates became the agents of change in the life of the frontier population, including reducing the Cossacks in numbers and autonomy, they were dividing the populace into those who gained in the new order and those who lost.

The new socio-economic order was forming just as religious tensions and faultlines exacerbated in the Ukrainian lands. The Ruthenians (Ukrainians and Belarusians) had long been disadvantaged as Orthodox, and members of their elite had converted to Western Christian groups. Although the Reformation had secured an official act of toleration in the Commonwealth, the Reformed churches and their Catholic opponents began to intensify their missions in the Orthodox territories. Their successes alienated more and more of the elite of these territories from the remainder of the population. With the Counter-Reformation ascendant by the late sixteenth century a segment of the Orthodox hierarchy had
A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE UKRAINIAN REVOLT

129
tried to preserve their church by uniting with Rome but preserving their institutions and traditions. As a segment rejected the Union of Brest and found support in many strata of Ukrainian-Belarussian society, including the Cossacks, strife ensued.\textsuperscript{18} The decision of the Polish-Lithuanian government to declare the Orthodox Church illegal from 1596 to 1632 turned many of its faithful, including nobles, to attack the established order. King Władysław IV recognized the Orthodox in order to secure election in 1632 and gain Orthodox support in a war against Muscovy, but this accommodation only partially improved the situation, since neither the Uniate nor Orthodox Church accepted the legitimacy of the other. More importantly, the increasing influence of new Catholic piety on the Commonwealth’s elite undermined any arrangement for non-Catholic Christians and in fact even put the acceptance of Uniatism in question.

The Commonwealth was a political structure with a number of weaknesses. The nobiliary republic could not call on the full loyalty of the commoners. Dedication to noble freedom kept its government minimal and slow moving, curbed the power of its monarch, and prevented the formation of a large standing army. All these weaknesses emerged during the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising. King Władysław’s dissatisfaction with his position prompted him to attempt to provoke a war without the support of the Diet and to include the Cossacks in his conspiracy. The king’s sudden death initiated a lengthy election process in the midst of the revolt. The small standing army was lost at the beginning of the revolt and the Commonwealth had to resort to the outdated levy by the summer of 1648. The need for unanimity made decision making in the Diet so difficult. Eventually the vast state and its noble nation rallied against the rebels and defeated them at Berestechko, but the state did not have the capacity to suppress them fully, particularly since the rebels were able to call in neighbors. The exclusion of non-nobles and indecision in policies had permitted an incipient Cossack republic to be engendered on the borders of the Commonwealth. The dissension of the king and the Commonwealth had allowed the Cossack republic, on the verge of extinction after 1638, to revive.

Without foreign intervention, the uprising would never have progressed as it did. The Zaporozhian Host had taken part in international affairs for a century before the revolt, and the Venetians’ desire to use Cossack naval strength against the Ottomans had stood at the heart of Władysław’s conspiracy. Most importantly, the Crimean Tatars, who would have been endangered if the Commonwealth, including the Cossacks, and Muscovy had combined in a southern war, decided to support
a Cossack-led revolt. The social radicalism of the revolt frightened some neighbors such as Muscovy, while the turmoil in Istanbul long kept the Ottomans from intervening. The rebels’ successes made the Crimean Tatars rethink the alliance since they were creating a dangerous power to their north. Still, whatever their problems in gaining external support, by 1649 the rebels were enmeshed in international diplomacy at a high level.19

The revolt can not be imagined without its leader, the controversial Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. His personal grievance led him to incite the revolt and to take the position of hetman, which he held to his death. A Cossack captain became a major international figure courted by Venice, Sweden and the Empire. During his life he was greeted as “Moses, a deliverer of his people from the Polish servitude” and characterized as a crocodile and the oppressor Khmel’, “who had seven abominations in his heart.”20 Subsequent historians have differed as to his person, vision, and works. Some have seen him as a great leader and statesman, the equal or superior of Oliver Cromwell or William of Orange. Others have viewed him as a Batu or Tamerlane who brought only destruction. Still, all commentators realize that Khmel’nyts’kyi was the central figure in the uprising, who managed to keep the movement vital and under his control for a decade.

For subsequent generations, the uprising was seen as a national war of the Ukrainians and Poles. Historians have frequently pointed to the social nature of the conflict and have demonstrated that the national identity and nationalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did not exist in the seventeenth. Projecting modern national identities into the conflict leads at times to paradoxical historical myths. The great Polish hero Jeremi Wiśniowiecki was born the Orthodox prince Iarema Vyshvets’kyi, scion of an ancient Ukrainian family, cousin of the Orthodox metropolitan Petro Mohyla.21 It is true that after his conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1631, the Ukrainian chronicles portrayed him as a renegade “who from Ruthenian roots became a Pole.” Still it is difficult to see him as a “Pole” while Adam Kysil’, who flirted with Uniatism but did not convert but who also sided with the Commonwealth, is usually seen as a “Ukrainian” (though a Cossack captain hurled the abuse – “You Kysil, your bones have been overgrown with Polish meat”).22 Yet despite the complex nature of ethnic origins, religious affiliation, cultural characteristics, and national identities on both sides of the struggle, the war did take on the general character as a conflict between “Rus’ and Liakhs” and national or proto-national sentiments and descriptions were common.23 In the long
run the war redirected Polish-Ukrainian relations, above all by creating a new Ukrainian polity, elite, and culture outside the Commonwealth.24

The degree to which Khmel’nyts’kyi sought to create a state is debated, as is whether the Cossack Hetmanate of his time was a state.25 While not independent states, the Cossack Hetmanate and Zaporozhian Sich of the eighteenth century created many of the political, social, and cultural achievements that served as the basis for modern Ukrainian culture and identity. Those entities traced their origin and political culture to the great revolt of 1648.

In the debates on whether the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising was a revolution, one of the major questions posed is whether the rebels had an ideology of change.26 In general, the rebels sought to preserve Ukraine from the changes that had occurred in the two generations before the revolt. Their demands were couched in the return to ancient privileges (albeit often fictitious) that had been abrogated. But like many movements against change that seem to “renovate” the past, the uprising led to innovation in theory and practice.

The Jewish massacres in the context of the Uprising

Just as the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising has been intensively studied, the position of the Jews in Ukraine and their fate during the uprising have long been established.27 Despite the considerable scholarship, the available sources do always provide us with sufficient evidence on questions such as the extent and nature of Jewish leaseholding, the motivations of those who attacked the Jews, above all the role of religion, and the numbers of deaths and converts. In general, we can hope that the new opening of archives in the former Soviet Union, the growth of Jewish studies in Poland, and the new freedom to carry on research on this period in Ukraine may provide us with new sources and answers. Still the limited knowledge of Hebrew and Yiddish and Jewish religious and intellectual community life among specialists of Ukrainian and Polish history and the limited number of scholars in Israel who work on topics of Ukrainian and Polish history outside the context of Jewish studies hinder development in the field.28

As scholars such as Salo Baron have pointed out, the Ukrainian frontier was a new, exhilarating and ultimately dangerous experience for the Jews who migrated there.29 The Jews changed the nature of the frontier by bringing their talents to its settlement and economy and the frontier changed the Jews by placing them in new contacts with their neighbors. As they moved into this land of violent conflicts,
they undertook new positions by bearing arms and administering the
new socio-economic order, even including the right of life or death over
subjects. Regrettably, sources for the most important part of this expe-
rience, the Dnipro Basin in the two decades before the revolt, have not
come down to us because it was in these territories that the revolt de-
stroyed the records of the old order. This limitation makes difficult the
discussion of the essential question of social relations between Cossacks
and other strata of the population near the starosta districts.

The demographic boom also affected the Jewish community, pro-
pelling eastward migration that even resumed after the massacres.
In general, the rapid demographic growth and the paucity of statist-
ics make for considerable problems in estimating populations, propor-
tions, and losses. Fortunately, the demographic work of Shmuel Ettinger
and Maury cy Horn and the source analysis of Bernard Weinryb have
improved our ability to make estimates.30

The slowing of the economy in the core Polish territories in the
1620s and the continued growth in the Ukrainian lands only inten-
sified migration. If for many of the younger generation of the frontier
population before 1648, the socio-economic changes were limiting the
number who could continue their way of life or find positions other than
as serfs in the new order, for the rapidly expanding Jewish population
the new order offered numerous opportunities. Traditionally, Jews in
this region had played a significant role in the long-distance Black Sea
trade along with Armenians and Greeks and in commercial affairs. In
the late sixteenth century, their involvement in the new economic order
drew them into a system related to the Baltic Sea grain trade. Some
scholars, such as Omeljan Pritsak, have posited that economic competi-
tion of Jews, Greeks, and Armenians should be explored in the revolt,
especially given the importance of Greek hierarchs in Ukraine from
1648 on. Although the importance of this competition in shaping the
revolt is merely a hypothesis, the significance of Jewish involvement in
commerce, leaseholding, tax collecting, and handicrafts in the magnate
economic order on the land and in private towns intensified antagonisms
with the populace, including with Christian burghers. The question
to be posed is not whether the new order was productive and de-
veloped the economy, but in whose interest that development occurred.
Whether Ukraine could have developed economically without the sec-
ond serfdom may be debated, but that Jews played a significant role in
the magnate-noble order that was imposing it on a restive population
is certain.
In the new society of estates being established in Ukraine, Jews functioned as a corporate order. Whether they were powerful leaseholders or petty craftsmen, they were linked as a group to a declining royal power and more directly to the magnate landowning order. Within their own “order” they had social mobility, and they were perceived as a group supporting that order. Marxist historians such as Borovoi went to great efforts to demonstrate a link between the Jewish masses and the rebels. While Borovoi did so as part of an attack on Jewish “nationalist” historiography, his analysis can be criticized solely in economic terms, without having to deal with the obvious issues of Jewish religious identity and Christian Judaeophobia.

Many of the debates among historians on the Jewish massacres have centered on the degree to which socio-economic or Christian Judaeophobic causes played a role. Similar differences in emphasis exist in discussions of the pogroms in the Russian Empire. The multiplicity of Christian confessions in the conflict in seventeenth-century Ukraine and the dominance of anti-Catholic and even anti-Protestant statements in the religious tracts prior to the revolt and in the statements of the rebels make evaluation of Orthodox Judaeophobia in the revolt difficult to judge. Comparative studies on discussions of Jews and other religious groups in the Orthodox polemical literature or on the significance of conversion during the uprising would assist in studying this question. Internal and external, especially Greek, Arabic and Russian, sources of Orthodox Judaeophobic sentiment would have to be examined. Certainly the accusation by the Orthodox that the Catholic Poles gave freedom to the Jews that they denied to the Orthodox was one of their most potent arguments to delegitimize the Polish regime, in particular given the strong Judaeophobic nature of post-Tridentine Catholicism that was becoming dominant in the Commonwealth.

In contrast to the Cossacks who had hopes that they could restore their position by siding with the king against the magnates, the Jews sought protection from both king and magnates. Just as they fit in the structure of the magnate economy, they also found a place in the political structure in which royal power declined and magnate influence over the institutions of the nobility increased. The Jewish tradition of glorifying Wiśniowiecki, the symbol of religious-national treason and cruelty in the Ukrainian tradition, reflected the practical power of the magnate in Ukraine in 1648. Wiśniowiecki represented the magnate faction that sought to destroy the rebellion and its perpetrators, in contrast to the king who at least considered an accommodation. In the long run the Jewish and Polish traditions that cast Wiśniowiecki
as a hero like the Ukrainian cult of Khmel’nyts’kyi made attacks and defenses of idealized leaders take on great importance in all discussions of the uprising. But if some magnate and court circles in 1648, like some later Polish scholars, argued that Wiśniowiecki’s policies had been deleterious to the Polish state, the magnate faced no such criticism in seventeenth-century Jewish sources that cast him in the role of the protector for whom the Jewish community so ardently longed.

If Wiśniowiecki, the king, and the Polish nobility were usually portrayed positively, it is the “Greeks” (the Orthodox Ruthenians) and the Cossacks who are depicted as the enemy in the Jewish chronicles. The use of the religious designation is one more demonstration of the importance of religious markers in defining the communities of Eastern Europe. It is the equivalent of the Polish sources use of Rus’ or Ruthenians. In their own way, the Jewish sources indicate the socio-cultural-national aspect of the uprising that was to give it such resonance in the early modern period as the root of the distinction between the nobles’ Polish Commonwealth and the Cossack Ukrainian Hetmanate and in the period of modern nationalism between the Polish and Ukrainian national movements.

One could not expect the terrified Jewish community of the mid-seventeenth century to analyze the negative role of the magnates in the Polish state or Ukraine or to reconsider their position in the socio-economic structure. If their primary reaction to the revolt and the massacres was to explain the events in terms of their God and their relation with Him, their primary practical reaction was to strengthen their relation with the king and the magnates and to continue to restore their community and way of life before the revolt. This group that was an essential component of socio-economic change in Ukraine was in itself conservative not only in its worldview but also in adhering to the magnate order and the structures of the Commonwealth. Subsequent historians and commentators have seen the massacres as of epochal significance for Jewish history. In addition to the demographic losses, frequently given in hundreds of thousands, they have seen the uprising as ending the eastward movement of Jewish migration and leading to the formation of central and west European Jewish communities. They have linked the massacres to movements such as that of Sabbatai Levi and Hassidism. They have also seen them as the beginning of danger and insecurity that prefigured the nineteenth and early twentieth-century pogroms and even the Holocaust. In some way they have seen the massacres as proof that Jews could not live in eastern Europe and thereby stimulating Zionism. Many of these
hypotheses and links have been questioned by recent scholars who have estimated the victims as many times fewer and have argued that the uprising’s long range impact on Jewish life in the lands that remained in the Commonwealth and on any Jewish worldview appears not to have been as fundamental as many earlier writings have characterized it.\textsuperscript{35}

One cannot understand the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising without examining the Jewish massacres, just as one cannot understand the massacres outside of the context of the uprising. A more careful examination of the works of scholars in Jewish and Ukrainian history should assist the scholars in the two fields to understand the very different perspectives on the seventeenth-century events, the uprising, and the person of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi that have emerged in the two fields.

Notes

4. Vol. 1 \textit{Bohdan Chmielnicki do elekcyi Jana Kazimierza} (Lviv, 1906) and vol. 2 \textit{Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana Kazimierza do śmiertci} (Lviv, 1909).
7. The best account of the age is I. P. Kryp’iakievych, \textit{Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi} (Kyiv, 1954), though it was marred by the demands of Soviet censors. Fortunately Kryp’iakievych’s son, Roman, kept the original text and it was published in 1990 with an enlightening introduction on the practices of Ukrainian scholarly publishing by Iaroslav Isaevych. I. P. Kryp’iakievych, \textit{Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi} 2nd corrected and enlarged edition (Lviv, 1990). In addition to the general histories of Ukraine and Poland, the English reader can turn to Hrushevsky, \textit{History of Ukraine-Rus’}, vol. 8 (vol. 9, pt. 1 will be the next volume to appear in the Hrushevsky Translation Project), G. Vernadsky, \textit{Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine} (New Haven, 1941) and F. Syssyn. \textit{Between Poland and Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil}, 1600–1653 (Cambridge, MA., 1985). Of the newer literature, see


9. Dates are given in Gregorian or New Style.


12. There is considerably debate on the Ukrainian population in the early sixteenth century, above all the degree of depopulation of central Ukraine, and on the aggregate number in the seventeenth century, but all authors see a rapid tempo of growth. See O. S. Kompan, “Do pytannia pro zaselenist’ Ukraїnі v XVII st.,” *Ukraїns’kyi istorichnyi zhurnal* 1 (1960), 65–77 and Z. Guldon “Badania nad zaludnieniem Ukrainy w XVII wieku,” *Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej* 13 (1965), 561–566.


15. For a summary of the discussion on Ukrainian participation in the Baltic grain trade, see Z. Guldon, “W kwestii udziału Ukraiiny w handlu zbożowym z Gdańskiem w II połowie XVI i I połowie XVII,” *Zapiski Historyczne* 30 (1965), 67–73.

16. For literature on the social changes in mid-seventeenth century Ukraine, see F. Sysyn, “Ukrainian Social Tensions before the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising,” in S. Baron and N. Shields Kollman, *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine*, (Dekalb, 1997), 52–70.
17. On religious and cultural affairs, see I. Ševčenko, Ukraine between East and West (Edmonton-Toronto, 1996), which contains bibliographies with emphasis on English-language literature to each essay.

18. For the most recent treatment of the Union of Brest, see B. Gudziak, Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest (Cambridge, MA., 1998).

19. See V. Holobuts’kyi (Golubutskii), Diplomaticheskaia istoriia osvoboditel’noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 g.g. (Kyiv, 1962) and Ia. Fedoruk, Zovnishn’opolitychna dial’nist’ Bohdana Khmel’nyts’koho i formuvannia ioho politychnoi prohramy (1648–serpen’ 1649 rr.) (Lviv, 1993).


21. For the vision of Wisniowiecki in the Polish and Ukrainian traditions, see M. Korduba, “Jeremias Wisniowiecki im Lichte der neuen Forschung,” Zeitschrift für osteuropäische Geschichte 8 (1934), 221–238, a review of W. Tomkiewicz, Jeremi Wisniowiecki (1612–1651) (Warsaw, 1934), which remains the best biography of the magnate.

22. F. Sysyn, Between Poland and the Ukraine, 165, 166.


26. The thesis by Stephen Velychenko, “The Influence of Historical, Political, and Social Ideas of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi and the Cossack Officers between 1648 and 1657” (London School of Economics, 1980), remains unpublished. The topic of political thought has received renewed attention in recent years in Ukraine, especially by Valerii Stepanov and Iurii Mytsyk.

27. For bibliography on the topic, see M. Balaban, comp. Bibliografia historii Żydów w Polsce i w krajach ościennych za lata 1900–1930 (Warsaw, 1939); G. Hundert
and G. Bacon, The Jews in Poland and Russia: Bibliographic Essays (Bloomington, 1984); Sistematicheskii ukazatel' literatury o evreakh (1708–1889) (St. Petersburg, 1892); J. Raba, Between Remembrance and Denial: The Fate of the Jews in the Wars of the Polish Commonwealth during the Mid-Seventeenth Century as Shown in Contemporary Writings and Historical Research (Boulder, CO., 1995) and my review “The Jewish Massacres in the Historiography of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising: A Review Article,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 23 (Summer 1998), no. 1, 83–89. For additional literature, see the notes in the articles by J. Pelenski, “The Cossack Insurrections in Jewish Ukrainian Relations” (31–42) and F. Sysyn, “The Jewish Factor in the Khmelnytsky Uprising” (43–54) in the book, H. Aster and P. Potichnyi, ed., Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective, 2nd ed. (Edmonton, 1990), the introduction to J. Schatzky et al., Gzeires takh (Vilnius, 1938), and S. Borovoi, “Natsional'no-osvoboditel'naia voina ukrainskogo naroda protiv pol'skogo vladychestva i evreiskoe naselenie Ukrainy,” Istoricheskie zapiski 9 (1940), 81, 82, 102.


31. S. Borovoi, “Natsional’no-osvoboditel’naia voina ukrainskogo naroda,” 81, 82, 102. The article is reprinted with other articles in Evreiskie khroniki XVII stoletiia.


34. For an example of an assessment of the impact of the Jewish massacres as epochal, see the foreword by William B. Helmreich for the 1983 edition of Hanover, xi–xv. In comparing the massacres to the Holocaust, Helmreich called them a holocaust similar in kind. His foreword is a good example of changing attitudes in Jewish historiography toward the events of 1648–1649 and Ukrainians after World War II. It goes as far as to insist “no historical documents have ever been presented in support of the idea that Jews exploited the peasants.” xi. In the notes to his introduction for the 1950 edition, Mesch cites a source giving 100,000 victims as too low and cites a Hebrew chronicle’s figure of “766,000???” uncritically. See Stampfer’s essay in this volume.

35. See Weinryb, “The Hebrew Chronicles” and The Jews of Poland. On the relatively limited nature of migration outside the Commonwealth in 1648–1649, in contrast to that after the Muscovite and Swedish invasions, see M. A. Shulvass, From East to West: The Westward Migration of Jews from Eastern Europe during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Detroit, 1971), 25–50. Shulvass found most of the migrants came from western Poland and the work does not negate the continued migration to the east.